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  Over the last two decades public service broadcasting (PSB) around the world has 
faced increasing pressures from accelerating commercialisation and the fragmentation 
of the broadcasting landscape. This has led a number of media commentators in the 
system’s traditional heartlands to ask whether the idea has now outlived its usefulness. 
Against the grain of this international trend, Taiwan has moved in the opposite 
direction, democratising its state-owned television system and introducing a form of 
public broadcasting for the first time. Against the grain of growing enthusiasm for a 
privatised solution supporters presented PSB as a necessary counter to the perceived 
deficiencies of the existing system, in serving a society moving from authoritarian to 
competitive party rule.  
  This study sets out to explore how the expansion of PSB in Taiwan has been socially 
defined and constructed, and by whom. The various constructions in play were 
mapped through in-depth interviews with a range of claim-makers involved in the 
process. A systematic content analysis of the mainstream Taiwanese press was then 
conducted to explore the ways contending positions and issues were presented in the 
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public domain and to identify the key voices given a public platform.  
  This analysis demonstrated that the opinions and concerns of the general public 
were largely missing from a debate dominated by political and academic elites. Against 
the grain of their own claims to be representing the public key actors constructed 
public debate as a series of monologues, advancing their own sectional and 
paternalistic interpretations of the public interest. 
  These findings point to the supremely ironic conclusion that a process ostensibly 
dedicated to reconstructing broadcasting as key element in a new, democratic, public 
sphere, excluded the public from active participation and relegated them to the role of 
spectators.  
 
 
Keywords: PSB (Public Service Broadcasting), Political Struggle, Mediated Debate, 
Taiwan, Content Analysis, In-depth Interview.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Mar 2011, a devastating earthquake struck Japan and then caused a 
massive tsunami and a nuclear power-plant’s meltdown. The disasters 
immediately attracted intense media attention across the world, including in one 
of Japan’s closest neighbours, Taiwan.  
While media outlets across the globe resonated with the deadly earthquake 
and its aftermath, the dramatic ways the Taiwanese media represented the 
disasters soon triggered a series of criticisms about unnecessary doses of 
sensational and panicking exaggerations. For instance, the word ‘doomsday’ 
flashed across the headlines; ‘flee’ was used in screaming headlines, instead of 
a neutral word ‘evacuate’, to describe how Japanese moved out from the 
damaged areas (Taipei Times, 13/03/2011, p. 8). Another example was a 
rumour that a Japanese pornography actress might be caught in the tsunami 
which became a prominent breaking news item (Je, Apple Daily, 16/03/2011, p. 
A23). Other dramatic features included the mix editing of actuality footage with 
devastating scenes from Hollywood films, and frantic voiceovers from reporters 
and news anchors. Critics complained that the media frenzy brought ‘nothing 
but unnecessary agitation to viewers’ (Taipei Times, 14/03/2011, p. 8).  
Since the channel of Japan’s public service broadcaster, NHK, is also 
accessible in Taiwan’s television system, in comparison with local media, many 
viewers soon discovered that NHK projected a much less sensational coverage 
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of these disasters and provided more useful information to help viewers’ to a 
better understanding of the crisis. As one press editorial pointed out, in contrast 
to the professional performance of NHK, ‘the screaming catastrophic disaster 
show’ orchestrated by Taiwan's media gains themselves sneers (United 
Evening News, 17/03/2011, p. A2). Another editorial noted that ‘we surely have 
a thing or two to learn from Japan when NHK provided better quality to serve 
their audience and to gain the respect the media deserves as the fourth estate’ 
(Taipei Times, 14/03/2011, p. 8). Similar sentiments from the general public 
were also published in the section of letters to editor. For example, ‘Even 
though I speak no Japanese, I prefer watching NHK rather than Taiwan’s local 
media’ (Hong, Liberty Times, 13/03/2011, p. A15; Young, United Daily News, 
16/03/2011, p. A15). 
1.1 System Failure of Media Representation 
Surely it is debatable whether NHK’s close ties to the Japanese government 
may have prevented it from revealing certain inconvenient truths in relation to 
the disaster (Huang, 2011). However, the specific criticisms of the performance 
of Taiwan’s media were not new at all. Again, this incident raised alarm-bells 
and exposed the old problems in Taiwan’s media environment where audience 
ratings are the predominant concern. It not only exposed the way 
commercialisation has trivialised and sensationalised media content, but also 
the extent to which commercial pressures have shaped a television system 
driven by viewer ratings and the power of advertisers. Under pressures from 
uncertainty of funding as audiences and advertising fragments, the system 
relegates fundamental principles of media professionalism a long way behind 
commercial considerations and consumers’ choices. By doing so, it fails to 
address public affairs and the full range of issues of contemporary society.  
To address the consequences of media commercialisation, mirrored again by 
the Japan earthquake, some media professionals pointed to the potential 
capacity of the fledgling (Public Service Broadcasting) PSB system in Taiwan 
but also indicated the challenges preventing PSB from providing a corrective 
influence in the media landscape. Drawing comparisons with the BBC in the UK 
and NHK in Japan, a veteran journalist He Rong-xing raised the key question of 
whether Taiwan’s PSB could raise its standard to match NHK's. He argued that 
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‘the main reason why the PSB group in Taiwan have no power to balance the 
twisted commercial market is mainly because of the lack of a long-term and 
deliberate media policy’ (He, China Times, 16/3/2011, p. A15). Echoing this 
view, He Guo-hua, a public broadcaster and the manager in the News division, 
indicated that ‘different extents of financial supports to the two public service 
broadcasters in Japan and Taiwan led to different results in their influences (He, 
Apple Daily, 17/3/2011: A23). Both these views underline the political and 
economic difficulties facing PSB and its uncertain future in Taiwan. 
The introduction of PSB in Taiwan dates back to 1998 when the Public 
Television Station (PTS), a free-to air television station, was established. Its 
finance mainly relied on government subsidies. Unlike many Western contexts, 
where established PSB services have declined due to the impact of market 
forces, the plan to introduce a similar service in Taiwan was motivated by a 
wish to ameliorate the effects of ‘overwhelming market forces’. The birth of 
Taiwan’s PSB can therefore be viewed as a birth pushed by ‘the concern over 
overwhelming market forces (Chin, 1997, p. 90)’.  
Charged with a mission to introduce quality television programming, the 
Public Television Station (PTS) never managed to achieve more than a minority 
audience in the highly commercialized media landscape and it was clear that 
‘the private media will continue to dominate’ (Chin, 1997, p. 91). In 2006, a PSB 
expansion project led to a merger of PTS with another national terrestrial 
television station and three other television channels to establish an umbrella 
broadcasting organisation named the Taiwan Broadcasting System (TBS).  
As was observed above, it can be easily argued that the introduction of PSB 
was motivated by a desire to alleviate the symptoms of the overwhelming 
commercialism in Taiwan’s media landscape, one of key reasons why PSB is 
defended in other countries around the world. However, in Taiwan’s social 
context, to explain the inception of the PSB solely in terms of concerns over 
commercialism represents only half of the picture. The challenges facing 
Taiwan’s young PSB must also be understood in Taiwan’s political context 
which situates it in an uncharacteristic PSB position. It is to these matters that 
the discussion now turns.  
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1.2 Media Reform in a Blue-Green Political Divide 
Taiwan’s rapid industrialization during the 1960s and 1970s, combined with the 
democratic revolution that began with the lifting of martial law in 1987, were of 
deep historical importance to this transitional society. In the following decade 
Taiwan’s ‘political miracle’ matched the earlier ‘economic miracle’ by creating a 
vibrant liberal democracy completing with competitive multi-party elections.  
The establishment of PTS and the subsequent expansion to the TBS system 
can therefore also be seen as one of the achievements that marked the 
emergence of a democratic society, a conclusion reinforced by the fact that  
PSB expansion coincided with an unprecedented period of political transition 
with the electoral defeat in 2000 of the Kuomintang (KMT) party, which had 
ruled Taiwan since the end of World war II, and its replacement in government 
by the main opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).  
During the KMT’s long tenure in power, despite the commercialization of the 
media market, national terrestrial television stations were still controlled 
predominantly by the KMT party-state. The DPP strongly protested this KMT 
control, as did many media academics, commentators, and social activists. The 
huge change in the political climate created by the DPP’s electoral victory in 
2000 ignited ‘a new hope for social activists and media academics to free 
state-run television’ from political control and establish a system that was closer 
to the model of ‘relative autonomy’ that characterised public service 
broadcasting elsewhere (Feng et al, 2002). 
The significance of this dispute about the degree of state control of 
broadcasting was also rooted in the profound differences in both political 
parties’ vision of the future and autonomy of the Taiwanese nation. This conflict 
was between one side supporting eventual reunification with China and the 
other one envisaging Taiwanese independence from the mainland China. 
In order to fully understand the PSB expansion in Taiwan, this antagonistic 
and polarised political divide needs to be considered. The political divide is a 
spectrum between ‘reunification with China’ and ‘Taiwan independence’. On the 
pro-Taiwan Independence side the political coalition led by the DPP came to be 
known as ‘Green’ force because this is the predominant colour of the DPP flag 
while the pro-Chinese Reunification side, led by the KMT, came to be referred 
to as the ‘Blue’ force due to the political colours of the party.  
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This ‘Blue-Green divide’ has been identified as one of the most salient issues 
in Taiwan's politics (Hughes, 2011; Fell, 2011; Rigger, 2011). As Fell observes 
severe polarisation around this central issue occurred during the second half of 
the 2000s and ‘paralysed the polity over important issues (Fell, 2011, p. 93)’.  
On the issue of the democratisation of terrestrial television, a number of 
ideas had been put forward during the KMT’s tenure in power suggesting 
possible ways that national television could be improved, but most of them 
were ignored by then KMT government. Following ‘the new hope to free 
state-run television’ from political influence ignited by the 2000 political change, 
two of the most popular proposals in the pursuit of the democratisation of 
terrestrial televisions resurfaced. The first, which was very much in line with the 
general shift in economic policy away from the previous heavy reliance on state 
management and toward a more market driven system, advocated privatising 
the state-owned television channels. This proposal was strongly supported by 
the KMT which had just lost its power. The alternative, which went against the 
grain of the market-led thinking, proposed transforming the state-owned 
television asset into a new, extended, public service broadcasting system. This 
solution, which was endorsed by numerous media academics and social 
activists, had one of the promises made by the DPP in their election campaign. 
After a period of debate and political struggle which will be examined in detail in 
subsequent chapters, this option outran the privatisation plan and became the 
preferred policy. In this proposal, the key concept, in mandarin Chinese, is 
named ‘Gong Gong Hua’ (公共化). This term ‘Gong Gong Hua’ conceptually 
means a transformation of the state-owned terrestrial televisions to a 
corporation in the public sector under the authority of the state. Specifically, this 
entails all political parties, the state, and the military relinquishing all control 
over terrestrial television and ceding its administration and operation to an 
independent corporation in the public sector. This proposal was seen by its 
advocates as a way of creating space within the broadcasting landscape for a 
greater degree of freedom and independence in the pursuit of the ideals of 
public service. In contrast with the privatisation plan, the ‘Gong Gong Hua’ 
transformation also frees the television channels from commercial pressures by 
providing government financial support.    
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1.3 Controversial PSB debate in Taiwan 
During the KMT’s three decade long rule before 2000, the KMT party-state’s 
actions had the effect of uniting the various and diverse groups standing on the 
opposite site, including the main opposition party DPP and many social 
movement camps from different corners. After the DPP defeated the KMT and 
began to operate government for the first time, the redistribution of power soon 
became a problem. In the process of power restructuring, idealists often 
became the victims of realpolitik. The ‘Gong Gong Hua’ proposal is one 
example. As the DPP government’s resolve to implement PSB expansion in this 
form dwindled, so did the chances of a healthy configuration of the PSB 
establishment. In 2002, media academics who strongly endorsed the ‘Gong 
Gong Hua’ held a furious protest to protest the DPP government’s tardiness in 
implementing its promise. This conflict inside the ranks of the former alliance 
between the DPP and social activists attracted a lot of media attention, such as 
‘Media scholars who offer endorsement for DPP now face ordeal (China Times, 
24/9/2002, p. 13)’, ‘Media academics say goodbye to DPP President’ (United 
Daily News, 11/10/2002, p.4), ‘Scholars declare a return to social movements 
(China Times, 11/10/2002, p. 6)’.   
Informed by different mixtures of partisan interests, commercial profits, or 
conceptions of the public good, interpretations of ‘Gong Gong Hua’ varied 
according to the positions the key players occupied in the debate. The 
divergent versions of ‘Gong Gong Hua’ held by government, political actors, 
social activists and media academics soon led to many disagreements, 
especially when it came to concrete practice and policy implementation.  
At the beginning of 2006, debates over the ‘Gong Gong Hua’ entered a new 
chapter when the passage of ‘the statute regarding the disposition of 
government shareholdings in the terrestrial television’ established the 
institutional form that PSB expansion would take. The proposal was to merge 
the existing PTS with one other state-owned terrestrial television channel CTS 
(Chinese Television System), together with two ethnic and one overseas 
channels fund by government.  
This new consolidated TBS grouping held out the prospect of a public service 
system with sufficient critical mass to make a noticeable countervailing 
difference to the competitive media landscape. The increasing power and 
 7 
potential social influence of TBS however inevitably made it a political target 
and prompted partisan competition over the leadership of this new 
broadcasting group.  
Throughout the various phases of the development of PSB policy, from 
inception, to implementation and concrete experience, decisions made behind 
closed doors by key players had periodically caught press attention. In 2004, a 
controversial appointment fuelled disillusion with the DDP government among 
PSB advocates. Hsia Chiang, an actress famous for her ties with the DPP and 
her close friendship with the (then) president’s family, was appointed as CEO of 
CTS by the DPP government. The appointment was widely viewed as a return 
to the familiar KMT tactic of exercising control by gerrymandering key 
appointments in media. Chiang’s appointment kicked up quite a stir in media 
circles because it was believed to be motivated by partisan political expedience 
rather than being a decision based on proven ability to do the job (Taipei Times, 
25/06/2004, p 2). One of the reasons this appointment proved so controversial 
was that Chiang had stated that she would ban soap operas imported from 
China. This could have been interpreted as a move designed to provide more 
opportunities for local production but it was widely taken as evidence of her 
strong allegiance to the stance of the DPP on Taiwanese independence. Some 
critics claimed that the DPP government had not been slow to learn tricks from 
the KMT in using state financed broadcasting as a means of furthering its own 
political objectives. For instance, ‘DPP’s media manipulation even worse than 
the old KMT’ (United Daily News, 12/07/2004, p. 4).  
In 2008 the political struggle inside the TBS group reached a new peak when 
the KMT recaptured the presidency. Soon after returning to power, the KMT 
legislative caucus, Lin Yi-shih, first froze the budget for PTS, and then came up 
with a proposal that all programme budgets should be reviewed and approved 
in advance by the regulator, the Government Information Office (GIO) , in order 
to avoid unnecessary waste of public money (Taipei Times, 13/12/2008, p. 3). 
Critics claimed that these actions were aimed at using the budget reviews to 
threaten the independence of the PSB, and attracted headlines such as 
‘Auditing or intervening? (Liberty Times, 20/12/2008, p. 4)’. Media scholars 
asserted that these changes would soon ‘destroy the PSB’s core value of being 
independent from any kind of political interference (Tang & Jian, 2008, p. 8)’.   
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  The KMT legislative caucus, Lin Yi-shih, also suggested increasing the 
number of directors on the board of the PSB group, which was a move that 
soon invited a huge amount of criticism, expressed in headlines such as ‘Do 
parties, state, and military really withdraw their control from the media?’ (China 
Times, 14/12/2008, p. 11), ‘Media Scholars moan Death of Democracy’ (Liberty 
Times, 19/12/2008, p. 2).  
Despite this vocal opposition an amendment was quickly passed by the KMT 
dominated legislature in 2009 to install eight extra directors on the TBS board. 
A renowned political critic, Lin Cho-shui, fired a warning shot in a letter 
published in the Liberty Times in which he wrote: ‘President Ma's Army invades 
the TBS at stormy night (Lin, 23/8/2009, p. A15)’. 
After the arrival of the new directors, the board soon split into rival factions 
over the issue of the chairmanship. The acting chairman Cheng Tung-liao and 
a director on the other side, Chen Shih-min, both wrote letters to mainstream 
newspapers to justify their actions and invite public support. The power struggle 
reached another new peak when the directors on both sides filed lawsuits to 
prevent each other from exercising the right to execute in the boardroom. The 
lawsuit fight paralysed the board since its consequence was that ‘only five out 
of the 21 directors left in the board can legally execute their positions’ (Taipei 
Times, 28/04/2010, p. 3). Subsequently, the Chairman Tung-liao Cheng and the 
CEO Hsien-hsien Feng, who had been accused of being ‘loyal DPP warriors’ by 
the KMT (United Daily News, 19/12/2008, p.10), were edged out and stepped 
down in a reshuffle of personnel.  
Although these accelerating conflicts exposed the continuing undercurrent of 
political struggle behind the closed doors of the boardroom, the debates and 
disputes surrounding the PSB group appeared in the media only fragmentally 
and scattered overtime. As a consequence, it was hard for the general public to 
piece together what was really happening in the process of PSB expansion, 
especially when different mainstream newspapers, with their attendant political 
biases, produced polarised interpretations of the same incidents and offered 
different versions of the same events. 
The lack of public engagement in the PSB system was one of concerns 
voiced by a former CEO of the PTS and TBS, Hu Yuan-Hui (2007, p. 207) when 
he discussed the challenges facing Taiwan’s PSB. From his experience of 
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being the BBC’s Director-General, Mark Thompson, has argued that PSB has 
to be a ‘conscious civic choice and that ‘any country that wants to develop a 
PSB tradition needs to begin to think about how to develop ‘widespread public 
support’ (Thompson, 2006, p.4). It was precisely, the level of public debate 
necessary to foster public support that was conspicuously absent in Taiwan. 
Starting from the tension between ‘rich media, poor democracy’ highlighted in 
Robert McChesney’s resonant phrase (McChesney, 2000), this thesis 
examines how competing views of PSB, and the policy making process that led 
to its eventual institutionalisation, have been constructed in mediated debates  
in this very young democracy. This thesis examines the Taiwanese case as an 
instance of the triangular interactions between market, state and civil society 
drawing particularly on the critical political economy perspective on inquiry and 
conceptualisation. Murdock & Golding (2000) note that critical political economy 
differs from mainstream economics in four main respects. It is: ‘holistic’, 
‘historical’, centrally concerned with ‘the balance between capitalist enterprise 
and public intervention’, and most importantly, goes beyond technical issues of 
efficiency to engage with ‘basic moral questions of justice, equity and public 
good’ (Murdock & Golding, 2000, p. 61). Work within this tradition has paid 
particular attention to the shifting relations between states and markets in 
structuring the operating environment for media in democratic societies. 
Furthermore, this perspective focuses on the limitations of commercial media in 
providing full resources for citizenship, and the role of government in 
addressing ‘market failures’ through regulation and financial support for public 
communications initiatives. In recent years the balance struck in the post war 
period has been substantially tipped in favour of private enterprise by the 
processes of marketisation. In this light, Taiwan’s case, pushing against this 
grain of marketization, offers an important example of the tensions around this 
process. 
This thesis firstly questions the widely held belief that the commercialisation 
of the media necessarily leads to democratization, that ‘free’ markets foster free 
expression, adopts a political economy approach to examine the reasons for 
the emergence of PSB in an over-commercialised media landscape, and 
details the debates surrounding the formation of policy around PSB’s  
institutionalisation paying particular attention to how PSB expansion has been 
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social defined, and by whom.  
1.4 A Sequenced Overview of Thesis Structure  
This thesis is composed of 9 chapters. Following this introductory chapter, the 
second chapter contextualises this present study within general debates 
around the contested concept of public service broadcasting and its relation to 
ideals of the public sphere and outlines several conceptual and practical PSB 
models around the world that inform this study.  
  The third chapter details the contextual background to the research 
presented here emphasising that Taiwan is a transitional society politically, 
economically and culturally, and explores the extent to which the 
commercialised media system can be said to have failed to provide the cultural 
resources required for informed and engaged citizenship in an emerging 
democratic polity.   
  The fourth chapter traces the history of Taiwanese PSB and the main issues 
that have attended different phases of its development and then outlines the 
central research questions tackled in this thesis and the research methods 
employed to address them.  
  The fifth chapter draws on interview with decision makers and key players 
involved in PSB expansion documenting their differing attitudes towards the 
process and the ways they attempted to construct the debate. This chapter 
intends to illustrate boundaries of inclusion and exclusion by investigating the 
clash of claims that stem from differences in the interests and priorities of 
different groups.  
  Following this mapping of the competing constructions of the various players, 
the sixth chapter charts the public debate around PSB on the basis of a content 
analysis of press representations. Taking the three leading national daily 
Taiwanese newspapers, with their contrasting political allegiances, as key 
public channels of information and argument, it presents a detailed analysis of 
similarities and differences in their patterns of coverage.  
  Building on this general overview of press representation, the seventh 
chapter is the first of two that deal with the detailed ways in which debates 
around PSB expansion, and the contending positions in play, were afforded or 
denied explicit platforms in the three newspapers.  
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  Chapter seven focuses on the way press editorials interpret ‘popular’ themes, 
in relation to their own political stance or bias, to enhance the political 
arguments. In the eighth chapter the focus turns to letters to the editor and  
the way the press presents itself as providing a ‘public forum’, offering 
opportunities for ‘ordinary ’ citizens to voice their opinions and reach a national 
audience. The analysis interrogates this claim and attempts to identify reasons 
why some voices resonated more loudly than others in this mediated ‘public 
opinion forum’ orchestrated by editors.  
  The ninth and final chapter, offers overall reflections on the study and the 
career of Public Service Broadcasting in Taiwan ,exploring how power operated 
to shape the course of PSB expansion - how it was deployed, enacted, and 
what the outcomes and consequences were, and evaluating to what extent the 
PSB experiment has succeeded in Taiwan.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Public Service Broadcasting: A 
Contested Concept 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter firstly explores the ways in which experiences of other public 
service broadcasters around the world were referenced in Taiwan’s PSB 
expansion. Then the second section traces the roots of the idea of 
Habermasian public sphere and examines its relationship with the institutions of 
PSB. The third section elaborates on the definitions and principles of PSB, 
reviewing the founding notions of John Reith, the first director-general of the 
British Broadcasting Corporation from 1927 to 1938, and then moving on to 
more recent elaborations developed in different academic discussions and 
policy documents. The fourth section examines the way that the theoretical 
concepts underling PSB has been put into practice, further investigating 
selected models and highlights the features of particular relevance to the 
expansion of PSB in Taiwan. 
  The purpose of this chapter is firstly to discuss the extent to which 
Habermas’ idea of the public sphere fits the case of public service broadcasting 
(PSB), and secondly to explore the way PSB presents itself as acting on behalf 
of the formation of public opinion. These aims require us not only to revisit 
fundamental theoretical concepts, but also to review the practical organisation 
of PSB in relevant contexts in order to assess the political, social and cultural 
problems posed by different ways of institutionalising its basic ideals.  
    This chapter concludes with a discussion of the challenges and 
opportunities now facing PSB and the role it plays in the empowerment of an 
informed and active citizenry. 
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2.1 Significance of British Model in Taiwan’s PSB Expansion  
The PSB expansion was introduced in Taiwan as a key to the solution for 
existing problems as well as the future of Taiwan’s media landscape.  
  As was briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, actually the initial practice of PSB 
concept in Taiwan dates back to 1998 when the Public Television Station (PTS) 
was established under the demands for PSB which emerged in the mid-1990s. 
However, charged with a mission to provide quality television programming, this 
initiative never managed to achieve more than a minority presence in the 
commercialized media landscape.  
  Similar to the model of the PBS in the US, the function of the PTS was ‘to 
provide that programming that was unprofitable for the commercial 
broadcasters to produce’ (McChesney, 1999, p. 247). Compared with other 
existing commercial media, PTS was too late for its entry and too small to 
compete with its commercial competitors in Taiwan. For instance, the usually 
less than 1 percent of the audience share of the PTS (PTS, 2001) was one of 
salient examples to see its minority role in the media environment and its 
questionable claim to be a national broadcaster. A significant figure of PSB 
advocate, Feng Chien-san (馮建三), argued that this very PTS is not a real 
public broadcasting since the PTS is only to compensate for the inadequacy of 
commercial television. In Feng’s view, a real PSB should function as a 
mainstream role in the media environment which can have real impact to 
alleviate the symptoms of the overwhelming commercial media and political 
forces (Feng, 1999).   
  With huge disappointments with the marginal role of the PTS and the 
remaining overwhelming commercial broadcasting, in 1999 a group of critical 
media academics began to explore more effective ways to achieve substantial 
media transformation. A second wave of PSB demands gathered momentum 
when a policy window was opened by the unprecedented political transition in 
the 2000 presidential election.  
  This window opened the way for renewed political struggles, social 
movement activity and academic debate, centred around two competing 
proposals for reforming the terrestrial television stations, with advocates of 
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privatisation on the one side and supporters of PSB-oriented proposal on the 
other.  
  Against the privatisation ideas, the PSB-oriented proposal proposed 
transforming the state-owned television asset into a new, extended, public 
service broadcasting system. In this proposal, the key idea conceptually means 
a transformation of the state-owned terrestrial televisions to a corporation in the 
public sector. Specifically, the proposal entailed all political parties, the state, 
and the military relinquishing all control over terrestrial television and ceding its 
administration and operation to an independent corporation in the public sector.  
  This proposal was seen by its advocates as a way of creating space within 
the broadcasting landscape for a greater degree of freedom and independence 
in the pursuit of the ideals of public service. This key idea mainly generated 
from the ideal model of the BBC in the UK: ‘a national, popular, and pluralistic 
broadcasting’ (Scannell, 1996, pp. 25-31). 
2.1.1 A dominant PSB in media landscape  
The British model is always a significant case in PSB debate since the BBC 
has been towering in the PSB history from the very beginning where the 
concept of public service broadcasting emerged in Western Europe after World 
War II (Blumler, 1992) and found it most influential early institutional expression 
when the BBC was established in 1927 and started its regular television 
broadcasting in 1936. The reasons why the British model was a significant 
model referenced in the second wave of the PSB advocate in Taiwan were not 
only because its long-term track record in the PSB history, but also the 
mainstream and dominant role of the BBC in the UK which reflected why 
Taiwan’s PTS failed to serve as a PSB. In comparison, the British model 
provided a living example and prime solution to the failure of the PTS with its 
marginal role in Taiwan’s media landscape.  
  As was mentioned earlier, most of the key PSB advocates, such as Feng, 
believed that only a mainstream PSB can really deliver what the PSB promises 
to the media environment and achieve substantial media transformation in 
Taiwan. 
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2.1.2 Professional background of key PSB advocate  
Another reason why the British model was significant in Taiwan’s PSB 
expansion is that, among the key advocates, some active media academics 
gained their PhD degree from the UK and had a particular understanding of the 
BBC model. For example, the key figure in the long-term PSB campaign, Feng 
Chien-san (馮建三), was awarded a PhD at Leicester University. Another key 
player, Wei Ti (魏玓), studied his PhD at Loughborough University. With their 
professional knowledge of the BBC, the ethos of British model was highlighted 
in the second wave of the Taiwan’s PSB expansion (more details of their view 
will be addressed in Chapter 5 with interview data).  
  The PSB proposal, raised by the active academics to against the 
privatisation plan on the state television stations, was viewed as a more 
positive, tangible and democratic vision for change in Taiwan’s broadcasting 
policy and practice to fix the flaws in the first PSB, PTS, which served as a 
marginal alternative to the commercial market (more details for the PSB 
development will be addressed in Chapter 4 with more detailed social and 
political context of Taiwan). 
2.1.3 Other relevant models in neighbourhood  
Apart from the two fundamental models in UK and US, in Taiwan’s 
neighbourhood there are also two empirical examples from countries whose 
histories and cultures overlap with those of Taiwan: Japan and South Korea.   
  The PSB models in Japan and South Korea were often referenced in the 
Taiwan’s PSB debate since the two countries, with the similar historical and 
cultural background, can provide examples of transformations from former 
state-owned televisions under military control to PSB.  
  Thus, the aims of the following sections are not only to revisit fundamental 
theoretical concepts, but also to review the practical organisation of PSB in 
relevant contexts to assess the political, social and cultural circumstances 
posed by different ways of institutionalising an ideal PSB. 
 
2.2 The Media as Public Sphere  
The relationship between the media and democracy has long been a significant 
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research field in media studies since the improvement of democracy is viewed 
as one of the media’s major functions (Garnham, 1990). Within broadcasting 
studies, Jürgen Habermas’ key concept of the public sphere has been ‘the 
most influential variant of this ideal’ (Dahlgren, 1995; Murdock, 2005, p. 177) 
because the issues he addresses and the problems he poses seem to be 
fundamental for the study of modern societies and the contributory role of 
modern media (Scannell, 1984).  
  This section does not attempt to provide a definitive critical analysis of 
Habermas’ work, but rather approaches his theoretical assumptions as a 
departure point to critically understand the role of PSB in democratic societies 
as ‘providing a mechanism for the coming together of a public consensus’ 
(Price 1995, p. 35). Two points of view taken from Habermas’ work by Scannell 
(1984) are followed in this study as principles to observe the role of PSB: ‘a 
historical approach to the formation of broadcasting‘s public sphere’ and ‘a 
concern with the rational character of communication in everyday actual 
contexts’ (Scannell, 1984, p. 136).   
2.2.1 The Habermasian public sphere and the media  
The public sphere, in Habermas’ work, is ‘the realm of social life where the 
exchange of information and views on questions of common concern can “take 
place” when citizens, exercising the rights of assembly and association, gather 
as public bodies to discuss issues of the day, especially those of political 
concern’ (Dahlgren, 1995, p. 7). Calhoun (1992) observes that ‘the importance 
of the public sphere lies in its potential as a mode of societal integration’ 
(Calhoun, 1992, p. 6).In Habermas’ account, the original public sphere 
developed in face to face deliberations on public issues that took place in the 
coffee and chocolate houses that emerged in mid-seventeenth century London. 
With the complexity of modern society today, the public flow of information and 
debate has increasingly come to rely on the range of mass media which have 
come to supplement of information. As Murdock & Golding (2005) indicate, for 
most people for most of the time the world is understood politically, 
economically and culturally primarily via media representations. With the result 
that the media ‘play a pivotal role in organising the images and discourse 
through which people make sense of the world (Murdock & Golding, 2005, p. 
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60),’ Dahlgren (1995) argues that the media ‘have become the major 
institutions of the public sphere since the scale of modern society does not 
allow more than relatively small numbers of citizens to be physically co-present’ 
(Dahlgren, 1995, pp. 7-8).  
  The contemporary public sphere then, is no longer limited to locations 
stratified by class or to media dependent on relatively high levels of literacy. 
The zone of public sphere has shifted to a dynamic space characterised by 
multiple forms of mediated public participation. However, since its technological 
base allows for the possibility of universal, inclusive and synchronous coverage, 
broadcasting has come to be seen as the pivot of the mediated public sphere.  
  Three virtues of the concept of the public sphere for rethinking the 
relationship between the media and democracy have been identified by 
Garnham (1992, pp. 361-362). The first is the focus on the indissoluble link 
between the institutions and practices of mass communication and the 
institutions and practices of democratic politics. The second is the emphasis on 
the necessary material resource base for any public sphere. And the third is the 
potential it offers to escape from the simple dichotomy of free market versus 
state control that dominates so much thinking about media policy. 
Higgins further notes ‘the public sphere emerges from a view of politics as a 
process of dialogue, and is meant to describe a platform for negotiating and 
reconciling competing interests, so that the formation of public policy is aided 
by the informed interventions of concerned citizens’ (Higgins, 2008:27).  
Some critics however have questioned the utility of the notion of the public 
sphere and pointed to its ambiguous status in Habermas’ work, arguing that ‘it 
appears both as a normative ideal to be strived for and as a manifestation of 
actual historical circumstances in early bourgeois Europe’ (Dahlgren, 1995, p.  
10).   
Reviewing commentaries on Habermas’ conception of the public sphere, 
mainly from Garnham (1992), Peters (1993), Fraser (1992) and Thompson 
(1990), Dahlgren outlines four analytic dimensions of the public sphere in 
media studies; ‘media institutions, media representation, social structure and 
sociocultural interaction’ (Dahlgren, 1995, p. 11).  
The dimension of sociocultural interaction refers to both the inter-face 
between the media and citizens and non-mediated face-to-face encounters 
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between citizens. The dimension of social structure points to factors which 
constitute the historical conditions and institutional background of the public 
sphere, such as patterns of social stratification and the power alignments 
rooted in economic, political and legal organisation. 
The other two dimensions, media institutions and media representation, have 
generally received rather more attention in media studies and figure at the 
centre of policy debates. The dimension of media institutions covers media 
organisation, financing and regulation while the dimension of media 
representation focuses on patterns of media coverage. Each of these four 
dimensions offers an entry point for both theoretical and empirical inquiry into 
the public sphere and the four interlock with each other and constitute 
reciprocal conditions for one another (Dahlgren, 1995).  
In particular, in discussing the dimension of media institutions, Dahlgren 
argues that ‘the most explicit appropriation of Habermas’ public sphere concept 
has been with in the British debates where it has been utilised as a platform 
from which to defend public service broadcasting’ (1995, p. 13). Within this 
debate media critics have tended to associate public service broadcasting with 
the realisation of the public sphere and to view the commercial model of 
financing as a threat to it (Garnham, 1983; Scannell, 1989).  
In the following section, the relationship between the public sphere and the 
public service broadcasting will be further discussed.  
2.2.2 The public sphere and PSB  
Over last decade, as supporters of commercial options have become more 
confident and vocal, the question of how far PSB, as currently organised, is 
able to embody the ideals the public sphere and serve as ‘a means of the 
realisation of the public sphere’ (Dahlgren, 1995) has been raised with 
increasing urgency. In attempting to identify how far PSB is able to form a 
forum of public consensus, Price (1995) argues, we need to pay particular 
attention to the various ways in which public–service entities are ‘governed, 
financed, regulated and perceived’ since these factors ‘help determine, though 
hardly conclude, whether furthering the public sphere is an internalised civic 
and spiritual quest, or left to the margin, a hoped-for product of market 
interaction’ (Price 1995, p. 36).  
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According to Price (1995), the first key condition for the effective operation of 
PSB is how far it is able to achieve relative autonomy from the state. The 
function of this independence is ‘to encourage and nourish the formation of a 
“public” that is the quintessential aspect of the public sphere’ (Price 1995, p. 
32). Price further points out that ‘the keystone, often proclaimed but seldom 
perfectly achieved, is the development of a system that is immunised from 
direct government intervention, a refrain familiar as an element of Habermas’ 
Ideal Speech Situation’ (Price 1995, p. 36). As Raboy (1996, p. 9) argues, the 
government must see itself more ‘as architect than as engineer’. ‘The role of 
the state is to design and facilitate the functioning of a multifaceted national 
broadcasting system, rather than as the directive patron of a dedicated national 
broadcaster’ (Raboy, 1996, p. 9). Thus, the questions of how to minimise 
influences from the government has been a key issue of policymaking and 
academic research.  
Secondly, the mode of financing public broadcasting organisations is also a 
key determinant of PSB’s ability to identify and nourish a public sphere (Price 
1995, p. 34). Tracey (1998) breaks this point down in a simple way: ‘in a public 
system, television producers acquire money to make programmes while in a 
commercial system they make programmes to acquire money’ (Tracey, 1998, p. 
18). Price (1995) notes that it is possible to have a PSB system which 
encourages the public sphere which is financed directly by the government 
through the Legislature, but he notes, taking the United States as an example 
that ‘the direct financing of public broadcasting carries with its perils of 
interference’ (Price 1995, p. 34). On the other hand, the major commercial 
financing model, advertising support, transforms the ‘public’ into ‘audience’ and 
installs the pursuit of the goal of maximising audiences rather than serving 
citizens at the centre of the system. It is against the background of the 
problems posed by these two models, that Price (1995), and other observers, 
argue that automatic funding devices are crucial to allow the relationship 
between broadcasting and its public to be largely unencumbered by political 
and market forces (Price 1995, p. 34).   
The third, and arguable most important condition that allows PSB to nurture 
of mediated public sphere is the culture of the organisation since ‘the way the 
ambitious goals of a broadcasting origination are stated and implanted in those 
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who create its identity’ has a crucial impact on the way staff view their role 
(Price 1995, p. 35). The defining identity of PSB has been viewed in various 
ways by different players in the PSB debate. For example, the commercial 
broadcaster Rupert Murdoch argues that ‘populist television should be left to 
commercial stations and that public television should plug the gaps, delivering 
programmes that the market system does not’ (Tracey, 1996, p. 159). In reply, 
PSB defenders hold that ‘PSB should be seen as an instrument of social and 
cultural development, rather than as a marginal alternative service on the 
periphery of a vast cultural industry’ (Raboy, 1996, p. 9).  
The three determinants mentioned above all interact in complex ways with 
political and market forces. However, as Graham Murdock argues, ‘the crucial 
choice is not, as many commentators suppose, between state licensing and 
control on the one side and minimally regulated market mechanisms on the 
other. It is between policies designed to reinvigorate public communication 
system which are relatively independent of both the state and the market, and 
policies which aim to marginalize or eradicate them’ (Murdock, 1992, p. 18).  
In answer to the question posed by critics of ‘actually existing’ public service 
broadcasting and enthusiasts of ‘free’ markets in representations as to ‘why the 
future should be modelled on an institutional ideal that has so often failed to live 
up to its promises in the past’, Murdock (1999) states that, ‘restructured and 
re-imagined, public service broadcasting offers the most open, flexible and 
inclusive solution to the problem of underwriting the cultural rights of citizenship’ 
(Murdock, 1999, p. 16).    
 Murdock has elaborated this argument by outlining ‘four basic sets of 
cultural right’ (Murdock, 1999, pp. 11-12). They can be summarised as follows:    
 
  1) Rights to information: citizens have rights of access to the relevant 
information about the conditions that structure their range of choices, and about 
the actions of significant social, political and economic actors, such as state 
agencies, the government, corporations, opposition parties and social 
movement;    
  2) Rights to experience: citizens have rights of access the diversity of 
representations of personal and social experience; 
  3) Rights to knowledge: citizens have rights of access to frameworks of 
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interpretation that points to links, patterns and processes of changes, and 
suggests explanations which translate information and experience into 
knowledge; 
  4) Rights to participation: citizens have rights to speak about their own lives 
and aspirations in their own voice, and to picture the things that matter to them 
in ways they have chosen.  
 
Seen in this light, the next section will address the definitions and principles 
of PSB by reviewing the notions of John Reith and more recent points of view 
offered by academics and policy documents. 
2.3 PSB as a Contested Concept 
The concept of public service broadcasting emerged in Western Europe after 
World War II (Blumler, 1992) and found it most influential early institutional 
expression when the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was established 
in 1927 and started its regular television broadcasting in 1936. Although it is 
well known that broadcasting in Britain is based on the principle of public 
service, defining exactly what that means, can, on close inspection, prove 
‘elusive’ (Scannell, 2000, p. 45). When the 1986 Peacock Committee in Britain, 
turned to the broadcasters for their interpretations of public service they 
remained unenlightened. Their report observed, ‘we had some difficulty in 
obtaining an operational definition from broadcasters’ (Peacock, 1986, p. 130, 
cited in Scannell, 1989, p. 135). 
  Market competitors have seized on the fuzziness of the concept to offer a 
revisionist definition that perfectly fits their own interests. Rupert Murdoch, for 
example, states that ‘anybody who, within in the law of the land, provides a 
service which the public wants at a price it can afford is providing a public 
service’ (quoted in Ellis, 1994, p. 1; cited in Raboy, 1996, p. 8). At the same 
time, if we look at the way the concept has been championed by its supporters 
we can identify some consistent and enduring themes.  
2.3.1 Definitions of PSB 
In his foundational definition of public service broadcasting, the first 
Director-General of the BBC, John Reith, indicated that it should have four 
facets (McDonnell, 1991, p. 1): ‘First, it ought to be protected from commercial 
 22 
pressures. Second, it aims to serve the whole nation. Third, it should have a 
monopoly position. And, finally, it aims to provide a high standard of 
programmes’.  
Reith also famously summarised the core purposes of the BBC, as to ‘inform, 
educate and entertain’. The key term here is ‘educate’, in the original sense 
taken from the Latin, ‘educare’, meaning to provide a lead. Reith considered 
that ‘only a few viewers knew what programmes they need and want, so the 
public service broadcasters should produce good programmes for the 
audiences and play an edifying role (Congdon, 1992). 
In Reith’s brief and trenchant manifesto for a public service broadcasting 
system there was ‘an overriding concern for the maintenance of high standards 
and a unified policy towards the whole of the service supplied’ (Scannell, 2000, 
p. 47). This initial conception of PSB was not only based on Reith’s own beliefs, 
it was also rooted in technological constraints. ‘The scarcity of the spectrum 
frequencies is considered the main justification for the monopoly position’ 
(Seaton, 2003, p. 367). Although Reith’s formulation has been consistently 
challenged by critics, and dismissed and derided by advocates of commercial 
solutions, as unacceptable paternalistic, his ideas, revised and updated, have 
continued to inform debate down to the present (Hearst, 1992). 
  After reviewing conceptions of PSB over time, Collins (1998, p. 54) 
concluded that although its proponents offered definitions based on different 
approaches, they shared common ground in viewing PSB and the market as 
oppositional categories (Collins 1998, p. 73).  
In an attempt to devise a definition of PSB that fits contemporary conditions, 
Scannell (1990, p. 25) has argued that the core objective is to provide a ‘mixed 
programming on national channels available to all.’ There are two essential 
elements in this argument: a mix of programming and universality. Since 
Scannell believes that PSB still has cultural and democratic missions, he sees 
its essential role as guaranteeing ‘equal access for all to a wide range of 
common informational, entertainment, and cultural programmes carried on 
channels that can be an important citizenship right in mass democratic 
societies.’ (Scannell, 1990, p. 26) 
  In response to the threat to PSB posed by commercial television, Blumler 
(1992, pp. 30-39) identified seven core values of PSB: 1) programme quality; 2) 
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diversity; 3) cultural identity; 4) independence of programme sources from 
commercial influences; 5) the integrity of civic communication; 6) welfare of 
children and juveniles; and 7) maintenance of standards. This conception 
builds on Reith’s original emphasis on the educational and cultural roles of PSB 
by highlighting the welfare of children and juveniles as a distinctive value.  
  In recent studies, Van Dijk, Nahuis and Waagmeester (2006, p. 254) have 
reiterated that the objectives of PSB should include pluralism and diversity, 
independence, quality and accessibility.  
  Heap (2005, p. 116) summarising reports of the objectives of PSB from the 
European Union, has identified four defining roles: 1) Aiding informed 
citizenship through impartial and independent news, information and comment; 
2) supporting democratic values through the encouragement of public debate 
that involves and respects the human rights of all groups in society; 3) offering 
a wide range of quality programmes in all genres; and 4) promoting social 
cohesion and vitality of national cultures. 
  Hujanen (2005, p. 58) has argued that PSB is defined by five key features: 1) 
universal accessibility; 2) diversity of programmes; 3) information distributions; 
4) provision of education; 5) promotion of culture and 6) development of 
democracy. 
  Papathanassopoulos (2002, p. 11) considered that there were four essential 
characteristics of PSB: 1) a universal service available to all irrespective of 
income or geographical location; 2) a commitment to a balanced output and to 
balanced scheduling across different programme genres; 3) a balanced and 
impartial political output; and 4) a degree of financial independence from both 
government and commercial bodies.  
  As these various definitions clearly demonstrate, despite a core of agreement 
on basic principles, conceptions of PSB are both a contested and dynamic over 
time.  
  There is then, no easy answer to the question of what principles public 
service broadcasting should follow, but a reasonably thorough attempt at 
consolidation and synthesis was made in the mid-1980s by the UK’s 
Broadcasting Research Unit (BRU, 1985). The main principles in the BRU 
document can be summarised as follows:     
1) Universality of availability (geographic); 
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2) Universality of appeal (general tastes and interests); 
3) Particular attention on minorities (especially disadvantaged minorities who 
should receive particular provision); 
4) Special relationship to the sense of national identity and community; 
5) Broadcasting should be distanced from all vested interests, and in particular 
from those of the government of the day; 
6) Direct funding and universality of payment; 
7) Broadcasting should be structured so as to encourage competition in good 
programming rather than for numbers; and 
8) The public guidelines for broadcasting should be designed to liberate rather 
than restrict the programme makers.  
  Some of these principles, such as ‘universal availability’, ‘good programming’, 
and ‘direct funding’ follow Reith’s ideas, the other characteristics have been 
developed in response to social and cultural changes. For instance, the 
concept of ‘particular attention to minorities’ is mentioned, because against a 
background of increasing migration and the assertion of minority rights there 
was a growing sense that ‘general and national programmes could not satisfy 
the needs of minorities’ (Tracey 1998, p. 28). 
  These general principles as listed by the BRU, at first glance, seem to be 
both comprehensive and clear, but they may well provoke arguments when 
translated into in concrete practices. For example, while the aim of making 
‘good programmes’ and serving ‘the interests of minorities’ might command 
wide support as principles, their operationalization is problematic. Is ‘good’ to 
be defined by professional or by aesthetic and ethical criteria? Which minorities 
merit particular attention? A further problem is posed by the ambiguity of key 
principles such as ‘national identity’. The question of nationhood is not fully 
resolved in many countries, including the UK (Raboy, 1996, p. 7), and it is even 
more controversial in Taiwan caught as it is in the cultural and political crossfire 
between China, the U.S. and Japan. (More details about Taiwan’s specific 
situation will be given in the next chapter).  
  In 1992 the UK Department of National Heritage published the White Paper 
‘The Future of the BBC’, in which eight objectives that public service 
broadcasters should try to achieve were listed : 1) Focus on audiences; 2) 
Quality; 3) Diversity and choice; 4) Accessibility; 5) Editorial independence; 6) 
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Efficiency and value for money; 7) Accountability; 8) National identity (DNH 
1992). 
  Compared to the BRU’s principles, these objectives place more emphasis on 
the audience perspective, an indication that in a more commercially competitive 
environment public service broadcasters were being urged to become 
audience-oriented institutions instead of producer-oriented institutions. 
  Changes in the concept of PSB are also evident in other European countries. 
With the development of communications technologies, free markets, and the 
liberalisation of east European, the concept of PSB has been challenged. In 
order to cope with these changes, both the Council of Europe (in the Prague 
Resolution of 1994) and the European Parliament (in the 1996 Resolution) 
have tried to identify certain core principles. The 1994 Prague Resolution 
includes nine principles: 1) A common reference point for all members of the 
public; 2) A forum for broad public discussion; 3) Impartial news coverage; 4) 
Pluralistic, innovative and varied programming; 5) Programming which is both 
of wide public interest and attentive to the needs of minorities; 6)Reflection of 
the different ideas and beliefs in multicultural societies; 7) A diversity of national 
and European cultural heritage; 8) Original productions by independent 
producers; 9) Extended viewer and listener choice by offering programmes not 
provided by the commercial sector (Raboy, 1996, p. 15). 
The 1996 European Parliament Resolution also identifies this nucleus of 
common features in PSB. Rumphorst (2007) summaries the key features as 
follows: 1) an aid to informed citizenship, an agency of representative pluralism 
bringing together different groups in society in a common conversation that 
shapes public opinion; 2) offers a wide range of quality production in all genres 
to the whole population; 3) sets quality standards in popular programmes 
followed by mass audiences; 4) serves minority interests and caters for every 
section of the population; 5) provides unbiased and fully independent 
information, both in mass coverage and in-depth factual programming, capable 
of earning the audience's trust and of representing a reference point in the 
rapidly expanding information market; 6) plays a major role in encouraging the 
public debate that is vital for the proper functioning of democracy and provide a 
forum for debate for all groups and organizations in society; 7) ensures that the 
general population has access to events of general public interest, including 
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sports events (Rumphorst, 2007). 
  The Office of Communications (Ofcom), the regulator of communications in 
the UK, addressed the purposes of PSB as part of its review of the 
performance of PSB (Ofcom, 2004), identifying three key features: 1) to deal 
with a wide range of subjects; 2) to cater for the widest possible range of 
audiences - across different times of day and through different types of 
programme and; 3) to maintain high standards of programme-making.  
  In a later document, published in 2005, after a series of consultations and 
discussions Ofcom set out a more comprehensive definition of PSB based on 
four public service purposes and five public service characteristics (Ofcom 
2005, pp. 7-8). The four public service purposes were: 1) informing our 
understanding of the world; 2) stimulating knowledge and learning; 3) reflecting 
UK cultural identity; and 4) representing diversity and alternative viewpoints. 
The five characteristics are: 1) high quality; 2) original; 3) innovative; 4) 
challenging; 5) engaging; 6) widely available. These purposes and 
characteristics became the criteria that Ofcom employed to review the 
performance of public service broadcasters in its second PSB review in 2009 
(Ofcom, 2009, p. 21). 
  The various definitions and principles outlined above clearly show that the 
concept of PSB is dynamic and unfolding as commentators and government 
and intergovernmental agencies respond to changing conditions and contexts. 
As Raboy has pointed out, however, the main challenge is not ‘how to perfect 
the list’ but ‘how to apply such a set of concepts and principles’ (Raboy, 1996, 
p7) and it to this question of operationalization that we now turn.  
 
2.4 From concepts to Practice  
From last section we can see that there is no shortage of defensible working 
definitions of PSB. Translating them into institutional forms and practices 
however is ‘rendered problematic by a series of political, economic, 
technological, ideological, and developmental constraints’ (Raboy, 1996, p. 2). 
In this section I want to examine how these constraints operate by looking at 
selected instances of actually existing public service broadcasting. 
  Compared to commercial broadcasting which is run in order to generate 
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profits and has been financed historically mainly by selling audiences to 
advertisers, public broadcasters receive funding from diverse sources including 
license fees, individual contributions, public financing and commercial 
financing. 
Historically, PSB was the dominant form of broadcasting in Europe and in 
many of the former colonial territories, led by India, which gained their political 
independence after World War II. Over the last thirty years however, boosted by 
the expansion of commercial cable and satellite services, commercial 
broadcasting has entered these hitherto monopoly or protected markets placing 
public service broadcasting under increasing pressure. In this section, four 
contrasting models of PSB, illustrating four different historical trajectories and 
responses to current conditions will be briefly reviewed: the BBC in the UK, 
PBS in the U.S., NHK in Japan, and KBS and MBC in South Korea.  
2.4.1 The United Kingdom: The BBC 
Of the all broadcasting organisations in the world, ‘the BBC has been the most 
widely admired but has none the less proved difficult for others to copy 
successfully’ (Smith, 1995, p. 80). The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
is an autonomous public service broadcaster that operates under a Royal 
Charter and a Licence and Agreement from the Home Secretary. Scannell 
(1996) broadly divides the organisation’s development into three periods:  
  1) 1927- 1954: The period of National service;  
2) 1954-1977: The period of Competition;  
3) 1977-1995: The period of Cultural pluralism.  
‘Each of which was shown to have a core characteristic: first as national, 
then as popular, and finally as pluralistic’ (Scannell, 1996, pp. 25-31). 
In the national service period, from 1927 to 1954, the BBC was established 
as a state – regulated monopoly, ‘Its original mandate, set out in its founding 
constitutional documents, was to provide a national service in the public 
interest’ (Scannell, 1996, p. 25). 
The BBC was, from the outset, colonised by highly educated, white, 
middle-class (middle-aged) men. Finding the right tone of voice – a voice that 
could speak to people of all class – has always been difficult (Scannell, 1996, p. 
27). Class remains a sensitive issue. 
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  In the second period, the competition period from 1954 to 1977, a 
commercial television system, Independent Television (ITV), was set up within 
the PSB system. Although funded by advertising revenues, the ITV companies 
were subject to public service requirements as a condition of holding their 
licences, and obliged to make a range of programmes which, while socially 
valued, were not necessarily profit maximising. At the same time they took 
advantage of the BBC’s reputation for paternalism and high mindedness and 
‘staked out the ground upon which the battle for audiences was to be fought as 
popular programming (Scannell, 1996, p. 28). Initially BBC audiences fell 
sharply, but by the mid-1960s, after the Corporation had responded by 
enhancing its own popular programming, the total available television viewing 
audience was shared between the BBC and ITV on a more or less equal basis, 
to the satisfaction of both parties (Scannell, 1996, p. 29). 
  In the third period, 1977 to 1995, ‘pluralism’ became the leitmotiv (Scannell, 
1996, p. 30). In order to create a wider range of programmes for those 
minorities and social groups whose needs, interests, and tastes were not 
adequately served under the existing arrangements, in 1980, the new 
Conservative government brought in a Broadcasting Act, which created what 
was called Channel 4 (Scannell, 1996, p. 27). This was given a PSB remit, with 
a specific responsibility to cater for minority interests, but, in contrast to the 
BBC, was funded from advertising revenues rather than taxation  
Scannell (1996) argues that the core characteristics of the three periods 
above stand out as distinctive strands woven into the fabric of British 
broadcasting system today. 
Within the United Kingdom the BBC is funded principally by an annual 
television licence fee, charged to all British households, companies and 
organisations using any type of equipment to receive live television broadcasts. 
The level of the fee is set annually by the British Government and agreed by 
Parliament. The BBC use the income from the licence fee to provide a range of 
radio and television services including 10 national television channels (BBC 
One, BBC Two, BBC Three, BBC Four, CBBC, CBeebies, BBC News, BBC 
Parliament, BBC Alba, BBC HD), BBC Red Button interactive TV, 10 national 
radio stations (Radio 1, 1Xtra, Radio 2, Radio 3, Radio 4, Radio 4 Extra, Radio 
5 Live, 5 Live Sports Extra, 6 Music, BBC Asian Network), National TV and 
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radio services for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and over 40 local 
radio stations for England, BBC Online, and BBC World Service (BBC, 
14/01/2012). 
  BBC also has a commercial arm, BBC Worldwide as well as a number of 
other commercial ventures. Profits from these activities are returned to the BBC 
for investment in new programming and services. The BBC Trust, as the 
governing body of the BBC, is separate from the Executive which manages the 
BBC’s day-to-day operations. The function of BBC Trust is to represent licence 
fee payers and make sure the Executive delivers the programmes and services 
required by its remit, while ensuring that the BBC is accountable and open. The 
BBC Trust also protects the independence of the BBC from commercial or 
political influence. It holds the Executive to account for the BBC’s performance 
through reviews of its services in the areas of television, radio, online, news, 
sport and the BBC World Service (BBC Annual Report, 2010, p. 14).  
In December 2011, in the conclusions of ‘Putting Quality First’, the BBC Trust 
identified four primary objectives for the BBC between then and 2016. These 
objectives, which require a challenging programme of organisational and 
cultural change, include: 
1) Increasing the distinctiveness and quality of output by increasingly 
focusing on its five editorial priorities across its portfolio of services;  
2) Improving value for money for licence fee payers: to reduce the share of 
its expenditure allocated to running costs in order to direct a greater share of 
the licence fee into making great content; 
3) Serving all audiences: to meet our audiences’ expectations by progressing 
key digital projects. 
4) Set new standards of openness and transparency: the objectives are 
monitored by a range of different measures, including audience research, 
financial analysis, external audit, and an assessment by the BBC Trust (BCC, 
2010, p. 36). 
  Meeting these goals presents major challenges. Firstly because the BBC has 
recently been given the additional responsibilities, for the Welsh Channel 4 and 
the World Service, adding to the pressures on its already stretched finances. 
Secondly, because the arguments coming from advocates of market based 
broadcasting, for privatising some of the corporation’s more popular services, 
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allocating some of the licence fee income to other providers of public service 
programming, or even selling off the organisation completely, show no signs of 
weakening. 
  In 2000 the White Paper, A New Future for Communications, affirmed that 
‘we will continue to rely on PSB for one clear reason – it works’ (DTI & DCMS, 
2000). In the decade since then this general endorsement has been 
consistently challenged by the new market. Even so, for the moment, the BBC 
remains the cornerstone of the British system, and a number of observers 
continue to endorse the argument put forward by Graham and Davies (1997, p. 
35) that ‘the success of the British broadcasting industry can be attributed to 
the BBC and the BBC should play an important role and use its advantages, 
such as experience, expertise and economies of scale to help the development 
of the broadcasting industry in the digital age’.  
2.4.2 The United States: PBS 
From the close of the Second World War until the late 1970s, public 
broadcasting organisations in Europe had stood in powerful, resilient opposition 
to commercial systems. This was in marked contrast to the United States, 
‘where public broadcasting had been much slower to develop and had far fewer 
resources’ (Tracey, 1998, p. 40). 
  Headquartered in Arlington, Virginia, the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) 
(formerly National Educational Television) is a non-profit television network with 
354 member TV stations in the United States which hold collective ownership 
(PBS, 2012).  
  PBS was founded on October 5, 1970, at which time it took over many of the 
functions of its predecessor, National Educational Television (NET). PBS and its 
member stations claim to be ‘America’s largest classroom, the nation’s largest 
stage for the arts and a trusted window to the world’ (PBS, 2011). 
  Unlike the model of America's commercial broadcasting television networks, 
in which affiliates give up portions of their local advertising airtime in exchange 
for network programming, PBS member stations pay substantial fees for the 
shows acquired and distributed by the national organization. 
  This relationship means that PBS member stations have greater latitude in 
local scheduling than their commercial broadcasting counterparts. Scheduling 
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of PBS-distributed series may therefore vary greatly from market to market. 
This can be a source of tension as stations seek to preserve their localism, and 
PBS strives to market a consistent national line-up. However, PBS has a policy 
of ‘common carriage’ requiring most stations to clear the national prime-time 
programs on a common broadcast programming schedule, so that they can be 
more effectively marketed on a national basis.  
PBS stations are commonly operated by non-profit organizations, state 
agencies, local authorities, or universities in their city of license. Compared with 
other public broadcasters in most other countries, PBS does not own any of the 
stations that broadcast its programming.  
  PBS was founded to provide diversity in programming at a time when in the 
U.S. most television broadcast over the public airwaves was provided by only 
three privately owned national networks. Compared with the BBC which 
regarded their mandate as providing a service to the entire nation, U.S. public 
broadcasters realised that they could only survive politically by not taking 
listeners or viewers away from the commercial networks. As a consequence, 
‘the function of the public or educational broadcasters was to provide that 
programming that was unprofitable for the commercial broadcasters to produce’ 
(McChesney, 1999, p. 247). Echoing this view, Tracey (1996) argues that the 
logic of PSB is that any programme which is too popular should more properly 
appear on commercial television. As he notes, ‘one of the basic conceits of 
American public television is “if you are attracting too many viewers and if you 
are too popular, then you must be doing something wrong” (Tracey, 1996, p. 
162)’. However, ‘at 2 percent of the audience share, one has to question public 
television‘s claim to be a national broadcaster’ (Tracey, 1996, p. 162).   
Nowadays there is debate as to whether or not the PBS system has outlived 
its public necessity. Proponents maintain that the original mandate, to provide 
universal access, particularly to rural viewers and those who cannot afford to 
pay for the private television services, remains vital. In addition, they argue that 
PBS provides some types of television shows which would not be shown at all 
on the commercial broadcasting television networks and television channels.  
Apart from subsidy, since 53% to 60% of public television's revenues come 
from private membership donations and grants (PBS, 2012), most stations 
solicit individual donations by methods including fundraising, pledge drives or 
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telethons which can disrupt regularly scheduled programming. Some viewers 
find this a source of annoyance since normal programming is often replaced 
with specials aimed at a wider audience to solicit new members and donations. 
As Smith (1995) points out, public television stations in American remained 
starved of funds and ‘the non-profit stations have often been accused of 
spending as much air time raising funds as the commercial stations do with 
their advertisements’ (Smith, 1995, p. 90). 
In McChesney’s opinion, given the obstacles PBS faced, U.S. public 
broadcasters still have done ‘a remarkable job of establishing and maintaining 
a loyal, albeit small, audience’ (McChesney, 1999, p. 251). However, ‘the 
already compromised commitment to “public service” - meaning service to the 
entire population based on non-commercial determinants- has withered over 
the years’ (McChesney, 1999, p. 251). 
Tracey (1996) argues that the PBS problems fashioned by the Public 
Broadcasting Act of 1967 are both conceptual and structural. At the conceptual 
level, the Act maintained public television’s educational role but added a more 
general role, such that is now matched the definitional trinity of most public 
broadcasting organisations – informing, educating and entertaining. Structurally, 
the two axes which constituted ‘the system’ were local and national. ‘This 
duality in both concept and structure was, and remains, an inevitable source of 
tension’ (Tracey, 1996, p. 162). To this we can add the absence of autonomous 
public funding, and PBS’s consequent vulnerability to politically motivated 
efforts, at both national and state level, to reduce the size of the direct grant.  
2.4.3 Other PSB Models in Taiwan’s Neighbourhood  
Apart from the two fundamental models in UK and US, the seeds of PSB 
concepts have landed in different soil to grow into various forms within different 
social and cultural contexts. In Taiwan’s close neighbourhood, there are two 
empirical examples from countries whose histories and cultures overlap with 
those of Taiwan; the former imperial power of Japan, and South Korea, which 
like Taiwan, was a Japanese colony. In Japan, NHK presents a successful 
model of PSB supported by license fees, while in South Korea KBS and MBC 
provide examples of transformations from former state-owned televisions under 
military control to PSB.  
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2.4.3.1 Japan: NHK 
The Broadcasting system devised after Japan’s defeat in World War II was a 
combination of British-style public service broadcasting, financially supported 
by licence fees, and U.S.-style commercial broadcasting, dependent on 
advertising revenues. Within this mix public broadcaster, Nippon Hoso Kyokai 
(NHK), or the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, is supported almost entirely by 
a licence fee system (NHK, 2011; Shimizu, 1996, p. 141).  
  NHK originally introduced a radio service in 1925 and a television service in 
1953. It was originally modelled on the British Broadcasting Company, the 
precursor to the British Broadcasting Corporation created in 1927. Much like 
the BBC, it was funded by a "receiving fee" payable by every Japanese 
household, with no commercial advertising and the maintenance of a position 
of strict political impartiality.  
The Japanese public network was established under the 1950 Broadcast 
Law, with the aim of ‘promoting public welfare through nationwide broadcasting’ 
(NHK, 2011). To ensure that the public interest is served as far as possible, the 
law provides for a specific structure for NHK, with a board of governors as its 
highest decision-making organ (Shimizu, 1996, p. 144). The Board is the 
decision-making body for every important matter concerning NHK’s 
management policy and operation, including the annual budget, operational 
plan and basic programming policy. There are twelve members, appointed by 
the prime minister and approved by both Houses of the Diet on behalf of the 
Japanese public. They bring a broad range of experience and expertise to NHK 
(NHK, 2011). 
NHK runs two national terrestrial TV stations (NHK General and NHK 
Educational) and three satellite-only services (NHK BS-1, BS-2 and the 
hi-definition NHK Hi-Vision services).It also runs 3 national radio services and a 
number of international radio and television services, akin to the BBC World 
Service. NHK has also been an innovator in television, developing the world's 
first high definition television technology in 1964 and launching high definition 
services in Japan in 1981 (NHK, 2011). 
In Japan, the launch of digital satellite TV broadcasting in December 2000 
was followed by the first digital terrestrial broadcasts in December 2003. The 
core technology is Hi-Vision (HDTV), which delivers clear, vivid pictures and 
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CD-quality sound. All the programming on General TV is now produced and 
aired in Hi-Vision. NHK has been conducting research on even more advanced 
technology (NHK, 2011).  
According to NHK’s ‘Corporate Plan for 2009-2011’ (NHK, 2009), in order to 
reach the two management goals of increasing both the audience contact rate 
and the payment rate for the receiving fee, nine courses of action are outlined. 
They are: 1) making all efforts to reform the organizational culture of NHK to 
heighten public trust; 2) directly addressing domestic and global issues; 3) 
fulfilling NHK’s role as a public broadcaster by offering new services in the 
coming era of the fusion of broadcasting and communications media; 4) 
Becoming a base for revitalizing regional areas; 5) broadcasting Japan and 
Asia to the World; 6) effectively prioritizing efforts for the smooth and complete 
transition to digitalization; 7) increasing the receiving fee value by structural 
reforms; 8) strengthening efforts for equitable sharing of receiving fee burden; 9) 
promoting environmentally-aware operations (NHK, 2009, p. 2-3). 
2.4.3.2 South Korea: KBS and MBC 
Since mid-1999, the 'Korean Wave' of television programmes and popular 
cultural products spreading into East Asia has caught many media 
commentators' attention, so has the South Korean television industry.  
Compared with NHK, which is financially supported by licence fees, public 
service broadcasting in South Korea has developed a significantly different 
model shaped by its specific political and social conditions.  
 The crucial intervention occurred under the Chun-Doo-Whan regime which 
forcibly reshuffled 29 broadcasters into an oligopoly of two public Broadcasters, 
the Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) and the Munhwa Broadcasting 
Company (MBC) (Shim, 2008, p. 23). 
Altough tagged as 'public' broadcasters, KBS and MBC have increasingly 
come to rely on advertising for their finances. By the early 1990s, KBS relied 
more on advertising (61%) than on the reception fee/license fee (39%) while 
98% of MBC's revenue came from advertisements (Kim, 2001).   
 
KBS 
Today KBS is South Korea’s leading public services broadcaster and relies on 
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both licence fee and income from the advertisements to operate its three TV, 
seven radio and four DMB channels (KBS, 2012). 
  KBS began its first radio broadcasting service back in 1927 and launched 
Korea’s first television broadcasting service in 1961. The headquarters is 
located at Yeouido in Seoul. There are 18 regional stations and 11 overseas 
bureaus as well as eight subsidiary companies such as KBS Media which 
manages the local and global marketing of KBS content. 
  Around 37.8% of its revenue currently comes from a mandatory Television 
License Fee, while 47.6% comes from commercial advertisement sales (KBS, 
2012). For national or governmental programs such as the International Radio 
service (KBS World Radio) and the Radio service for physically handicapped 
people, KBS receives public funds directly from the South Korean government. 
 
MBC 
In the name of the Munhwa Broadcasting Company (MBC), Munhwa in Korean 
means ‘Culture’. Unlike KBS, MBC is a public broadcaster that receives no 
government subsidy and derives its income almost entirely from commercial 
advertising (MBC, 2012). Although operating under the title of ‘public’, MBC is 
actually the oldest of all the commercial broadcasting networks in South Korea. 
Since its inception in 1961, it has contributed to the development of the Korean 
broadcasting industry based on its nationwide network of 19 regional stations 
and 9 subsidiaries.  
  MBC’s flagship terrestrial television station is channel 11 on VHF in Seoul. 
The network is owned by the Foundation of Broadcast Culture (70% of the 
company's stock), while the Jung-Su Scholarship Foundation owns 30%.  
  In its earlier history, MBC used to be a private commercial network but when 
the Chun Doo-hwan regime closed private commercial radio and TV networks 
MBC was forced to give most of its shares to the government, losing its position 
as a private broadcaster. In 1980, 70% of the MBC network's stock was given 
to the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS). 
  The Foundation for Broadcast Culture, which currently holds 70% of MBC 
shares, was created in 1988. The Foundation helped to free MBC from external 
constraints, thus resulting in greater independence. According to the 
Foundation for Broadcasting Culture Act, 15% of the operating profit must be 
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returned to the Foundation for public use. Moreover, the Korean Broadcasting 
Law requires the MBC to contribute 4.75% of its total advertising revenue to the 
Broadcasting Development Fund operated by the Korean Broadcasting 
Commission, which undertakes broadcasting development tasks as well as arts 
and cultural projects (MBC, 2012).  
2.5 Threats and Opportunities Facing PSB  
Paddy Scannell once remarked that, ‘if the PSB simply is a series of pragmatic, 
instrumental solutions to problems as they arose initially, it should, indeed have 
disappeared as those problems were overcome’ (Scannell, 1996, p. 24). 
However, PSB has shown no signs of vanishing in Britain or elsewhere in East 
Asia. From the practical examples outlined in the last section, it seems the 
public service broadcasting still thrives in many countries. However, over the 
last two decades public service broadcasters around the world have faced 
increasing pressures from both accelerating commercialisation and the 
fragmentation of the broadcasting environment. A widespread assault can also 
be seen on the importance, even legitimacy, of public service broadcasting in 
the major industrialised democracies (Tracey, 1998, p. 40).  
2.5.1 The Decline and Fall of PSB   
Scannell (1996) notes that a combination of new technologies and a new 
political climate in the 1980s seemed to put a question mark against the 
continuing relevance of public service broadcasting. Critics claimed that ‘its 
original rationales had disappeared; that PSB had been merely a pragmatic 
response in the early twentieth century to the problems of spectrum scarcity 
and of financing broadcast services’ (Scannell, 1996, p. 23). With new 
information technologies seen as solving the problem of channel scarcity and 
the payment mechanism, and with fibre-optic cabling and geo-stationary 
satellites delivering a range of services hitherto unimaginable, the need for PSB 
seems simply to wither away as the market took over.  
However, Scannell (1996) argues, such arguments have been market-led. 
They start from ‘the assumption that broadcasting is a business like any other – 
that its business is the profit-driven production programme commodities and 
that these are produces for consumption like any other commodities’ (Scannell, 
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1996, p. 24). 
The defenders of PSB take a different view of broadcasting. Broadcasting 
certainly is a large scale business, but its business is not just the production of 
media commodities but of a communicative relationship (Garnham, 1994).  
The question of whether a market- led approach to broadcasting is better or 
worse than a public service- led view cannot be settled definitively one way or 
another (Scannell, 1996, pp. 24-25). 
  On the basis of his review of various public service broadcasters around the 
globe, Tracey (1998) identifies a number of major challenges facing the PSB. 
They can be summarised as follows (Tracey, 1998, p. 17): 
1) The Structural challenge: created on the one hand by the desire to shift the 
‘burden’ of funding away from the public purse and on the other by the desire to 
develop high-tech cable and satellite with all the consequent implications for a 
multi-channel environment;   
2) The ideological challenge: the assumption that the social good flows not 
from collective activity organised from the top down, but from myriad individual 
decisions organised from the bottom up; 
3) The development and character of new technologies: new technologies offer 
plentiful possibilities for interactive communication which emphasise the visual, 
immediate, and sensual at the expense of the deliberative and cerebral; 
4) Social practices: the inclusive ‘public’ character of broadcasting is 
challenged by the increasing mobility of listening and viewing, as people 
increasingly jettison the set schedules devised by broadcasting organisations 
and access programming across a widening range of platforms at times of their 
own choosing.  
Facing these challenges, PSB defenders continue to argue that the central 
role of PSB in guaranteeing diversity of representation cannot be easily 
replaced by the multi-channel environment. This is because the television 
industry has high fixed costs and low marginal costs (Graham & Davies, 1997, 
p. 11) a characteristic which leads to concentration of ownership and similarity 
of programmes as companies compete for the same audiences and advertising 
by concentrating on already popular formats, matching like with like. As a 
consequence, although it seems ‘that viewers have more choice in the 
multi-channel environment but actually it is more of the same’ (Seaton 2003, p. 
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375). According to this argument, developments in communications 
technologies may have solved the problem of spectrum scarcity but have not 
fostered a more diverse television market. This position supports the view that 
PSB remains a necessary corrective to the failures of the market system (DTI & 
DCMS, 2000) and continues to merit public funding. 
2.5.2 Challenges for PSB Introduction into Transitional Countries 
In many parts of the ‘transnational’ world, public service broadcasting is a 
distant ideal but a working reality. The main reason is that even when the 
leaders in these countries have embraced that ideal, ‘the lack of a receptive 
political and professional culture is often the next hurdle’ (Raboy, 1996, p. 2). 
Raboy indicates that problems of financing, mandate, and interpretations of 
purpose are ‘all indications of a more fundamental problem of political will’ 
(1996, p. 2). 
From long term observation, Rumphorst (2007) highlights the challenges 
facing the introduction of PSB in o countries with state broadcasting on the one 
hand and commercial broadcasting on the other. 
According to Rumphorst (2007), in countries with state owned systems, it 
may not be easy to convince those in power to give up their direct control over 
broadcasting and transform it into truly independent public service broadcasting. 
However, in many such countries democratic ideas and principles have gained 
ground over recent years and ‘put the citizen increasingly at the centre of 
attention’ (Rumphorst, 2007, p. 10).  
At the same time, the communications environment has also been changing 
in fundamental ways with global deregulation in the telecommunications field, 
commercial broadcasting virtually everywhere with little regulation, satellite 
broadcasting with no national borders, cable distribution of foreign programmes, 
technical developments like digitisation and compression which offer 
possibilities for many additional programme channels, and the arrival of the 
Internet which carries unlimited numbers of audio and audiovisual programmes. 
In the situation, in Rumphorst’s view (2007, p. 11), though it may be clear that 
state broadcasting is no longer viable, ‘It certainly takes courage for those in 
power to install and to live with truly independent public service broadcasting’.  
On the other hand, in countries which so far been dominated by commercial 
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broadcasting, it will also be difficult to obtain the necessary support for 
introducing public service broadcasting (Rumphorst, 2007, p. 12). For one of 
the pillars of a truly independent public service broadcasting, a system of 
obligatory licence fee funding, may be very difficult to establish among viewers 
who are accustomed to ‘free’ programmes. 
However, in countries where commercial broadcasting has only functioned in 
conformity with the logics of the market, it also can be observed that audiences 
may increasingly feel the need for ‘different’ content.  
All forms of broadcasting are ultimately financed by consumers and citizens. 
The financial support might come from tax payers in the form of direct state 
funding, from consumers via additions to the price of purchased goods 
designed to offset the costs of commercial advertising, from subscribers to 
pay-tv channels, or from a mandatory levy or licence on receiving sets. Each of 
these forms of payment carries with it certain assumptions. 
1) Tax-payers: the state makes the programmes in the best interests of the 
state; 
2) Consumers: the commercial broadcasters choose the programmes to 
maximize both its audience share and its profits; 
3) Subscribers: in the same situation as consumers in 2); 
4) Licence-fee payers: a public service broadcaster produces programmes 
for citizens (Rumphorst, 2007, pp. 10-12). 
2.6 Summary  
As we have seen in this chapter, PSB in many countries is in a situation of 
retreat with its values and funding mechanisms placed under acute pressure. 
Against this background its expansion in Taiwan seems to contradict a 
significant global trend. Basically, the battle for public broadcasting in Taiwan 
can be addresses with two streaks:  
  1). Taiwan was going against the grain of international trends of PSB while a 
number of media commentators in the PSB traditional heartlands have been 
asking whether the PSB idea has now outlived its usefulness;  
  2). The argument for PSB was going against the grain of the growing 
enthusiasm for privatisation and market-led solutions - not just in broadcasting 
but within the economy as a whole as it moved from state management.  
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  On the other hand, in terms of the necessarily context-specific prescriptions 
for Taiwan’s PSB in Taiwan, in the domestic political background, withdrawing 
state and party control from broadcasting were viewed as a departure point 
rather than programme quality and market failures.  
  Similar to other public broadcasters around the world, the discussions on the 
institutionalisation of Taiwan’s PSB has been led by political and media elites. It 
is hard to escape a conclusion that the elite-oriented streak has played a key 
role in most public broadcasters. However, compared with the earliest 
conceptualisation of public broadcasting, the paternalistic Reithian idea that 
elites have a responsibility to decide and determine what the public interest is 
and how it should be catered for, nowadays the public engagement in the PSB 
system is a key reason of a healthy PSB (Hu, 2007, p. 207; Thompson, 2006, 
p.4). As Mark Thompson argued that it is about how to develop ‘widespread 
public support’ (Thompson, 2006, p.4).  
Seen in this light, the main task of this thesis is to assess the context specific 
political, social and cultural forces that have shaped the recent PSB expansion 
in Taiwan. In pursuit of this aim the following two chapters will address firstly 
the national peculiarities of Taiwan’s media landscape and secondly the way 
Taiwan’s PSB has developed within this specific context. These contextualizing 
chapters are then followed by 4 chapters which draw on interview data, press 
content analysis, and the close examination of editorials and letters to the 
editor, to develop an analysis of how the idea of PSB and the intention to 
expand it has been socially defined and contested. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Transitional Taiwan and Its 
Broadcasting Landscape  
 
 
 
 
In the opening chapter it was briefly mentioned that some features of how 
commercial pressures and rating-driven competitions are played out in 
Taiwan’s media landscape and how this lead to insistent calls for the 
introduction of proper PSB media to temper this environment. These issues are 
explored in greater detail in this chapter by looking at how the origins of the 
current media environment have been shaped by wider political, social and 
economic transformations in Taiwan. 
This chapter begins with a national profile of Taiwan and goes through a brief 
history and different groups of people that have inhabited the island. Then 
some key aspects in political, cultural and social changes in this transitional 
society will be highlighted to demonstrate their relevant influences on the media 
landscape. As further background, a chronological overview of Taiwan’s media 
history will be presented that identifies three main periods of television 
development in Taiwan, named as ‘scarcity’, ‘choice’ and ‘abundance’ (Pauwels, 
2010). These features are useful to highlight the shifting process from a 
stated-controlled media environment to the current highly-commercialized 
media landscape where the fledgling PSB is struggling to survive.   
This chapter concludes with a discussion of the systematic failures of media 
representations in the profit-driven Taiwanese media environment.   
3.1 National Profile of Taiwan 
Geographically, Taiwan is situated in the western Pacific between Japan to the 
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north and southern China to the west (See Figure 3.1 above). It lies along the 
major air and sea transportation routes in the region. As an oceanic nation of 
23 million people (See table 3.1 above), the Republic of China (ROC) 
government comprises the main island of Taiwan, the archipelagos of Penghu, 
Kinmen, and Matsu, and a number of other islands. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Map of Taiwan 
 
 
          (Source: Government Information Office, 2012b)  
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Table 3.1. Basic Data of Taiwan 
Area  
 
36,200 sq km (13,900 sq miles)  
(Taiwan proper and associated islands) 
Population 23.23 million (July 2012) 
Capital  Taipei City 
Official Language Mandarin (Chinese) 
Other Languages Holo (Chinese, one of Han subgroups) 
Hakka (Chinese, one of Han subgroups) 
Austronesian languages 
GDP Per Capita US Dollars $5,112 (2011) 
Economic Growth Rate  1.89% (2011) 
                   (Source: Government Information Office, Feb 2012) 
 
Over 95 percent of Taiwan’s population is of Han Chinese ancestry, with the 
remainder composed of indigenous peoples and recent immigrants (GIO, 2010). 
Han Taiwanese are the descendants of immigrants that arrived in two main 
waves: first, in the 17th century a huge wave of immigrants moved to Taiwan 
when the Ming dynasty on mainland was invaded, and later, in 1949, when the 
ROC government, led by KMT party, relocated to the island (Taiwan Year Book, 
2007). Mandarin Chinese, the official language, is almost universally spoken 
and understood, while large segments of the population also speak Holo and 
Hakka. In addition, Taiwan’s indigenous groups have their own Austronesian 
languages while immigrants speak a variety of tongues (GIO, 2007). 
 
3.2 External and Internal Tensions on Taiwan 
Judged by its population and size, Taiwan would not catch too much 
international attention. However, Taiwan keeps remaining in the global eye due 
to its geo-strategic location, and its complicated relationships with China and 
the United States.  
  One of the main international concerns is that ‘If one day there is a conflict 
between America and China the spark will most likely be Taiwan since America 
underwrites the security of democratic Taiwan’ (BBC, 14/Jan/2012a).  
  A significant example can be seen in January 2012 when democratic 
elections of presidential and parliamentary were held in Taiwan, an island which 
is just over 100 miles from China. The elections were closely watched by many 
global media since the election results might have created a new source of 
instability in Asia if the DPP party that supports Taiwanese independence won, 
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which neither America nor China would have wanted to occur. Ironically, the 
peaceful character of this election was commented upon as ‘unusual’ because 
on this occasion there were none of the troubles that marred previous elections 
(‘in 1996 China lobbed missiles into the sea near Taiwan, in 2000 China issued 
warnings about the electoral outcome, in 2004 one of the presidential 
candidates was shot and there were several corruption scandals during the 
2008 campaign’) (the Economist, 2012, p. 54).  
In the 2012 election, the KMT and pro-Chinese candidate Ma Ying-Jeou 
secured a second term in office, beating Tsai Ing-Wen, a female candidate from 
the main opposition and pro-independence party, DPP. It was a close win for 
KMT since President Ma took 51.6% of the vote to challenger Tsai's 45.6%. 
Many international media reported that the final result was ‘a relief to both 
China and America’ (BBC, 14/Jan/2012a; Guardian, 14/Jan/2012a; Guardian, 
14/Jan/2012b; Washington Post, 14/Jan/2012; Financial Times, 15/Jan/2012; 
The Sunday Times, 15/Jan/2012; the Economist, 2012, p. 54) since the result 
also reaffirmed KMT’s policy of establishing closer ties with Beijing. 
The election not only epitomizes the external pressures outside Taiwan, but 
also how internal tensions form a controversial political divide between 
pro-China and pro-independence.  
  The issue of the extent to which Taiwan can assert autonomy from China has 
been a running sore in Sino-US relations for more than six decades since in 
1949, the ROC government, led by the KMT, relocated to Taiwan when the 
Chinese Communist Party established the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
on mainland China. In the section that follows I will examine how Taiwan has 
developed from the historical context since the KMT’s relocation to Taiwan in 
1949. 
3.3 Brief Overview of Taiwan’s History 
A brief summary of milestone events towering in Taiwan's history from the 
traces of early inhabitants to the latest developments is provided in following 
section in a chronological overview table (see Table 3.2. below).  
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Table3.2. Key Events in Taiwan's History (1624-2011) 
European colonization 
1624 
1626 
1642 
1621-1622 
-Beginning of Dutch colonization  
-Beginning of Spanish colonization (northern Taiwan)  
-Spanish driven out by the Dutch; Reign of the Jheng family  
-Han administration after Jheng Cheng-gong defeated the Dutch 
Ching Rule  
1683 
1885 
-Replacement of the Jheng family as rulers of Taiwan by the Manchus  
-Incorporation of Taiwan as the 22nd province of China  
Japanese colonization  
1895 
1895-1919 
 
1919-1936 
 
1936-1945 
 
 
 
1945 
-Taiwan ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki  
-Pacification and special governance: The Japanese used the military and police 
to suppress dissent. 
-Assimilation of Taiwanese as an extension of the Japan homeland: Japan 
claimed the rights of Taiwanese were protected under its domestic codes.  
-Japanisation: The colonial government adopted a Japanization policy to 
naturalize Taiwan's residents as Japanese citizens. Taiwanese were forced to 
deny their heritage by adopting Japanese names, clothing, cuisine, and 
religious rituals. 
-Japan's defeat and surrender at the end of World War II. 
The ROC on Taiwan  
1945 
1971 
1979 
1986 
1987 
1996 
2000 
 
2002 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2008 
 
 
 
2009 
 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
-Control of Taiwan passed to the ROC government  
-Withdrawal of the ROC from the United Nations  
-Termination of diplomatic ties with the ROC by the United States 
-Formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)  
-Lifting of martial law (had been in effect since 1949) 
-Taiwan's first direct presidential election  
-Taiwan's second direct presidential election (Transfer of political power from 
Kuomintang to DPP) 
-Accession of Taiwan to the World Trade Organization  
-Holding of the third direct presidential election along with the first national 
referendum  
-Constitutional amendments provide for ratification of future amendments 
through referendum, and for overhaul of the system for electing legislators. 
-The fourth direct presidential election results in the second transfer of power 
between political parties. 
Several economic and other technical agreements are signed with mainland 
China, marking a new era of détente. 
-ROC health minister leads an observer-status delegation to attend the World 
Health Assembly of the World Health Organization under the name “Chinese 
Taipei.” 
-The ROC inks the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
with mainland China. 
-The ROC celebrates its centennial in Taiwan. 
 
Source: Government Information Office (2012c)  
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As Table 3.2 outlines above, after China's defeat in the First Sino-Japanese 
War, in 1895 Taiwan was ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
(GIO, 2005). The Japanese colonial government undertook several 
infrastructure developments to remake this island to a base where Japan could 
expand southward. Under a half-century of colonial rule, which sought to make 
Taiwan an agricultural base serving Japan’s strategic needs, Taiwan’s 
agricultural had been commercialised and given a strong foreign trade 
orientation (Garver, 2011). Also, culturally the government conducted 
‘Japanisation’ to naturalize Taiwan's residents into Japanese way. For example, 
Taiwanese were forced to give up their heritage by adopting Japanese names, 
cuisine and lifestyle. Chinese languages and customs were discouraged. Under 
the colonisation, Taiwanese were denied the right of self-governance and were 
kept out of key positions in all facets of society (GIO, 2007).  
  At the end of World War II in 1945, following Japan's defeat and surrender, 
Japan relinquished Taiwan and the Republic of China assumed control of 
Taiwan. In 1949, the KMT government in China relocated to Taiwan after losing 
a civil war against the Chinese Communists. The influx of soldiers and 
immigrants from the mainland China to Taiwan changed the island’s character 
by getting it involved in the Cold War.  
When the Korean War happened in 1950, the USA dispatched its Seventh 
Fleet to protect Taiwan from the communists and began to provide Taiwan with 
economic and military aids (GIO, 2005). In 1958 the US and ROC government 
issued a joint communiqué reaffirming their solidarity. This prevented Taiwan 
from being conquered by the communists in China through the 1950s and 
1960s (GIO, 2007). 
  From 1951 to 1965, large amounts of economic and military aid came from 
the United States. Much of the aid was used to improve Taiwan's infrastructure 
and the agricultural sector. With industrialization and modernisation, rapid 
economic development has shifted Taiwan form a former colony to a energetic 
exporter of high-tech products after 1980s (Booth, 2011). After the lifting of 
Martial Law in 1987, a process of democratization began (Wang, & Lo, 2000). 
The democratisation was implemented by transforming the government from 
single-party rule of KMT to a government determined by democratic elections. 
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A high point of the democratisation appeared in 2000 not only when the main 
opposition party Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) defeated long-term 
dominant KMT in election, but also the executive power was handed over 
peacefully (GIO, 2010).  
In the transitional history outlined above, some eye-catching features can be 
underlined in economic, political, cultural and social aspects. 
3.3.1 Economic Aspect 
Taiwan’s economic growth, from a former colony with a defeated power in 1945 
to ‘an Asian tiger’ in the 1960s and 1970s’, and ‘a formidable producer and 
exporter of medium- and high-technology products after 1980’, is one of 
distinctive features that shaped the character of the transitional society (Booth, 
2011, p. 101).  
Between 1962 and 1985, Taiwan's economy experienced its rapid growth. In 
the early 1980s, items such as garments, footwear and toys were still the key 
products contributing to the economic growth, but by the end of the 1990s, their 
shares had become negligible. That is because at the beginning of 1980s, the 
government carried out a series of plans to shift the economy by forcing the 
labour-intensive industries, once the mainstay of Taiwan's economy, to give 
way to technology-intensive or capital-intensive industries. In the 1990s, the 
electronics and information-technology sectors expanded rapidly to become 
Taiwan's main industries, accounting for more output and exports than any 
other sector in the manufacturing industry. By 2002, the largest share went to 
electronic goods, information and communication products, basic metals, 
non-garment textiles and machinery. All of these new exports were capital- or 
skill- intensive or both (Chu & San, 2011). 
In this rapid economic development, a significant economic trend worth 
noticing was the rise of investments in China in the 1980s by Taiwan's business 
community (Taiwan Yearbook, 2007). The sharp increase of Taiwan's exports to 
China beginning in the 1990s decreased the island's dependence on the US 
market (GIO, 2012c). 
Compared with mainland China, a key element in Taiwan's steady economic 
growth was the wide range of implementation of education throughout the 
island to raise literacy rates (GIO, 2006). For example, in 1951, 34.6 percent of 
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the population six years and older were illiterate. This figure had dropped to 
15.3 percent by 1969 and to 2.84 percent of the population over 15 years of 
age in 2004 (Taiwan Yearbook, 2007). 
Another key element was Taiwan's enterprising spirit which has been viewed 
as an important drive to help Taiwanese overcome the difficulties in economical 
and political situation and brought about globally-acclaimed economic 
achievements (GIO, 2007). The remarkable transformation of Taiwan, from a 
poor and agriculture-based economy into a knowledge-based economy, has 
been seen as a part of a broad set of changes often labelled as ‘globalisation’. 
Taiwan entrepreneurs have been important drives of the process of the 
globalization, and the Taiwan economy has naturally been one of its largest 
beneficiaries (Naughton, 2011).  
3.3.2 Political Aspect 
Taiwan’s rapid industrialization during the 1960s and 1970s, combined with the 
democratic revolution that began with the lifting of Martial Law in 1987 were of 
deep historic importance.  
Looking over the history of Taiwan’s democracy, Schafferer (2005, p. 1) 
roughly draws three periods of development in the history of Taiwan’s political 
field:  
1) Limited pluralist authoritarian party system (1945-1986);  
2) Pluralist party system with one dominant party KMT (1986-2000), and  
3) Polarized pluralist party system.  
  A limited pluralist authoritarian party system developed in Taiwan under the 
KMT regime between 1945 and 1986. The relocation of the ROC government 
to Taiwan at the end of the Chinese civil war opened the beginning of Martial 
Law (1949-1987) in Taiwan. This imposed press censorship, banned new 
political parties, and restricted freedoms of speech, publication, assembly, and 
association. During that time, the KMT government allowed opposition 
candidates to take part in local and national elections, and to form loosely 
connected political organizations, but ‘restricted the political power of the 
opposition’ (Schafferer, 2005, p. 1). In 1975, after the death of the KMT leader 
and President Chiang Kai-shek, his son Chiang Ching-Kuo came to power to 
continue the dominant ruling. In 1987, shortly before Chiang Ching-Kuo’s death, 
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he lifted the Martial Law, which made the democratization possible (Wang, & Lo, 
2000). 
  The late 1970s and early 1980s, some opposition movements against the 
one-party authoritarian rule of KMT were undertaken by opposition leaders. The 
formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on September 28, 1986 
was a landmark moment in Taiwan's progression towards multi-party 
democracy (Schafferer, 2005). 
  Taiwan's first direct presidential election was held in 1996, and the KMT 
incumbent Lee Teng-hui was re-elected. But the real test of Taiwan's 
democratic progress came with the first transfer of power in March 2000. DPP 
candidate Chen Shui-bian won the second presidential election, ending the 
KMT's half-century hold on the presidency. According Rawnsley & Rawnsley 
(2012, p. 16) a conclusion can be drawn from Taiwan’s experience that 
liberalization and democratization are phases of political change presenting the 
least problems, but ‘this can only apply to transitions that are as atypical as 
Taiwan’s – smooth, non-violent, consensual, incremental and elite-driven’ 
(Rawnsley & Rawnsley, 2012, p. 16).  
  In March 2004, President Chen Shui-bian was re-elected. As of June 2006, a 
total of 118 political parties had registered with the Ministry of the Interior. 
Currently, the six largest parties are the ruling Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP), the Kuomintang (KMT), People First Party (PFP), Taiwan Solidarity 
Union (TSU), Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (NPSU), and New Party (NP)- all 
have seats in the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan at a Glance, 2007).  
  In 2008, KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou won the election and led the KMT 
back in power. In 2012, President Ma Ying-Jeou secured a second term by 
beating DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen. 
3.3.3 Culture and Social Aspect  
Over the next decade after 1987, Taiwan’s ‘political miracle’ matched its earlier 
‘economic miracle’, and the continuation of these achievements came along 
with the new challenges surfacing when group consciousness emerged as a 
reaction to the decades-long suppression of cultural diversity under Martial Law. 
For instance, ‘the social movements of women, labour, and environmental 
issues all played an increasingly engaged role in trying to guide government 
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policy’ (Fell, 2012, p. 234). As different social groups competed fiercely to exert 
their political subjectivity, the politics of difference among various groups have 
generated the arising conflicts from their struggle over political recognition. In 
the arising conflicts, cultural differences often become the boundary of groups.  
Although Taiwan is a predominantly Chinese or Han society, its heritage is 
much more complex than this generalization could imply since the succeeding 
waves of Han immigrants from mainland China belonged to a wide range of 
groups with various languages and different customs (GIO, 2009). In modern 
Taiwan, distinctions among the groups may have become blurred due to 
extensive intermarriage and universal use of the Mandarin Chinese language, 
but the ethnic composition can still be roughly separated into several groups, 
such as indigenous peoples, Han People, the Holo, the Hakka, and the 
immigrants arriving with ROC government after 1949 (Taiwan Yearbook, 2007).    
Before the arrival of any immigrants from China, indigenous people, 
possessing diverse cultures and languages, were the only inhabitants of Taiwan. 
Now they contribute about two percent of the whole Taiwanese population. 
Among them, there are 12 major different groups of indigenous peoples. 
Despite intensive exposure to Chinese and Western culture, the indigenous 
groups have maintained some of their unique lifestyle and distinctive cultural 
traits (GIO, 2007). 
  On the other hand, the ancestors of Taiwan's Han people started to migrate 
from China's south-eastern provinces to Taiwan in the 17th century. The 
majority of these early immigrants were composed of the Holo from southern 
Fujian Province and the Hakka from eastern Guangdong Province in China. 
Most of them moved to Taiwan for longing for better lives and seeking shelter 
from upheavals during the transition from the Ming dynasty to the Ching 
dynasty. After about three hundred years, another big wave of Han people 
moving into Taiwan again in large numbers of immigration. The ROC 
government led by KMT relocated to Taiwan in 1949 and brought about 1.2 
million people from China (GIO, 2006). Unlike earlier immigrants, the influx of 
the immigrants composed of people from every province of China. They are not 
only Han Chinese but also minority peoples from Mongolia, Tibet, and 
south-western China. These immigrants brought their own customs and cultural 
traditions to Taiwan, which are as distinctive and rich as those of the Holo, 
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Hakka, and indigenous peoples. The cultural influence of these immigrants on 
Taiwan can be seen in diversity of food, songs, art and literature. 
The languages and dialects spoken in Taiwan also have their own origins. 
Common Han languages used in Taiwan include Mandarin, Holo Taiwanese 
and Hakka while the indigenous groups use their own indigenous languages 
(GIO, 2007). After the KMT government moved to Taiwan in 1949, Mandarin 
Chinese was decided to be the official language and was forced to promote 
through the educational system.  
Following Taiwan's democratization in the late 1980s, social pluralisation was 
accompanied by a growing emphasis on local languages. Public and private 
efforts have been devoted to teaching students their mother tongues and 
preserve the languages and dialects of smaller ethnic groups. For instance, to 
help preserve indigenous culture, the government has included the study of 
indigenous languages in Taiwan's compulsory education system. In 2005, more 
than 40,000 elementary and junior high school students took indigenous 
language courses, and 40 languages and dialects were taught. (Taiwan 
Yearbook, 2007). 
  In a review of transitional changes in cultural way, Lee & Wu (2006, pp. 5-7) 
roughly coin ‘five phases of the development of civil society’ in post-war Taiwan. 
They can be briefly summarised as follows. The first phase from 1965 to 1978 
is a period when the society experienced rapid modernisation. The concept of 
‘right’ was emerging but the different groups from various concerns still remain 
in the relationship of patron and client with the state. In the second phase from 
1978 to 1986, with the growing numbers of groups representing different voices 
in the society, the role of these group gradually shifted from clients to ‘watch 
dogs’ which are without rather than within the configuration of the state. The 
third phase from 1986 to 1990 is the time when some sociologists introduce the 
concept of civil society from the Western countries while social movements of 
women, labour, politics were emerging. The seed of civil society and pluralism 
grew its impact during the fourth phase from 1990 to 2000 and reached a high 
peak in 2000 when the unprecedented power shift occurred in the presidential 
election. In the fifth phase, from 2000 to date, the concept of civil society has 
gained a solid foundation and become a ideal model in most discussions of 
social development.  
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Combined with the political and economic background discussed earlier, from 
authoritarian society to young democracy, from agricultural system to a 
showcase of capitalism, Lee & Wu (2006) indicate that shaping of the civil 
society echoes with the governmental intervention from the state and the 
ideology of capitalism behind the rapid economic growth. However, compared 
with the capitalism-orientated civil society in Hong Kong and authoritarian 
society in China, Lee & Wu also (2006) note the civil society in Taiwan is 
somewhere between the both types.   
  As discussed in Chapter 2, the media plays a pivotal role in the 
empowerment of civil society. The interaction of media with the transitions to 
democracy and the civil society in Taiwan will be addressed in next section.  
 
3.4 Three Phase of Television Transitions in Taiwan 
Having summarized some of the key aspects in the process of transforming 
Taiwan, this section further examine the shaping of the media landscape in that 
social context to become a competitive market driven by maximizing rating and 
profits. The section looks at the both ways in which the democratization in 
Taiwan has influences and been influenced by the media. 
A media profile of modern Taiwan can be seen in table 3.3. below.  
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Table 3.3. Media Profile of Taiwan    (Jun, 2011) 
Radio stations 171 
Terrestrial (wireless) television stations  5 
Cable television companies  69 
TV & radio program production companies  7,160 
Audio (compact disc, etc.) production companies  10,098 
Satellite broadcasting program providers 107 
Satellite broadcasting service operators  9 
Newspapers  2,156 
Magazines  8,122 
Book publishers  13,257 
Foreign media with correspondents in Taiwan 61 
Source: Government Information Office: Taiwan Year book (2012d) 
 
 
As table 3.3. shows, a very crowded media market can be seen with the size of 
Taiwan and its population. As discussed in the first chapter, this hyper 
competitiveness has tended to foster sensationalism and triviality in much of 
the sector. Several media scholars identify the ‘invasion’ of a HK newspaper, 
Apple Daily, in 2003 as a key factor in exacerbating ‘tabloidisation’ in the 
Taiwanese media during the early years of the twenty first century. (Lin, 2008; 
Lo, 2008; Lee & Li, 2006, Ko, 2003). According to these sources, the notorious 
tabloid style and values of the Apple Daily stimulated a competitive emulation in 
other Taiwanese titles that significantly reshaped the media landscape. 
However, not all agree, for example the academic We Ti, adopting a political 
economic perspective, held that most of these increasingly accentuated 
features were ‘home grown’ (Her, 2006) with their roots in the shaping history of 
Taiwan’s Media environment. In other words, the ‘uni-causal’ offered by the 
Apple Daily invasion might obscure deeper economic imperatives that have 
shaped the Taiwanese mediascape over a far longer period of time. Here We 
Ti’s view (Her, 2006) is taken as a departure point for this section to review the 
shaping process of the contemporary media landscape to identify the 
‘home-grown’ problems and to see how the PSB expansion can serve as a 
solution.  
A brief overview of iconic events in Taiwan television history is shown in Table 
4.4. below.  
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Table 3.4. Landmark Dates in Taiwan Television History 
1962 
 
The Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV) was founded as the first commercial TV 
broadcaster in Taiwan. TTV was the pioneer of TV industry in the local media 
market.  
1969 The China Television Company (CTV) established. KMT-related enterprises 
invested most of share with the television station.  
1971 The Chinese Television System (CTS) was built to serve military and educational 
purposes. More than 70 percentage of its share are owned by the Ministry of 
National Defence and its related enterprise. 
1976 The legislature passed the Broadcasting and Television Law as the regulation of 
the television market. 
1980 Taiwanese prime minister, Mr. Sun Yun-hsuan, proposed to set up a Public 
Television Service. It was the first introduction of the concepts of the public service 
broadcasting in Taiwan. 
1987  Taiwan government lifted the martial law. 
1991 STAR TV entered the market in 1991, and STAR TV Chinese was the first foreign 
channel to be broadcast via a cable television system.  
(Successively, TVBS, Discovery, HBO, CNBC, Disney, ESPN, NHK, Super TV, and 
many others have entered this market.) 
1993 Emerged in the late 1970s as an underground media, the cable television was 
legalized after 20-years illegal existing. The penetration rate of Taiwan's cable 
television service increased rapidly from 39.3% in 1992 to 56.2% in 1993. 
1994 The penetration rate of the cable TV increased from 56.2% in 1993 to 66.3% in 
1994. 
1997 On May 31st, the Law of PTS finally passed in the Legislative Yuan. 
1997 The fourth terrestrial television station, Formosa TV, was established under the 
protest of the opposition party (DPP).  
Formosa TV is a television station based in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. FTV began 
broadcasting on June 11, 1997. 
1998 The fifth free-to-air nationwide TV station, the Public Television Station., was official 
established and launched its first broadcasting on July 1st. 
2006 The Taiwan Broadcasting System (TBS) launched.   
  
 Source: Government Information Office: Taiwan Year book/Media (2012d) 
  
 
 
In Pauwels’ analysis (2010) of television history in Europe, a chronological 
overview is presented by coining three main periods of the history:  
    1) Television within frontiers’ period;  
    2) Television without frontiers’ period; and  
    3) Television beyond frontiers’ period.  
  The three periods respectively show three key features in the periods of the 
history: scarcity, choice and abundance (Pauwels, 2010). This categorisation 
can also reflect the features of Taiwan’s broadcasting development, and for this 
reason the frame is adopted in this section to distinguish different phases of the 
media development in Taiwan. To some extent, the three periods might overlap 
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each other in this categorisation.  
3.4.1 Television within Frontiers: Scarcity (1949-1987) 
In most authoritarian countries, it can be seen that those in power often ‘put the 
media under tight control in order to consolidate their ruling power’ (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004, pp. 119-121). This feature was clearly evident in Taiwan in the 
period from 1949 to 1987. The implementation of the Martial Law in 1949 
declared a state of emergency, and rights of assembly, association, and the 
right to form political parties were suspended. In the thirty-eight years that 
followed, political rights and freedom of the media were limited (Lee, 2000, p. 
125; Jhou, 2007).  
In such a period, Taiwan’s first television system was in 1961, when the 
experimental National Education Television began broadcasting two hours of 
educational programming every day. This was followed by the establishment of 
Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV) in 1962, China Television Company (CTV) 
in 1969, and Chinese Television System (CTS) in 1971. These three television 
stations were responsible for broadcasting television programmes to whole 
Taiwan because local television stations were not permitted. As Seaton notes in 
discussion of the monopoly period of BBC, ‘the scarcity of the spectrum 
frequencies is considered the main justification for the monopoly position’ 
(Seaton 2003, p. 367), this was also an excuse for the KMT to justify their 
control on the monopoly television broadcasting system.  
Since the national economy was too impoverished to finance a 
non-commercial television system, non-commercial models were never 
contemplated (Lee, 1980). Take the first television station TTV ( from 1962 to 
1986)for example, apart from shareholding of government-owned Industries 
(48.95%), its shareholders also included private Japanese enterprises like Fuji, 
Toshiba, NEC and Hitachi, Ltd.   
  The second television station, China Television Company (CTV), received its 
50% investment from BCC (Broadcasting China Corporation: the main and 
largest radio network run by the KMT) and the other 50% came from other 
radio stations owned by domestic businesses in Taiwan. As a ‘television 
Company’, CTV claimed they were the first commercial television station in 
Taiwanese media history when it was established in 1969. However, since its 
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most investment were from the KMT-related enterprises, the management and 
programs of CTV were heavily influenced by KMT and the decisions for its 
management were made on political rather than professional grounds 
(Rawnsley & Rawnsley, 2012, pp. 4-5). The third one, CTS, was originally built 
to serve military and educational purposes. More than 70 % of its share was 
owned by the Ministry of National Defence and its related enterprise.  
In this period, Taiwan remained in a serious military conflict with communist 
mainland China, and in order to against communist’s anti-capitalism, the KMT 
state tended to harness and shape the state-owned but commercial-run 
television industry to showcase its commitment to free enterprise for the 
international community (Lee, 1980). In the state-owned and commercial-run 
model, the method of control was through a system of media ownership which 
not only privileged the regime but also embedded the media within the state 
structure. Table 3.5. below shows the ownership of three television which were 
under the control of a tri-power alliance of government, the ruling party, and the 
military between 1962 and 1986.  
 
 
Table 3.5. Three television stations and their shares distribution (1962-1986) 
  TTV CTV CTS  
Taiwan province government-owned 
Industries 
48.95    
KMT-owned Industries  68.32   
Ministry of National Defense Investment   40.15  
National Defense Ministry Related Industries   46.30  
Private Industries 51.05 31.77 13.55  
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 (Percentage) 
                                            Source: cited from Cheng (1993: p. 213) 
 
Table 3.5. illustrates a pattern of media ownership that does not conceal 
political influence and motives during the era of Martial Law. The KMT 
government, like their Communist counterparts in China (de Burgh 2003; 
Keane 2003, pp. 169–187) further created a labyrinthine patron-client network 
via the ownership control. The party-state incorporated the ‘patron-client 
relationship’ (or ‘clientelism’) into media control by rewarding certain media 
proprietors with high-ranking positions in the KMT or other economic benefits to 
ensure that media coverage presented the government in a favourable light 
(Lee, 2000; Lin, 2000). Some significant characteristics of the media in the 
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period were identified by Rawnsley & Rawnsley (2012, pp. 4-5). They can be 
summarised as follows:  
1) The media industries under the authoritarian system showed clear signs of 
clientelism, including important appointments and ownership;  
2) In order to reflect the political agenda, the news agenda and news 
coverage were politically controlled or influenced;  
3) Laws and legal systems were used to influence or intimidate the media. It 
led to a heavy self-censorship by media workers and the self-censorship was 
necessary for their survival;  
4) An autonomous public sphere was missing in the media. 
The features of this period outlined above mirror the inclination to perceive 
and practice the television stations as political instruments of state control. 
There was little room for the media to play an independent role isolated from 
political force and the political communication was a one-way, top-down 
process that transmitted the political will without a genuine public sphere for 
deliberation and dialogue.  
3.4.2 Television without Frontiers: Choices (1988-1999) 
Until the beginning of liberalization and democratization in 1987, the KMT 
maintained its control on the three national television stations via ownership 
which held by an overlapping party/state/military political authority that defined 
the martial law era. Economically, the three terrestrial television stations also 
accounted for a significant portion of the economic value in the monopolized 
market. After Martial Law was lifted in 1987, the oligopoly of the three main 
terrestrial televisions was changed by multi-channel competition coming 
alongside the prevalence of cable and satellite televisions and the launch of 
two other terrestrial television stations, Formosa Television (FTV) and the 
Public Television Station (PTS).  
  The feature of the changing political economy in the post-martial law period 
was increased capital concentration and a new alliance of money. One striking 
character in this period was the emergence of the cable television system 
which offered alternative ‘choices’ from the mainstream terrestrial televisions.  
  Cable television initially grew out from community antenna television. The 
community antenna, which was first appeared in 1969, was originally designed 
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to improve the reception quality in remote areas and mountainous terrain. 
Some operators began to offer illegal programmes and services by installing 
cheap transmission equipment in 1976. Taiwanese audience quickly embraced 
these cable channels due to the paucity of programming provided by the three 
terrestrial television stations. Cable television also captured a social and civic 
need by providing alternative political views from officially sanctioned 
information (Lee, 2000). Cable television soon became a profitable venture 
despite being illegal. Operators spread rapidly all over Taiwan. It was estimated 
that by 1984 there were over two hundred cable television (Weng, 1993), and 
over six hundred by 1993 (GIO, Jun/2003).  
Around this time, STAR TV Chinese became the first foreign channel to be 
broadcast via a cable television system when the satellite television system 
STAR TV entered the market in 1991. After that, TVBS, Discovery, HBO, 
CNBC, Disney, ESPN, NHK, Super TV, and many others have successively 
entered this market. These companies have competed with domestic satellite 
channels since the 1990s. These companies became increasing absorbed 
within the cable system and became the most important content providers.  
Wen (1993) highlighted several reasons for the prevalence of cable 
television, including 1) multiple choices of programmes; 2) technological 
progression; 3) appearance of the videotape and satellite providers; 4) 
subscription fee of cable television was much lower than buying a video player 
and videotapes; 5) no proper regulation on cable television operators for more 
than 20 years; and 6) an underground economy where pirate videotape 
factories supplied cheap American and Japanese movies, sex videos and latest 
releases to cable television operators. This cut down the cost for cable 
television operators to survive in the market. 
The rapid proliferation of the cable television soon raised two problems for 
the KMT government. This first problem was a growing threat to their ruling 
legitimacy. Some cable television systems were directly run by members of 
opposition parties and often delivered their own political points of view and 
alternative news sources challenging the monopoly of the state broadcasting. 
For example, the main opposition DPP’s fight for a reorganized media system, 
through the cable television, posed a challenge to the state. In the late 1980s, 
the DPP legislators often involved in physical fight with fists against the KMT 
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legislators to pass or reject special bills. Since the KMT’s media control, the 
physical confrontations in the legislature were always portrayed the DPP party 
in a negative way. The DPP legislators complained whenever the three main 
terrestrial television stations showed the fighting scenes, the DPP were 
portrayed in an unfair representation with bias. In order to balance television 
coverage, some DPP members utilised the videotapes to show their own 
perspective of what really happened in the Legislative Yuan through cable 
television system.  
As a substitute to mainstream media and programming of a local nature, 
cable television offered the possibility for forging stronger social relationships 
between sources and the audience. Such a narrowcasting, however, also 
divided the audience seeking out those programmes that corresponded to their 
own political orientation. As Robinson (1996) points out, coverage and talk 
shows on cable television did not make for notably more objective comment but 
promoted competition in biased reporting. Rawnsley (2001) indicated that in the 
period biased reporting was used to promote the political views associated with 
the opposition parties. ‘Bias for the opposition is warranted by the opposition 
parties because it can balance the bias of the mainstream media which favours 
the KMT government and remedy an already unbalanced media environment 
under KMT control’ (Rawnsley, 2001: p76).  
  The second problem is that most of cable television violated copyright 
policy by broadcasting pirated films. Some U.S. film distributors were enraged 
for their loss of business interests and condemned the illegal behaviour. Under 
pressure from the film industry, American Trade Representatives strongly 
lobbied for a new legal regime for cable and an official crackdown on illegal 
cable television systems. In March 1991, these issues were presented on the 
main agenda during the Taiwan-American copyright and patent protection 
Negotiations (Chin, 1997). 
Under pressures respectively from the opposition party (DPP), the cable 
television operators, and American officials, the KMT state compromised upon 
the existence of cable television. In 1993, the Cable Television Act was 
formulated under cross-pressure from various interest groups including political 
parties and private sections. After cable television was officially legalised in 
1993, the industry experienced tremendous changes in terms of its market 
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scale and structure (See table 3.6. below). The penetration rate of Taiwan's 
cable television service increased rapidly, from 39.3% in 1992 to 56.2% in 1993 
and grew to 66.3% in 1994. 
After the Cable Television Act in 1993, the Taiwanese government formulated 
the Satellite Act in 1999 to regulate the satellite operators and satellite program 
suppliers (See table 3.6. below). Since the satellite and cable television 
industry attracted both local and foreign entrepreneurs, their appearance 
introduced more competition and led to increased capital concentration and a 
new alliance of money and power in the seeming multiple-choice media 
environment (See table 3.6. below). 
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As part of the global trend toward broadcasting deregulation, Taiwan’s cable 
industry brought coalition between political groups and financial interests to 
another level, and the cable television itself may serve as a conduit for 
international capital (Feng, 1995). Although state control waned, the state still 
could allocate resources to maintain influence via alliance with their capital. 
Thus, political power and commercial capital developed a new dialectical 
relationship in this period. The cable and satellite competitive market also 
reflect a wide spectrum of political orientation in Taiwan. Although no cable 
system is directly run by any political parties, some systems are indirectly 
affiliated to political powers, including the opposition parties of DPP, NP (New 
Party), and the ruling party (KMT).  
  Apart from cable and satellite television, in this period two more terrestrial 
televisions were established: Formosa Television (FTV) was inaugurated in 
1997, and the Public Television Service was established in 1998. 
After the main opposition party DPP had constantly lobbied for ‘the fourth 
terrestrial television license since the late 1980s’ (Independent Evening Post, 
28 July 1987, p3), in 1997 the KMT state finally allowed one more terrestrial 
television station, Formosa Television (FTV), to be established. On June 11, 
1997, the fourth terrestrial television station FTV was launched with major 
investment from members of the main opposition party DPP. Some researchers 
(Feng, 1995; Lee, 1998) view this open-up of the KMT state as a means to 
co-opt dissent and protect its own continued monopoly. After DPP attained its 
coveted television station, DPP showed no more genuine interest in building 
the ‘public sphere’ Feng (1995; 1998). On the other hand, FTV also adopted 
‘biased reporting and media coverage’ to ‘balance the bias of the pro-KMT 
terrestrial televisions and remedy the already unbalanced media environment 
under KMT control’ (Rawnsley, 2001: p76).  
On the other hand, in 1991, a committee for Public Television Preparatory 
was set. Specialists and scholars in Law and Media were enlisted to formulate 
a draft for a Public Television Act. In 1997 the Public Television Act was passed 
and the first Board of directors and supervisors in the Public Television Service 
Foundation was approved. In 1998 the Public Television Station officially 
delivered its broadcasting service (more details about the development of the 
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PTS will be addressed in next chapter about the PSB history in Taiwan). 
In this the period of ‘choices’ (1988-1999), the shift from the state to market 
seemingly opened up more consumer choices. However, the market did not 
have a positive impact upon programming diversity in broadcasting. According 
to Li & Chiang’s study on the extent in which the programming diversity was 
affected by the changing structure of the media market (2001), the results 
indicated a negative relation between market competition and programming 
diversity. Li & Chiang (2001) argued that although the market competition 
increased from 1986 to 1996, this study discovered that the degree of 
programming diversity was reduced year by year. Furthermore, there were 
growing concerns as the market pressures and competition gradually formed 
the increased capital concentration. On the one hand, the new alliance of 
commercial power developed a new form of censorship power. On the other 
hand, the ferocious competition had impacts on the quality of media output as 
the competition mainly focused on ratings and advertising revenue.  
3.4.3 Television beyond Frontiers: Abundance (1999- to date) 
Following the period of television without frontiers (1988-1999), new problems 
arose in this ‘abundance’ period while liberalisation and deregulation 
encouraged more competition at the expense of quality of media output. As 
competition intensified, the media became less willing to invest in innovative 
programming and instead battled to capture the same middle-ground 
audiences with the same already- popular formats. This raises the question as 
to whether programme quality has always been apparent in Taiwan’s 
broadcasting. From the previous discussion, one would conclude not, with the 
rise of partisanship to ameliorate (partially) state monopoly 
With accelerating competition and an ever more crowded market, 23 million 
people not only shared five terrestrial television stations but also numerous 
cable and satellite broadcasting service. For instance, in 2004, a total of 60 
domestic and 19 foreign companies were offering 93 and 42 satellite channels. 
In 2005, 63 cable TV systems were in operation and the cable penetration rate 
was 60.4 percent (GIO, 2006). In 2006, domestic and foreign companies were 
offering 92 and 43 satellite channels (GIO, Apr/2007), respectively, including 
NHK from Japan; Home Box Office (HBO), Disney, and Discovery from the 
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United States; and groups of specialized, satellite-based channels operated by 
local media conglomerates, such as Eastern Broadcasting, TVBS, ERA, CTI, 
Video-land, San-lih Entertainment Television (SET), and Gala Television. In 
2007, with 130 cable television channels, Cable television was viewed by about 
80 percent of the population (GIO, 2008). 
In this period, Taiwan’s five terrestrial television stations were facing growing 
pressure when the rise of cable television gradually shared more and more 
advertising revenue in the existing market. For example, the three pro-KMT 
terrestrial commercial television stations had been losing money year after year 
from 2002 (Feng, 2009, pp. 21-42) while the cable television industry kept 
competing for viewers in the same market with the terrestrial televisions without 
any intention to create separate market or to cultivate their own targeted 
audience (Cheng, 2005). Furthermore, Cheng (2005) indicates that the cable 
television operators actually focused on short-term interests rather than 
long-term development. With their dominant position in the market, their 
position prevented them from investing more on pay-television or any other 
new technology since the possible re-structure of the whole market coming with 
any innovative change might bring risks to damage their existing profit (Cheng, 
2005). The phenomenon of cable television industry in Taiwan actually has 
been following a terrestrialising’ path (Cheng, 2005) which means the cable 
television system gradually to replace the free-to-air system with its 
multi-channels package including the terrestrial television programming. Thus, 
in 2005, the DPP government (GIO, 2007) instituted a national standardised 
allocation system for the cable channels with some reserved slots for main 
terrestrial television, public-interest programming of PTS, Hakka TV, TITV, CNN, 
or NHK.  
In a national wide survey in 2004 which focused on the cable television 
viewers’ watching behaviour and satisfaction (Zchi & Tsai, 2005), the result 
showed that 66% of the population spend 2 hours per day watching television 
and 17% of the population are heavy television users who spend more than 5 
hours every day in front of television. The popularity of the programming 
between terrestrial and cable televisions are shown in table 3.7. below.  
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Table 3.7. Television Channels Market Share 2003-2004 (by genre) 
 
General Terrestrial Channels 
 
 
22% 
 
 
 
 
Cable and Satellite Channels 
News 18% 
Entertainment and Drama 17% 
General Interest 13% 
Mandarin Film 7% 
Western Film 7% 
Children's Cartoon 5% 
Other* 11% 
 
*includes leisure and education, financial news, Japanese  
Programming, sports, music, and shopping channels. 
Source: ROC Yearbook 2003-2004, GIO.     
 
 
As Table 3.7. show, news is the most popular format in the cable television 
system. Since it is a profitable format, in Taiwan there are six 24-hours news 
channels competing in the market, including TVBS-N, FTV news, ERA news, 
the San-lih news, the CTI news, and the Eastern Television (ETTV) news 
channel. Whit the number of the all-news channels, it is hardly a  surprise to 
see the news channel decline to sensationalism and triviality as discussed in 
opening chapter. 
In the Table 3.7., the second popular genre is Entertainment and Drama. In 
an effort to strengthen competitiveness by lowering the cost, both terrestrial 
television and cable television operators increased importing programmes from 
China, Hong Kong, Japan, and South Korea (GIO, 2007). Here it mirrors 
serious problems in the national terrestrial television stations since they are 
supposed to have more ability to customize output for local audiences that 
those cable channels.  
In Taiwan, although different languages like the Holo Taiwanese, the Hakka 
and different indigenous languages were spoken in Taiwan, most news 
programs are still broadcasting in Mandarin since Mandarin Chinese is the 
official language (See table 3.8.). Compared with Mandarin programming, other 
minority ethnic language programming like Hakka or Indigenous programming 
have a smaller percentage (See table 3.8.). 
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Table 3.8. The Ratio of languages on broadcasting programming 
 Languages 2005 2006 
 
 
 
Radio Programming 
Mandarin Chinese    38.86%  37.00% 
Holo Chinese 48.02%   50.30% 
Hakka Chinese 10.18%  9.86% 
Austronesian languages 0.25%  0.32% 
English 1.93% 1.73% 
Japanese 0.02% 0.22% 
Others 0.74% 0.57% 
 
 
 
Terrestrial TV 
Programme 
 
Mandarin Chinese    82.99% 83.30% 
Holo Chinese 11.21% 10.94% 
Hakka Chinese 0.43% 0.34% 
English 4.22% 4.27% 
Japanese 0.23% 0.19% 
Others 0.90% 0.95% 
 
 
 
Satellite TV 
Programming 
 
Mandarin Chinese    58.18% 57.85% 
Holo Chinese 6.67%  8.65% 
Hakka Chinese 1.88%  1.68% 
Indigenous languages 0.10% 0.23% 
English 18.91% 17.50% 
Japanese 13.98% 13.95% 
Others 0.28% 0.14% 
Sources: The 2006 Annual report, National Communication Commission, 2007   
 
 
In order to preserve the languages and cultures of smaller ethnic groups, a 
Hakka television station (Hakka TV) was set up in July 2003 with funding from 
the Council for Hakka Affairs. Likewise, funded by the Council of Indigenous 
Peoples, Taiwan Indigenous Television (TITV) was inaugurated on July 1, 2005. 
However, Feng (2006, p. 14) also points out the establishment of the ethnic 
broadcasting services are not only due to consideration about minority interests 
but also political consideration by the DPP government ‘since these 
broadcasting services can also effectively reach and focused ethic groups with 
well-crafted messages during elections’ (Feng, 2006, p. 14). 
  Actually, with either the shift from state to market or the power shift from KMT 
to DPP, the media has never really been immune from political interference. 
Rawnsley & Rawnsley (2012, p. 8) identified two salient examples to illustrate 
the way the DPP government threatened media with government interference 
after 2000. The first example happened in March 2002 when the authorities 
raided into offices of Next magazine to prevent distribution of an article that 
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revealed a secret bank account with US$100 million allegedly used by former 
President Lee Teng-hui to buy influence abroad. The reporter was accused of 
having endangered national security and his home was searched as well 
(Apple Daily, 24/04/2010). Employees of the China Times, involved with 
investigating corruption in the National Security Bureau, were subjected to 
similar intimidation. The second example happened in August, 2004 when 
Taiwan’s High Court upheld for reasons of national security the conviction of 
reporter Hong Zhe-zheng of Power News. The case revolved around an article 
that the reporter had written in 2000 reporting Taiwan’s regular military 
exercises. Hong was sentenced to eighteen months in prison, suspended for 
three years (Liu and Tsai, 2009, p. 274). Apart from the two examples with 
magazine and newspaper, in terrestrial television the DPP government also 
adopted the KMT’s old tricks to developed their ‘patron-client relationship’ into 
media control by rewarding certain media proprietors with loyal DPP members 
to ensure that media output represented their image in a favourable light. For 
instance, in 2004 when the DPP government appointed a local actress Chiang 
Hsia, who is known as a loyal family friend of President Chen Shui-bian, to be 
the general manager of the state-owned CTS, this appointment stimulated lots 
of complaints from political actors. ‘Actress Chiang Hsia, a long-time supporter 
of DPP, took over as general manager of state-controlled CTS amid harsh 
attacks from opposition legislators on her professionalism and her political 
loyalties (Taipei Times, 25/06/2004, p. 2). This appointment also evoked 
criticism from academic circles and pressure groups which expecting the DPP 
government can establish a proper PSB as the government promised.  
These examples illustrate that even after 2000 that ‘the year of the historic 
presidential election when fifty years of government by the KMT gave way to 
the DPP, the new government were still closely monitoring the media’ 
(Rawnsley & Rawnsley, 2012, p. 8). 
To respond to the demand for an independent oversight away from the state, 
in 2006 the government launched the independent National Communications 
Commission (NCC), charged with regulating the country's communications and 
broadcasting industries. The new regulatory body consolidates responsibilities 
formerly shared by the Government Information Office (GIO) and the Ministry of 
Transportation and Communications.  
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Besides having a new regulator, another key issue in this period was the 
expanding public broadcasting group which prompted by higher public 
expectations. In January 2006, the law on disposing of public shares in 
terrestrial TV stations was given the green light. The Legislative Yuan passed a 
media reform bill regulating the sale of government-owned stock in TV stations 
and allowing the PTS, Taiwan's first public television channel, to merge CTS, 
Hakka TV, TITV and Micro TV to form a PSB group, Taiwan Broadcasting 
System (TBS), which is meant to be isolated from commercial and political 
influence.  
According to the statute, one of the state-owned terrestrial television Taiwan 
Television Enterprise (TTV) should sell all of its shares to the market through a 
public and transparent procedure and another state-owned terrestrial television 
Chinese Television System (CTS) would be transformed into a member of the 
PSB group. The government would spend approximately NT$2 billion (US$63 
million) to buy back its privately owned shares before donating them to the 
planned public television group, TBS. 
In this ‘abundance’ period, the market competition, which discouraged 
innovative programming but sacrificed its quality, mirrors the rise of 
consumerism and the decline of programming addressing audiences in their 
roles as citizens. Also, the political interference did not fade away from the 
media landscape while the media deregulation and governments’ changes 
occurred in this period.  
In next section, by combining features from the three periods, the politics of 
media representation will be outlined to show the systems failures in the media 
landscape.  
 
3.5 The Politics of Representation: System Failures 
When looking at the relation between market structure and programme 
innovations, a positive relation between oligopolistic market structure and 
programmes innovations was claimed by some media economists (Burnett, 
1992; Schumpeter, 1950). Basically, in an oligopolistic market, since a few firms 
control most of the market share, there will be a high degree of market 
concentration. These economists believe that only in an oligopolistic market 
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structure, firms can have sufficient financial resources to test different types of 
products, develop new programmes, and pass the costs of innovations on to 
consumers. Thus, they state that an oligopolistic market increases the 
innovation and diversity in mass media market (Burnett, 1992; Schumpeter, 
1950). 
  On the contrary, some other media economists claim that they found a 
negative relation between market concentration and product innovation (Coser, 
Kadushin, & Powell, 1982; Litman, 1979; Peterson & Berger, 1975; 
Rothenbuhler &Dimmick, 1982). They hold the view that when a few firms 
dominate a market they have little incentive to innovate because what each firm 
strives to do is to gain the largest share of a market. In this situation, each firm 
will try to produce products that please and satisfy as many consumers as 
possible. This process leads to homogeneity because the oligopolistic market 
reduces the possibility of innovation and makes programmes less diversified. 
With open competition among many firms, the best strategy is to differentiate 
their products from others to cater separate needs. That means that a market 
with many competitors induces innovation and increase diversity in mediascape 
(Coser, Kadushin, & Powell, 1982; Litman, 1979; Peterson & Berger, 1975; 
Rothenbuhler & Dimmick, 1982).    
  The dispute over the two theories is not settled definitively due to insufficient 
and inconclusive empirical data. However, both of the assumption backgrounds 
happen to be in the developing process of Taiwan’s media landscape and 
neither oligopolistic market structure nor open commercial competition could 
bring the diversity and innovation highly expected to the media market.  
  As was observed earlier in the three periods of the media history in Taiwan, 
some features can be summarised as follows.  
First, the political change from single-party rule to multi-party gradually 
brought liberation to the media landscape that used to be under single-party 
control. However, the multi-party environment could not secure adequate or fair 
representation because of the government’s continuing interference on the 
media. Second, the rise of consumerism alongside consumer oriented 
television led to the decline of programming addressing audiences as citizens. 
Thirdly, the inability of the commercial television system fails to reflect the 
range of issues of contemporary Taiwanese society. Fourth, the argument 
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around the need to protect national culture based around domestic production 
as against filling channels with imported programmes. Finally, the demands of 
ethnic groups for greater representation on the television screen are rising.  
  This chapter has illustrated the key moments in the process of the transition 
of the media landscape and outlined some system failures in the media 
representation. In recent years the focus of local media research have shifted 
to examining the capability of Taiwan’s fledgling PSB group, TBS, asking 
questions such as, is it a right decision to expand the PSB while other public 
broadcasters around the world in retreat and is the PSB expansion capable to 
rectify the system failures in Taiwanese media landscape. Here the answers 
are still being heatedly debated, especially in the light of domestic concerns 
over Blue-Green political divide. However, here the discussions just began. By 
the end of this thesis, with display of enough materials and evidences, this 
thesis will explain the way how the PSB expansion in Taiwan has been socially 
defined and constructed, and by whom.   
  The next step, in the chapter to follow, is to illustrate the details in the PSB 
history in Taiwan and then generate research questions and research methods.   
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Chapter 4 
 
Research Objects, Research 
Questions and Methodology  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our examination of the contested definitions and practices of PSB around the 
world in Chapter 2 and the system failures in the Taiwanese media landscape 
in Chapter 3, has aimed to develop a better understanding why Taiwan has 
undertaken to expand PSB at a time when, in most other countries around the 
world, it is in retreat and international media commentators question whether it 
PSB has outlived its usefulness.  
  The purpose of this present chapter is to illustrate the teething troubles and 
the endemic difficulties facing this fledgling PSB system, and to generate 
research questions for this study by reviewing the history of PSB in Taiwan 
together with relevant research findings.  
 
4.1 Case Description: Two Waves of the PSB Demands  
Table 4.1. provides a chronological overview for the key moments in the 
development of PSB in Taiwan. Two main waves of the demands for public 
service broadcasting can be identified in the timeline.  
  The first wave emerged in the mid-1990s and resulted in the creation of a 
single channel Public Television Station (PTS). However, this initiative never 
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managed to achieve more than a minority presence in the commercialized 
media landscape.  
  The model of PTS was similar to the model of the PBS in the US which 
discussed earlier in chapter 2. ‘The function of the public or educational 
broadcasters was to provide that programming that was unprofitable for the 
commercial broadcasters to produce’ (McChesney, 1999, p. 247).In other 
words, with the mission to fill the gap the market cannot or would not to fill, the 
logic of this model is that any programme which is too popular should more 
properly appear on commercial television (Tracey, 1996). 
  With huge disappointments with the marginal role of the PTS and the 
remaining overwhelming commercial broadcasting, a second wave gathered 
momentum when a policy window was opened by the unprecedented political 
transition in the 2000 presidential election.  
  This window opened the way for renewed political struggles, social 
movement activity and academic debate, centred around two competing 
proposals for reforming the terrestrial television stations, with advocates of 
privatisation on the one side and supporters of PSB-oriented proposal on the 
other. Against the privatisation ideas, the PSB-oriented proposal proposed 
transforming the state-owned television asset into a new, extended, public 
service broadcasting system. In this proposal, the key idea conceptually means 
a transformation of the state-owned terrestrial televisions to a corporation in the 
public sector. Specifically, the proposal entailed all political parties, the state, 
and the military relinquishing all control over terrestrial television and ceding its 
administration and operation to an independent corporation in the public sector. 
This proposal was seen by its advocates as a way of creating space within the 
broadcasting landscape for a greater degree of freedom and independence in 
the pursuit of the ideals of public service. This key idea mainly generated from 
the ideal model of the BBC in the UK, ‘a national, popular, and pluralistic 
broadcasting’ (Scannell, 1996, p. 25-31). 
  The reasons why the British model was a significant model referenced in the 
second wave of the PSB developments in Taiwan were mainly because the 
failure the PTS with its marginal role in the media landscape. The supporters 
for the PSB-oriented proposal believed that only a mainstream PSB can really 
deliver what it promised to the media environment. Also, among key supporters, 
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some active media academics gained their PhD degree from the UK and had a 
good understanding of the BBC model. For example, a key figure in the 
long-term PSB campaign, Feng Chien-san (馮建三), was awarded a PhD at 
Leicester University. Another key player, Wei Ti (魏玓), studied his PhD at 
Loughborough University. With their deep knowledge of the BBC and other 
Western European PSBs, the ethos of British model was highlighted in the 
second wave of the PSB expansion in Taiwan.  
  After a period of debate and political struggle, which will be examined in 
details in subsequent chapters, this option outran the privatisation plan and 
became the preferred policy. The direction of PSB expansion was finally 
cemented with the passage of legislation in 2006.    
  In order to illustrate the main features of these two waves conceptually and 
practically over time, the following discussion will be divided into four phases: 
the inception of PTS (1980-1997); creation and disillusion with PTS 
(1998-1999); formulation of plans for PSB expansion (2000-2006) and the 
implementation of the new PSB system (2006 to date). 
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Table 4.1. Chronological Overview of Public Service Broadcasting in Taiwan 
Year Events  
1980 Premier Yun Suan Sun first calls for the establishment of a Public Television.  
1983 The Government Information Office (GIO) drafts an outline for a centre for 
Producing Public Television Programmes. 
 
1984 The Public TV Program Production and Broadcasting Committee were established 
under the GIO. Time slots are requisitioned from three main terrestrial TV stations 
to broadcast programs. 
 
 
1986 Program production is given to the Public TV Program Production and 
Broadcasting Team under the Chinese Public Television Broadcasting 
Development Foundation. 
 
 
1991 The Public Television Preparatory Committee is established after the Executive 
Yuan approves guidelines for installation. Seven specialists and scholars are 
enlisted to formulate draft legislation for the Public Television Act. 
 
1993 The Public Television Act is submitted to the Legislative Yuan for approval.  
1996 Social activists from media academia form the Public Media Lobbying Alliance.  
1997 (31 May) The Public Television Act passes in the Legislative Yuan.  
1998 The Nomination and Review Committee of the Legislative Yuan approves 18 
nominees for the 1st Board of Directors and Board of Supervisors of the Public 
Television Service Foundation.  
 
1998 (1 July)The Public Television Service Foundation is established and officially 
launches broadcasting services. 
 
2003 (9 Dec) The Legislative Yuan passed amendments to the Broadcasting and 
Television Act, Cable Television Act, and Satellite Broadcasting Act. These 
amended laws prohibit the government, political parties, party affair personnel, 
appointed government officials, and elected public officials from investing in the 
broadcasting and television industries. In addition, government and political parties 
must withdraw their investments within two years after implementation of these 
three laws. Based on the government’s initial plan, Chinese Television System 
(CTS) would become publicly or privately owned. 
 
2006 (3 Jan) The Legislative Yuan passed the Statute Regarding the Disposition of 
Government Shareholdings in the Terrestrial Television Industry, ushering in a new 
era of media free of political parties, government, and military. 
(16 Jan) Liming Foundation donated CTS shares to the PTS Foundation. 
(31 Mar) The special CTS shareholders meeting elected the new CTS board of 
directors and supervisors. The board was composed of 11 PTS directors and 
supervisors, six experts recommended by PTS, and six representatives from 
private shareholders. The first meeting of the new board of directors and 
supervisors was convened, and PTS chairman, Dr. Louis Chen was elected CTS 
chairman without remuneration. During the meeting, the appointments of Yuan Li 
as CTS president, Wu-sung Kao as vice president, and other executives were also 
approved. CTS became a public entity in due process. The establishment of the 
Taiwan Broadcasting System (TBS), composed of PTS and CTS, was set into 
motion. 
  
 
 
2006 (1 Jul)  The Chinese Television System (CTS) went into the PSB umbrella 
structure. The Taiwan Broadcasting System was formed. 
 
2007 
 
(1 Jan) Hakka Television, Taiwan Indigenous Television and Taiwan Macroview 
Television merge to the TBS to become a PSB television family. 
 
(Summarised from Public Television Service Foundation 2007 annual report, p. 2) 
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4.1.1 The inception of PTS (1980-1997)  
The emergence of PSB in Taiwan dates back to the 1980’s when then-Premier, 
Yun Suan-sun, announced that the society needed a public service alternative 
to commercial programming (Feng, Shy, & Kuo, 2002). In response a 
ten-minute-long programme named the ‘public TV programme’ was broadcast 
via the three main terrestrial televisions. 
  One of these stations, the Chinese Television System (CTS), could have 
been the first public broadcasting television station in Taiwan since its original 
aim was to deliver educational programming. However, since the 
commercial-run state-owned model was seen to be operating effectively in the 
two other television stations, TTV and CTV, it was extended to CTS, forcing it 
give up its initial aim of providing an educational service. The first CEO of CTS, 
Liu Hsien-Yun, later recalled regretfully that the channel had missed the 
opportunity to deliver a distinctive service to the society (Chen, 2005). In his 
view, since CTS was as named after ‘a system’ rather than ‘a company’, its 
core mission was to provide a general education service rather than to make 
money. In his reminiscences he states:  
 
‘I deeply understand that earning maximum profit should not be the 
aim of the CTS. However, this commercial model put most of our 
programming under pressure from the advertisers who pay money 
to us…….We could not get rid of this (pressure) even though we 
realized that this pressure would damage the basic value of 
broadcasting.…As CEO, I feel very ashamed. That is why I offered 
to resign my position several times’ (Chen, 2005, p. 324). 
 
During the martial-law period, in the name of national security, the three 
terrestrial television channels were mainly owned by the government, the KMT 
party, and the military, respectively (Cheng, 1993). The lifting of Martial Law in 
1987 ushered in a rapidly growing multi-channel media landscape alongside 
satellite and cable television development. However, this rapid change failed to 
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bring diversity in programming. Research on this changing structure shows that 
while the intensity of market competition dramatically increased from 1986 to 
1996, the degree of programming diversity was reduced year by year (Li & 
Chiang, 2001). In response, in 1991, a committee for Public Television 
Preparatory was established and seven specialists and scholars in Law and 
Media were enlisted to formulate draft legislation for public television. The 
resulting Public Television Act was finally passed in 1997 and subsequently 18 
nominees for the first Board of Directors and Board of Supervisors in the Public 
Television Service Foundation were approved. In 1998 the Public Television 
Station officially delivered its new broadcasting service.  
4.1.2 Creation and Disillusion with PTS (1998-1999)   
In order to maintain its isolation from commercial pressures’ (ibid, Chapter IV, 
article 41), PTS was barred from receiving income from commercial 
advertisements. The Government Information Office (GIO) was appointed as 
regulator (the Public Television Act, I, 3) and the Public Television Service 
Foundation, which was responsible for administering the service, received 
funds from five main sources: 1) government contributions allocated from the 
annual national budget; 2) interest from operating the funds; 3) contributions 
from public and private institutions, organizations, or individuals; 4) income 
from the channel’s cultural businesses and activities; 5) income from producing 
programs on commission; and other sources of income (ibid, III, 28).  
  The core obligations of PTS were outlined in the Public Television Act. They 
included ‘safeguarding the citizens' freedom of expression’, ‘raising cultural and 
educational standards’ and ‘advancing the development of democratic society’. 
Most of these aims echoed principals followed by other public service 
broadcasters around the world. However, the most important mission listed in 
the Act, in the very first article in the first chapter, is that PTS should play a 
complementary role and ‘compensate for the inadequacy of commercial 
television’: 
 
 
 
This Act is enacted to promote the effective development of public 
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television, establish a public service mass media system, compensate 
for the inadequacy of commercial television, and safeguard the citizens' 
freedom of expression and right to know, raise cultural and educational 
standards, advance the development of democratic society, and 
enhance social wellbeing through diversified planning. (The public 
television act, I, 1) 
 
This emphasis on ‘compensation’ had the effect of placing PTS in a 
subordinate or secondary role providing programming for marginalised 
audiences ignored by the commercial television. As Chin (1997) noted, 
although commercial forces gave a birth to the public television station ‘it is 
clear that the private media will continue to dominate’ (Chin, 1997, p. 91).  
  As one channel in a market with more than one hundred commercial 
channels for viewers to choose from, it was not a surprise to find that PTS was 
not only unable to provide an effective counter to the commercialised media 
market, but also failed to satisfy the mounting demands for more effective 
political insulation of the media prompted by the continuing political influence 
over the three terrestrial televisions, TTV, CTV, and CTS. 
  
4.1.3 Formulation of Plans for PSB expansion (2000-2006) 
The 2000 presidential election ended the unbroken rule of the KMT and 
installed a government dominated by the main opposition party, the DDP, for 
first time in post-war Taiwanese history. This political shift opened a window of 
opportunity for media reform since the three terrestrial televisions had been 
under KMT’s control. As Feng, Shy, & Kuo (2002) point out, before the early 
spring of 2000, privatisation was the dominant and mainstream option for 
changing the ownership of terrestrial television while the PSB-oriented proposal, 
‘Gong Gong Hua’, was mostly supported by and confined to media academics. 
However, once the DPP presidential candidate, Chen Shui-Bian, adopted the 
‘Gong Gong Hua’ proposal in his campaign, it joined privatization as the other 
main option contesting in the policy-making arena for the reform for the 
terrestrial television (Feng et al., 2002).  
  One controversial event in 2001 accidentally accelerated the contest 
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between two proposals in a dramatic way. A DPP legislator Lin Chung-mao, 
insulted another prominent legislator, Sisy Chen, calling her ‘a shameless 
prostitute’ ('Lawmakers rise to decry Sisy Chen `prostitute' jibe', Taipei times, 
12/12/2001, p. 3). Lin Chung-mao’s claimed that, Sisy Chen, who was also a 
very popular television and radio host of political talk shows, had abused her 
media power to criticise President Chen Shui-bian in inappropriate ways, 
arguing that ‘when Sisy Chen abuses her media influences to criticise the 
President Chen abusing his power, it looks like a prostitute is criticising the sex 
industry’ (Taipei times, 12/12/2001, p. 3). The resulting public furore soon 
sparked a furious debate on the interplay between politicians and media. 
Alongside media and public prurience at Lin’s insulting choice of words the 
dispute also promoted a degree of serious discussion on the potential abuses 
of political patronage and the operation of political interference in terrestrial 
television, as signalled in this story:  
 
‘Curse incident’ shifts to "politicians out of the media". Sisy Chen called 
on the DPP to use the same standard to examine themselves……The 
debates about ‘Legislator Lin Chung-mo abuse of legislator-elect Sisy 
Chen’ yesterday shifted to ‘if all politicians should withdraw their power 
from the media.’...(Sisy Chen calls on political power out of terrestrial 
televisions, United Daily News, 14/12/2001, p. 3) 
 
Seizing the opportunity presented by calls for political power to be removed 
from the media, critical media academics and pressure groups renewed their 
efforts to press the case for PSB. For example:  
 
While a debate over terrestrial television ownership rages in political 
circles, a growing number of media academics are urging the [DPP] 
government to ‘get out of the media’ at the same time….…The debate 
over the collusion of political organisations and media was introduced 
last week in the wake of a fight between DPP legislator Lin Chung-mo 
and independent legislator Sisy Chen. (Taipei Times, 17/12/2001, p.3) 
 
Following the renewed debate about effective insulation of terrestrial television 
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from political influence, and how to cut the strong ties between the channels 
and the government, positions of the political parties soon became the core of 
the debate. 
  Although the PSB-oriented proposal was in the DPP’s Election Manifesto, 
after party came to power its attitude towards this proposal seemed to become 
more reserved. The proposal demanded serious political commitment because 
it entailed breaking the traditional ownership patterns inherited from the KMT 
period. First, the government would surrender its shares in two of the terrestrial 
televisions, TTV and CTS, undermining the entrenched liaison between 
economic interests and political power. The next step would be to restrain 
partisan and state influence in the media. The DPP administration afterwards 
claimed that the project ‘cannot be put into practice right away and needs 
further deliberation’, because it would cost much more than the government 
could then afford (Lin, 2001). Around the same time, the contest between 
advocates of privatisation and the PSB-oriented proposal in the Blue-Green 
political struggle flared up again. AS the Taipei Times noted:  
 
DIVISIVE ISSUE: Two competing visions for reducing political influence 
on the media threaten to derail reform efforts and the two sides are 
being urged to cooperate. …… (Legislators split on how to reform media, 
Taipei Times, 26/12/2001, p. 2)       
 
The PSB-oriented proposal were driven by a political alliance called the 
democratization of terrestrial television (ADTV) while the privatisation plan was 
supported by an alliance led by the People First Party (PFP) legislator Diane 
Lee. She argued that forcing the government and political parties to sell their 
shares in terrestrial TV to private investors was the only way to solve the 
problem. The ADTV worried that if the government sold its shares and the two 
televisions stations were privatized there would be no effective means of 
control over program quality. Lee, however, claimed that the government in 
Taiwan is not ‘mature enough’ to practice the ADTV’s PSB-oriented proposal 
(Taipei Times, 26/12/2001, p. 2).  
 
‘The two sides should reach a consensus on the issue as soon as 
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possible; otherwise, I am afraid nothing will change.’ KMT legislator 
Apollo Chen said…. (Legislators split on how to reform media, Taipei 
Times, 26/12/2001, p. 2)   
 
The two sides, both advocating ‘more effective insulation of terrestrial 
televisions from political influence’ but disagreeing on the best way to achieve 
this, privatisation or ‘Gong Gong Hua’, kept pushing their proposals into the 
policymaking process while the DPP government kept its distance from both 
sides. In 2002, a campaign group the Campaign for Citizens' TV (CCTV), held 
a protest and a press conference to blame President Chen for his broken 
promise on reducing political interference in the state-owned terrestrial 
television channels. This campaign took out half-page newspapers 
advertisement titled ‘We Will No Longer Tolerate [DPP government]’ to express 
their disappointment with the government’s inaction on media:  
 
‘The ‘Campaign for Citizens' TV (CCTV) held a press conference to 
condemn President Chen Shui-bian and the Executive Yuan for delaying 
the practice of ‘public television’ and other media commitments from his 
presidential campaign promises. Three campaign members, Lin 
Hsiao-hsin, Shih Shih-hao and Kuo Li-hsin, now offer their resignations 
as directors of local terrestrial TV stations to show a serious 
protest…….‘CCTV’ Convenor Feng Chien-san urged President Chen 
and the ruling party to immediately fulfil its media reform ….Presidential 
campaign promises. (Protest against the delay of media reform, China 
Times, 11/10/2002, p. 6) 
 
The protest, which demanded that the ‘DPP must keep promises on media 
reform’ (Taipei Times, 10/10/2002, p. 8) was written by campaign members who 
including the Director of TTV, Lin Hsiao-hsin, the Director of TTV, Shih Shih-hao 
and the Director of CTS, Kuo Li-hsin (2002). The campaign argued that the 
most urgent task was to turn remaining two state-run television, TTV and CTS, 
(the third one, CTV, was already privatised and the main shareholders were 
KMT-related private firms), together with the Public Television Service (PTS) 
into a larger and more efficient ‘public TV group’. Their view tallied precisely 
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with Chen's policy, laid out in the cultural policy section of the DPP’ s White 
Paper published for the presidential campaign in 2000. In their announcement, 
the Campaign members stressed that they had pushed the DPP to implement 
the policy since the party came to power, but the DPP government had failed to 
put this important policy into effect to date and that consequently the campaign 
group condemned them for their equivocation on their own promises. They 
urged President Chen and the ruling party to immediately fulfil their campaign 
commitment to a proper media reform and called for a clear timetable for 
reform that included plans for the establishment, step by step, of a ‘public TV 
group’ (The ‘Campaign for Citizens' TV, 2002). 
This disillusion with the DDP’s foot dragging was partly informed by 
recognition that once in power it had seemed to go down the same path of 
political bribery, or patron-clientelism, as its predecessor KMT in dealing with 
the terrestrial television. One example is the way the DPP government dealt 
with the nomination of high-ranking personnel to run the two terrestrial 
television stations.  
Key positions in state-owned or controlled media had long been treated as 
rewards from the ruling party to those helping them to win elections or maintain 
power. This ability to pay political debts is one reason why control of the media 
remained within the inner circle of power elites. The nomination from the DPP 
administration was controversial because it seemed to be continuing this 
pattern, with the Pan-Blue camp regarding it as a political reward for the 
nominees’ patronage rather than for their professional ability. For instance, the 
DPP government’s appointment of a local actress, Chiang Hsia, to be the 
general manager of the state-owned CTS in 2004, prompted widespread 
disappointment and complaints from media scholars and pressure groups 
arguing for PSB since it was widely regarded as a reward for Chiang Hsia’s 
loyal support for President Chen Shui-bian during his election. Critics claimed 
that it demonstrated that the President was not heeding warnings to avoid 
political appointments to senior media management positions. Chiang herself 
did not deny that her appointment was a political reward for her loyalty. More 
controversially, in her new role as general manager she claimed that she would 
ban all Chinese soap operas immediately to protect local programme 
productions. Although supporting local production commanded widespread 
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support, achieving this aim by banning Chinese made programming was widely 
seen as a politically motivated move, informed more by the DDP’s long 
standing opposition to any move toward reunification with the mainland than by 
a desire to encourage programme diversity. 
 
Actress Chiang Hsia, a long-time supporter of the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP), yesterday took over as general manager of 
state-controlled Chinese Television System (CTS) amid harsh attacks 
from opposition legislators on her professionalism and her political 
loyalties.……In a TV interview broadcast last night, the outspoken 
Chiang told the  host, "My new position is indeed a reward and it makes 
perfect sense because I support President Chen Shui-bian." ……Atop 
her priorities for her new job will be banning soap operas produced in 
China. (Pro-DPP actress takes CTS helm, Taipei Times, 25/06/2004, p. 
2)  
 
This continuation of the practice of using appointments to reward political 
loyalty disappointed many social activists and critical media academics and 
confirmed their disillusion with the DPP government’s betrayal of their promise 
to keep media free from political control. Ironically, when the DPP was in 
opposition before 2000, it had strongly criticized the ruling party KMT monopoly 
on media ownership, claiming that the media were being used as a government 
mouthpiece and advocating the removal of party politics from the media. In the 
context of the Chen government’s failure to enact the promise to reform the 
media made in the DPP white paper in 2000 (Editorial, Taipei Times, 
29/06/2004: 8), it is not surprising that the appointment of Chiang Hsia drew 
criticism from supporters of the DDP as well as the opposition (KMT).  
In response to the mounting demands for more effective insulation of the 
main terrestrial televisions from political pressure, the legislature eventually 
passed the ‘Statute Regarding the Disposition of Government Shareholdings in 
the Terrestrial Television Industry’ in 2006 (Liberty Times, 04/01/2006, p. 6; 
United Daily News, 04/01/2006, p. 2) which specified that the government’s 
74% share of CTS would be transferred to a Public Service Foundation.  
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In spite of the concern about possible pitfalls, the passage of this statute   
was viewed by the civil society organizations campaigning for ‘Gong Gong Hua’ 
reform, as a preliminary but significant progress (Wei, 2007). 
4.1.4 The Implementation of the New PSB System (2006-to date)  
The ‘Statute Regarding the Disposition of Government Shareholdings in the 
Terrestrial Television Industry’ in 2006 laid out a general framework for the 
future direction of PSB expansion by outlining a project to enlarge the scope of 
public television by combining the PTS with a state owned commercial 
television station and several ethnic channels.  
In July, 2006, PTS, at its 8th anniversary ceremony, officially ‘married’ the 
35-year-old, previously state-owned Chinese Television System (CTS) and 
were then major terrestrial networks merged to form the Taiwan Broadcasting 
System (TBS). Starting from 2007, two other television stations, Hakka TV, 
Indigenous TV, representing ethnic minority interests, together with Taiwan 
Macroview TV, joined the group under the administration of PTS to provide a 
more broadly based public service broadcasting system (details about the 
channels of TBS please see table 4.2. below). 
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Within the group, Hakka Television (Hakka TV), Taiwan Indigenous Television 
(TITV) and Taiwan Macroview Television (TMT) received their funding from 
different government sectors to carry out their missions to provide service to 
Hakka people, indigenous people and overseas Taiwanese citizens. In contrast, 
CTS was to remain a commercial television station relying on advertising 
revenue as its only source of income and assuming sole responsibility for its 
operational profit and loss. Table 4.3. details the differences in the financial 
sources of the stations.  
 
Table 4.3. Members of TBS and Their Financial Sources 
Television 
Station  
Revenue (2006) 
(million / US Dollar) 
Financial Sources 
PTS 45.5   60%:   Government appropriation 
              Other incomes  
CTS 50.0  
(2005) 
100%:  Commercial Advertisement  
Hakka TV 13.4   97%:   Government appropriation  
TITV 10.6   95%:   Government appropriation  
TMT 4.4   97%:   Government appropriation  
Source: the official webpage of TBS, Q&A, 2007  
 
 
CTS’s continuing reliance on commercial advertisements, while the other 
channels receive various government appropriations, undermines the financial 
and administrative coherence of the group and threatens its ability to fulfil its 
aim of bringing ‘public value’ to the media landscape.  
In order to assess the delivery of ‘public value’, a research team was 
organised to establish a public value assessment system. The team ‘identified 
25 indices in five dimensions of public value measure framework: reach, 
audience appreciation of program quality, impact, public service, and efficiency 
of financial and business operations’ (Tsao, Peng, & Lin, 2008, p.130). These 
five assessment dimensions and their data sources can be summarized as 
follows (Tsao, Peng, & Lin, 2008): 
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1) Reach is evaluated from three indices: reach rate, viewing hours, and reach 
rates of new platforms. Data sources tested are viewer surveys and website 
click statistics;  
2) Satisfaction with program quality is evaluated from five indices: number of 
programs entering as finalists in competitions, program diversity, program 
creativity, program profundity, and program fairness. Data sources tested are 
programming information provided by TV stations and evaluations of 
program satisfaction by viewers, NPO representatives, and experts and 
scholars; 
3) Influence is evaluated from five indices: ability to form a civil society, social 
influence, credibility, demands, and international visibility. Data sources 
tested are information provided by TV stations and evaluations of TV station 
influence by viewers, NPO representatives, and experts and scholars; 
4) Pubic service is evaluated from seven indices: resource sharing, 
improvement of broadcasting environment, viewing share, digital 
development, promotion of ethnic group communication rights, exaltation of 
ethnic languages and cultures, and audience preferences. Data sources 
tested are information provided by TV stations and evaluations of each 
broadcaster, viewers, NPO representatives, experts and scholars. 
5) Efficiency of financial and business operations is evaluated from four 
indices: operation transparency, efficient use and development of resources, 
increasing flexibility and specialty of human resources, and fair working 
conditions. Data sources tested are operating information provided by TV 
stations and questionnaires completed by employees. 
 
  The intention of this system for assessing pubic value was to provide a more 
comprehensive alternative to the Nielsen rating system, and to enable the 
public to effectively evaluate TBS’s performance. According to the TBS 
Chairman, Chen Sheng-fu (2011, p. 1), ‘TBS has a greater social responsibility 
compared to other commercial broadcasters, and its performance is assessed 
not only through viewer ratings’. Since public service broadcasters worldwide 
have developed a system of accountability, which focuses on the 
self-regulation of the media, it is ‘this system of accountability that serves as 
the basis for public value assessment at TBS’ (Chen, 2011, p. 1). 
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In order to reflect the strengths and weaknesses of TBS in the fulfilment of its 
duties as a public broadcaster, the first Public Value Assessment Survey was 
carried out in 2007, with a second survey in 2009 (TBS annual report, 2009). 
Although the 2007 survey results were clamed, by the then management team, 
to provide a good reference point for TBS in the formulation of improvement 
strategies and a blueprint for future development, in his later account, the TBS 
Chairman, Chen Sheng-fu, points out that whereas the 2009 survey covered an 
entire year the 2007 survey only covered a six-month period, with the 
consequence that the 2009 survey was able to provide more concrete and 
substantial results (2011, p. 1). 
The 2009 survey showed that although CTS scored the highest in viewer 
satisfaction, ‘its market positioning is still not clear’ (TBS annual report, 2009). 
Seizing on this, supporters of the public television system argued that if CTS’s 
performance was to be assessed by a public value test, it should have access 
to the public budget rather than relying solely on advertising revenue (Trend 
Spotting Marketing Research Co. Ltd., 2009).  
Another member of the new PSB consortium, Taiwan Indigenous TV (TITV), 
also faced the problem of unclear positioning, according to the survey. TITV 
was established under the Indigenous Education Act and received it budget 
from the Council of Indigenous People under the Executive Yuan. Starting 2010, 
the Indigenous Peoples Cultural Foundation took charge of TITV’s budget, 
while the PTS Foundation was entrusted with the day-to-day operations. This 
division of responsibilities posed issues for overall planning and the channels’ 
ability to fulfil its role as a public broadcaster and led the compilers of the 2009 
survey to argue that the status of TITV should be clarified as soon as possible 
to facilitate its long-term development (Trend Spotting Marketing Research Co. 
Ltd., 2009).  
The 2009 survey also concluded that TBS should consider ways to integrate 
resources from the television stations, and specifically to find ways to build a 
collaborative platform that enables sharing of resources and staff in the face of 
limited funding and resources (Trend Spotting Marketing Research Co. Ltd., 
2009). 
The survey also suggests that as a public broadcaster TBS should take the 
initiative to establish a mechanism for public and social participation, and at the 
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same time increase interaction with the viewers of the four television stations 
under its umbrella (TBS annual report, 2009). 
 
4.2 Research Aims and Questions  
Since, as we have seen, the expansion of PSB has long been in dispute in 
Taiwan, it has been a much debated topic and a particular focus for media 
academics.  
  These scholars’ long record of media scrutiny placed them in a strong 
position to influence public debate and a number translated their ideas into 
practice and became active participants in campaigns and lobbies to advance 
the case for PSB. Their interventions took variety of forms, such as publishing 
research papers in journals, holding seminars, joining political conferences, 
organising campaigns and lobbying, engaging in demonstrations, or 
engineering a letter campaign in mainstream newspapers.  
In the decade from 1998 to 2008, academic concern about PSB yielded over 
100 PSB-related studies and reports in academic and general journals and 
conference papers identified in Dai’s bibliography analysis (2008, see Table 4.4. 
below). To these it can be added over 100 more published by public 
broadcasters. 
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Table 4.4. Studies of PSB in Taiwan: 1998-2008 
Types 
 
Year 
Publications  
of  
public  
broadcaster 
General  
Journals/ 
Magazines 
Conference  
papers  
Academic  
Journals 
Official  
Reports Books 
PhD  
Thesis 
Master  
Theses Others Total 
2008 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 15 
2007 14 3 4 2 0 1 0 1 0 24 
2006 29 4 8 3 0 1 0 5 2 47 
2005 21 4 3 5 0 0 0 3 7 43 
2004 9  4 9 3 1 0 0 2 0 22 
2003 3 1 0 4 0 0 1 2 0 11 
2002 7 5 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 17 
2001 29 11 28 1 3 0 0 4 0 50 
2000 2 15 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 23 
1999 0 9 1 4 0 0 0 0 1 15 
1998 0 5 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 9 
No 
Date 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 
Total 138 61 59 24 6 3 1 21 12 287 
(Sources: Adapted from results in Dai, 2008, p. 319) 
 
As table 4.4. shows, the overall number of PSB-related studies peaks 
significantly in 2001 and then again in 2006. The first peak coincides with the 
policy window opened by the government change in 2000. Then there is a 
progressive drop from 2001 onwards. The second peak coincides with passing 
of the legislation for PSB expansion in 2006. 
These studies adopted a wide range of points of view to approach the 
analysis of PSB including: PSB and media policy (Cheng, 2003), PSB and 
media performance (Tsao, Peng, & Lin, 2008, Weng, 2006; Cheng, 2005; Lin, 
2006; Feng, 1999;1995), legislation establishing the legal status of PSB (Feng 
et al , 2002), the options for financing PSB (Feng, 1998), personnel and media 
accountability (Weng, 2008; Tsao et al, 2008), and PSB and national identity 
(Chen, 2008, p. 213).  
Despite the diversity of topics, the majority of the studies have perpetuated 
the political controversy around PSB because most reinforced the argument 
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that incompetent government(s) and the Blue-Green political divide were the 
primary barriers to its full realization. Few maintained that the elite-based PSB 
debate only managed to reach preliminary achievement because the values 
and rhetorics employed by the campaigns lacked a strong connection with the 
general public (Jiang, 2006; Wang, 2004; Lin, 2003). The lack of public 
engagement was however one of major concerns of a former CEO of the PTS 
and TBS, Yuan-Hui Hu, when he identified main challenges facing Taiwan’s 
PSB (Hu, 2007, p. 207). His concern echoes the views expressed by the BBC’s 
former Director-General, Mark Thompson when he argued that PSB has to be 
a ‘conscious civic choice’ and that any country that wants to develop a PSB 
tradition needs to think about how to develop ‘widespread public support’ 
(Thompson, 2006, p. 4). 
More work is needed to examine the extent to which the ‘public’, who are the 
central symbolic figures in debates on public service broadcasting, are actually 
involved and participate in the discussions conducted in their name.   
In order to fill the gap, this thesis draws on four main areas of inquiry and 
conceptualisation: 
  1) Critical Political Economy: Murdock & Golding (2000) note that critical 
political economy differs from mainstream economics in four main respects. It is 
‘holistic’, ‘historical’, and centrally concerned with ‘the balance between 
capitalist enterprise and public intervention’. Most importantly, it goes beyond 
technical issues of efficiency to engage with ‘basic moral questions of justice, 
equity and public good’ (Murdock & Golding, 2000, p. 61). Work within this 
tradition has focused on the shifting relations between states and markets in 
structuring the operating environment for media in democratic societies, paying 
particular attention to the limitations of commercial media in providing full 
resources for citizenship and the role of government in addressing ‘market 
failures’ through regulation and financial support for public communications 
initiatives. In recent years the balance struck has been substantially tipped in 
favour of private enterprise by the processes of marketisation. Taiwan offers an 
important instance of this process in action. This thesis questions the widely 
held belief that the commercialisation of the media necessarily leads to 
democratization, explores the reasons for the emergence of PSB in an 
over-commercialised media landscape, and details the history of the debates 
 91 
surrounding the formation of policies for PSB and its subsequent 
institutionalisation; 
  2) Politics of Media Representation: When we look into the history of 
Taiwan’s television industry, it is clear that continuing political domination of the 
terrestrial television networks, political interference in the media, the rise of 
consumerism, and debates around domestic production as opposed to filling 
channels with imported programmes, have been central to debates on ‘market 
failure’. These features erode the media system’s ability to function as a public 
sphere (Habermas, 1989). The argument that PSB should address these 
deficiencies but should confine itself to providing programming ‘that the market 
could not or would not provide’ (Murdock, 1999) removes any effective counter 
to the commercial sector’s domination of popular programming and in so doing 
sells citizens short by eroding their right to access to full range of cultural 
resources needed to support engaged social participation (Murdock, 1999). On 
the other hand, the structural relationship to government entailed in public 
subsidy renders broadcasting organisations potentially subject to government 
control or harassment sparking a continual struggle to maintain the relative 
autonomy of key editorial and administrative decisions and prevent public 
broadcasting from becoming state broadcasting. At the same time, commercial 
media protect their own interests by lobbing and other political expenditures 
and the cultivation of political relationships (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Thus, 
one important focus of work in this area is on the alliances and networks 
formed by civil society groups and by business interests and the ways these 
formations attempt to intervene in the policy marking process by building public 
and media support and influencing parliamentarians. Consequently, one the 
central concerns of this thesis is with the organisation of pressure group politics 
and the competing constructions of present situations and future possibilities 
that various alliances advance. 
  3) The Role of PSB: Conceptually Garnham (1997) argues that the essence 
of public service broadcasting is provision to all citizens on equal terms and 
Keane (1991) holds that it is driven by higher aspirations than solely to provide 
entertainment. From this perspective, one strand in the classic debate of PSB 
is of particular concern in this thesis; the question of what role (if any) PSB can 
and should play in a tele-visual environment where consumer choice has been 
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extended by the proliferation of cable and satellite channels. This thesis 
explores how far channel plurality can address the market failures of terrestrial 
systems and what distinctive role PSB can play in the multi-channel age. The 
Taiwanese case, characterised by the centrality of commercial television, offers 
a valuable addition to contemporary debates. 
4) Transitional Societies: In common with a number of countries involved in 
the third wave democracy (Huntington, 1991), Taiwan has experienced a 
double transition, economically from state management to market driven 
growth and politically from authoritarian rule to multi party representative 
democracy. A number of the Taiwanese PSB-related studies mentioned earlier, 
have suggested that the history of PSB in Taiwan may throw useful light on the 
wider processes involved in social reform, the transition to democracy, and the 
empowerment of civil society (Tsao, Peng, & Lin, 2008, Weng, 2006; Cheng, 
2005; Lin, 2006; Feng, 1999; 1995). Precisely because broadcasting is 
simultaneously a key industry and the major source of symbolic resources for 
political citizenship its constitution and future is central to understanding the 
wider politics of transition. Hence, the detailed case study presented here is 
intended to contribute to more general arguments on future of democratic 
culture in transitional societies as well as more specific debates on the future of 
PSB. 
  On the basis of these four general areas of interest and concern this study 
has two main aims. The first is to critically examine the course of debates 
around the expansion of PSB in Taiwan by addressing the following questions:  
1) Which interest groups have been involved in the debate?  
2) What are the main arguments and propositions they have put forward?  
3) What points of reference have they drawn on and what experiences from 
other countries have been seen as relevant?  
4) Which arguments have played a central role in policy formation? 
 
  The second aim is to explore the dynamics of the policymaking process by 
exploring the following questions:  
 
1) Why have some arguments been accorded greater credibility and weight 
than others in policy formation?  
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2) Who has the power to draw the boundary of inclusion and exclusion in the 
debate?  
3) What are the consequences of this process of inclusion and exclusion? 
 
  In order to answer these questions, this research drew on three main 
sources of empirical evidence: 1) in-depth interviews with a range of actors 
involved in the debate; 2) documentary analysis, and 3) press analysis. 
 
4.3 Research Methods  
In-depth interviews were conducted to address the various constructions of 
the PSB debate within different groups and the competing dynamics among 
them. Identified from preliminary press and documentary reviews, interviews 
were conducted with four main groups of key actors: parliamentarians, public 
broadcasters, social activists, and media academics. Data from the completed 
interviews were analysed to identify themes and associations using recognised 
techniques (Backer & Bryman, 2004) and coded in such a way as to allow for 
quantitative analysis of both the frequency with which certain themes appear 
and the extent to which they are emphasised by the different parties involved.  
Documentary analysis was undertakes to review the major written sources 
relating to the PSB debate. Combined with the interview data, this work 
attempts to establish an understanding of the key events in the debates around 
the extension of PSB and its subsequent implementation. The main sources 
include: government reports and papers, parliamentary debates, papers 
produced by stakeholders’ in the television and media industries, papers 
produced by civil society groups, papers produced by groups campaigning for 
the institution of the PSB, and comments by academic analysts.  
A press analysis was conducted to provide a detailed picture of the ways the 
arguments and debates were presented for public consumption in Taiwan’s 
major national daily newspapers. A systematic content analysis was conducted 
of the coverage given in PSB-related news stories, editorials, commentary, and 
letters to the editor.  
 
  The results of these various research exercises are explored in the next four 
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chapters. Chapter 5 draws on interviews with key decision makers and players 
in the debate, documenting their differing attitudes towards PSB expansion and 
their constructions of the situation. It explores the boundaries of inclusion and 
exclusion by investigating the clash of ideas that stem from differences in the 
interests and priorities of different groups.  
  Chapter 6 reports the results of the press content analysis presenting 
newspaper representations as one of the outcomes of the clash of ideas 
identified in the previous chapter.  
  Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 go beyond news reporting to explore the role firstly 
of editorials and secondly of letters to the editor, as respectively, codifications of 
the political and social positions occupied by the national titles selected for 
analysis, and as potential spaces for public expression and engagement. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Constructions of PSB Debate: 
Competitions for Claim-Makers  
 
 
 
 
 
In previous chapters it has been noted how certain issues existing in Taiwan’s 
media landscape generated urgent demands for the introduction of a PSB 
service in Taiwan. The purpose of this chapter is to look at the way how these 
issues have been defined as ‘problems’ and how the need for the PSB have 
been defined as ‘a solution to the problems’ by examining a series of 
claims-competitions among various claim-makers.  
The departure point for this chapter is the version of the social constructionist 
perspective developed by David Buckingham (2011) who maintains that social 
problems or issues ‘are not simply given, but actively constructed’ (Buckingham, 
2011, p. 7). More specifically, he argues that, in the process of construction, 
groups of people, who have their own claims and assumptions toward certain 
issues, ‘identify, select and name’ the social problems: ‘problems must be 
categorised and typified in particular ways in order to become the focus of 
public attention’ (Buckingham, 2011, p. 7). To this here it can be usefully added 
Loseke’s view (2003) that, in the more diverse and fluid context of 
contemporary societies, there is less space left for reaching consensus among 
the groups which often leads to the construction of social problems becoming a 
contested process. In this process, ‘the action of claims-makers plays a central 
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role’ (Loseke, 2003). The key claims-makers, who usually include experts, 
academics, campaigners, politicians, media commentators, seek to ‘define a 
social problem and increase its public visibility’, but also ‘in pursuit of their own 
sectional interests’ (Buckingham, 2011, p. 7).  
Following Buckingham’s lead, this chapter engages the perspective of social 
construction to examine the particular ways in which the actions of various 
claim-makers have constructed the ‘problems’ and ‘solution’ in Taiwanese 
media landscape. 
  This chapter is informed by a combination of findings from semi-structured 
interviews with key claim-makers in this PSB debate, and their claims published 
in the press or in archival documentary evidence. Key claim makers identified 
in this study include legislators, media scholars, social activists, 
activist-academics and broadcasters.  
By an examination of their claim-making and claim-fighting process, this 
chapter intends to gain a better understanding of the clash of ideas and the 
conflict of powers in the social construction of PSB expansion. The aim to 
explore the claims through different key claim-makers is not only to illustrate 
the reasons why they believe their concerns to be ‘problems need to be sorted 
out at that time’, but also to show the extent in which the claims-competitions 
might marginalise or prevent other ways of approaching the issues when they 
were constructed in specific ways. 
 
5.1 Identifying Key Claim-makers   
In order to collect information which is unlikely gained by observation or textual 
analysis alone (Berger, 2000), this chapter intend to explore different claims 
and to illustrate the clash of interests and priorities among groups by in-depth 
personal interviews. 20 key actors were identified from preliminary document 
and press review. The semi-structured interviews were conducted in 
interviewees’ workplaces in Taiwan between January and April 2008. In order to 
show the social construction of the PSB debate at certain key moments during 
the policy formulation and implementation time, the focus of interviews is 
placed on the processes side rather than outcomes side.  
These interviews, averaged from one to two hours in length, were 
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tape-recorded, transcribed and coded. The names and affiliated professions of 
the interviewees, as well as the dates of interviews are listed in Appendix 1. 
 According to the interviewees’ affiliated professions and the positions of their 
claims, this chapter broadly separates the interviewees into three categories: 1) 
legislators (parliamentarians) from different political parties; 2) media scholars, 
social activists and activist-academics; and 3) broadcasters. 
  In respect of the likely differences in the details of their responses (Marshall 
& Rossman, 1989), different interview schedules were designed for each 
category of interviewee. Public broadcasters were asked about their 
perceptions and experiences in PSB practice, the challenges they face and the 
possible solutions they seek. Social activists, media academics or 
activist-academics were asked about their visions for media reform and actions 
they took to realise these visions. Legislators were asked about their position, 
judgments and experiences during the policy formation and implementation. All 
interviews included general questions about why public broadcasting was 
deemed to be in crisis, how the problems should most appropriately be defined, 
who exerted most influence over public definitions in this area and what kinds 
of cultural and social resources were accessed in defining the issues as social 
problems. To help interviewees address these issues more effectively press 
coverage of some PSB news events were used as prompts during the 
interviews.  
5.2 Legislators’ Constructions   
As discussed earlier, the PSB expansion came along with a policy window 
opened by this unprecedented political transition in the 2000 presidential 
election. When the DPP came to power, with the re-distribution of powers after 
2000, it was alleged that there was a significant watering down of the PSB 
proposals. More specifically, on the surface it seems there was a very high 
level of agreement, between the two main parties, DPP and KMT, that the 
state-owned terrestrial television has been a ‘problem’ since the televisions 
served as propaganda tools to produce and spread partial political bias for a 
long time. Both parties came to agree that it was time to reform terrestrial 
television and loosen the control of the state. However, there was no 
consensus as to what path should be followed.  
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5.2.1 PSB in the Blue-Green Divide    
After coming to office after 2000, the DPP government seemed to reconsider its 
initial views on the democratisation of terrestrial televisions. For instance, in 
2001 the Government Information Office (GIO) claimed that the plan to 
withdraw all government control and ownership from terrestrial televisions was 
possible but ‘it is impossible to reduce all the problems in the media landscape 
in a once-for-all action since the current problems in the media have deep roots 
which started from KMT‘s long-term media control’ (Taipei Times, 18/12/2001, p. 
3). The DPP government claimed that they were working on a proposal to 
‘possibly minimize government influences’ on the televisions but ‘no timetable 
can be expected’ (Taipei Times, 27/12/2001, p. 3). The then DPP Premier 
Chang Chun-hsiung also echoed this tone, commenting: ‘it does take time and 
effort to conceive a comprehensive plan for the media reform’ (Taipei Times, 
27/12/2001, p. 3).  
  On the other hand, the KMT party advocated privatising televisions services 
out of fear that the DPP government would benefit from their influence over 
terrestrial televisions in the same way the KMT did. For instance, the KMT 
lawmaker Hung Hsiu-chu claimed ‘the DPP government keeps extending their 
control over the media by sending their loyal members into the television 
boardrooms’. Another legislator, Lee Ching-an, from People First party (PFP), a 
coalition partner of the KMT, accused that ‘before President Chen Shui-bain 
became a President, he used to criticise KMT’s media control policy and 
advocated that the KMT government should release all its shares in televisions 
to free market. How can he immediately change into another face after he 
came to power? (Taipei Times, 18/12/2001, p. 3).’ 
  In Taiwanese political background, it is not a surprise to see the claims, made 
by political actors standing on two sides of the Blue-Green political divide, 
contradicted to each. Also, it is not hard to detect the main concerns in the 
problem defining process are more on the partisan interests rather than the 
possible benefits the media reform can bring to the media landscape and the 
society. In this light, in the next section I further consider the issues created by 
excessive government control of publicly funded broadcasting.        
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5.2.2 PSB as a Government Mouthpiece   
As the well-known Peacock Committee in the UK when seeking to obtain a 
clear definition of ‘public service broadcasting’, ‘we had some difficulty in 
obtaining an operational definition from broadcasters’ (Peacock, 1986, p. 130, 
cited in Scannell, 1989, p. 135). In Taiwan, definitive definitions remain similarly 
elusive. Most of the legislators interviewed in this study showed little conviction 
or confidence in their explanations as to how the concept of PSB expansion 
could work to the benefit of Taiwan and its media.  
For example, Lee Yong Ping, a PFP legislator who gave her full support to 
the PSP proposals, expressed some doubts in the interviews as to the viability 
of the public model in Taiwan.  
Here some alert readers may already question, as a PFP legislator from a 
KMT coalition party, why would Lee Yong-ping support the PSB proposal rather 
than the privatisation plan supported by other KMT and PFP legislators 
mentioned earlier?  
  The answer probably lies in her earlier political background as a DPP 
member and a director of the DPP's Women's Affairs department, but in her 
interview she insisted that the decision to support the PSB proposal was out of 
her professional judgement based on her media expertise which combines with 
her master degree in media in NYU, New York, and practical experiences of 
being a manager in private television stations in Taiwan.  
  Even with her media expertise, Lee Yong-ping frankly admitted that one of 
key challenge is to explain everyone including herself what the PSB really 
means. In her interview she revealed that she was not confident enough that a 
workable system of the PSB concept can really be established. According to 
Lee Yong-ping: 
 
‘At that time, not many people understand what the public service 
broadcasting really means. To be honest, when the formulation of the 
Act really began, actually I didn’t have a clue about how to generate a 
mechanism to operate a real public-oriented media since we had no 
practical experience before.’ 
 
The failure to agree an operational definition had major political ramifications as 
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it meant the concept could be turned and twisted according to the particular 
points of view of different claims makers. Lee Yong-ping pointed out the PSB 
plan was easily characterised as a lousy method for DPP government to control 
the media. According to Lee Yong-ping:  
 
‘The most difficult thing to sell the PSB idea in the Legislative Yuan is 
that no one really believes the value of public service broadcasting. And 
the KMT-oriented press were always trying to stigmatise that the PSB is 
another way of government control since the PSB is associated with 
government funding. The plan was seen to be a very lame excuse for 
the [DPP] government to exercise its malicious interference into the 
televisions. I spent lots of time disputing with other legislators to clarify 
that the PSB would serve the whole public but the [DPP] government. ’  
 
Although Price (1995) notes that it is possible to have a PSB which encourages 
of the public sphere but is financed directly by the government through the 
Legislature, in Taiwan’s case PSB was interpreted as another form of state 
control by political claim-makers against the plan. Since simple claims are 
usually more effective than complicated ones (Loseke, 2003), compared with 
the elusive and suspicious concept which is difficult to explain to most 
Taiwanese who had rare PSB experience before, the concept of privatisation 
seems to be a much easier proposal to be understood in a environment where 
private media are prevalent.  
  As a main advocator for the privatisation plan, another PFP legislator Lee 
Ching-An (李慶安) held the view that the essential solution to get to the root of 
the ‘problems’ was to sell government shares of terrestrial television stations to 
the market. When asked why she placed her belief in privatisation rather than 
the PSB proposal, Lee Ching-an shared her sceptical feelings on the PSB 
concept. According to Lee Ching-an: 
 
‘Let the market mechanism decide! In my view it is the simplest way to 
isolate the manipulations from political parties and government.’ 
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With experiences and knowledge of political struggle, many politicians in KMT 
and PFP camps held more scepticism and stronger objections than Lee 
Ching-an who adopted a euphemistic way to claim that market mechanism 
could do better. Another KMT legislator Hung Hsiu-chu, unlike Lee Ching-an’s, 
directly stated that the PSB project was exactly a political plot of the DPP 
government. According to Hung Hsiu-chu:  
 
‘The PSB plan is the DPP government's lame plot for holding its shares 
and control over the two televisions (TTV and CTS).’ 
 
When asked further about her strong objection at that time, Hung Hsiu-chu 
described the PSB concept is just a political tool serving to make the ugly 
political game look better in the public eye. In her words: 
 
‘After The DPP came to power, the taste of power makes them unwilling 
to release its shareholdings of televisions. The DPP government keep 
saying that they are planning to separate the ownership from the 
management to isolate the media from political intervention. This is 
nonsense. I know this very well because this is exactly the old tricks in 
the book that the old-time KMT used to play.’ 
 
In other words, the plan was seen as a plot aimed at expanding the DPP’s 
influence under the disguise of the PSB. This leads us to the next section that 
address the way the PSB was viewed as a political plot.    
5.2.3 PSB as a Political plot   
To justify their delay on media reform, DPP political actors also fought back by 
claiming that the wealthy KMT, even after losing power, still exerted influential 
media control through their commercial connections and therefore had no 
legitimate right to criticise the DPP government (Taipei times, 12/12/2001, p. 3). 
At the same time, the KMT seemed to conveniently forget their own past record 
of state patronage abuses and kept presenting allegations of DPP intervention 
as unprecedented and of likely concern to the international community. In their 
eyes, privatization was the most compatible strategy for Taiwan with wider 
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trends in international markets. As the KMT spokesman Justin Chou stated it, 
‘although the KMT holds the most resources in media organizations among 
political parties, we think that the privatisation of all the media organizations is 
an international and modern trend. We want to draw a clear boundary between 
political powers and the media freedom’ (Taipei Times, 24/12/2001, p. 2). 
Echoed with this argument, two pro-KMT newspapers China Times (CT) and 
United Daily News (UDN), also drew on neo-liberal arguments in their editorials 
to address that the privatisation of the media is an international trend and it is 
the best way to improve and modernise the media industry (CT, 28/12/2001, p. 
2; UDN, 23/12/2001, p. 2).  
  As a main advocator for the privatisation plan and a believer of market 
mechanism, the PFP legislator, Lee Ching-an, raised a bold proposal by tabling 
an amendment to the Broadcasting and Television Act which would force the 
DPP government and all political parties, including KMT, to sell all of their 
shares in all terrestrial TV to the free market. 
In 2001, if KMT and PFP can co-work to produce a political alliance for voting, 
the Blue coalition parties could have easily passed any legislation in the 
parliament without the DPP legislators’ votes. However, sectional interests 
concerned about their respective shareholding in media not only split the 
political parties into rival factions but also generated significant disagreements 
on the amendment. The amendment eventually remained stalled in the 
parliament (Taipei Times, 27/12/ 2001, p. 3). The result mirrored the long 
existing distrust and interest calculations among different parties in Taiwanese 
politics. This claim-competition among political actors also reflected that the 
construction of ‘an urgent media reform the society really needs’ focused on 
political interests rather than rational consideration about the future of media 
development proposed by media academics and social activists (More detailed 
analysis on this issue will be addressed in following section focusing on media 
academics and social activists).   
  After the ‘fierce debate over the future of the two terrestrial television stations 
with legislators’ (Taipei Times, 27/12/ 2001, p. 3), the GIO Director-General Su 
Tzen-ping, who once strongly supported the PSB idea, soon stepped down in 
2002. After Su Tzen-ping, the several successors that followed in GIO ‘had no 
faith in public media’ and mostly adopted a ‘minimal change’ strategy to avoid 
 103 
any possible political controversy (Lin, 2003, p. 159). With the choice of 
nationalizing or commercializing the government's shares in two broadcasting 
networks, the DPP-led Cabinet kept looking at ‘both ways’ (Taipei Times, 
15/06/2004, p. 2).  
  In 2004, the government announced to take a ‘one step at a time’ approach 
to the issue of nationalizing two terrestrial television stations, CTS and TTV. 
The approach intended to first nationalize CTS, then deciding later whether to 
nationalize or privatise TTV (Taipei Times, 15/06/2004, p. 2). Also, with 
consideration over the high costs of nationalizing two terrestrial TV stations at 
the same time, the government preferred to start with CTS which has higher 
shares in government hands (75 percent compared with 47 percent for TTV). 
  These developments demonstrate how the DPP government weakened its 
commitment to the PSB proposal which aimed to transform the terrestrial 
televisions into a publicly orientated format. It is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that once the DPP had achieved office the political benefits of 
retaining some form of direct control over some broadcasting became far more 
apparent. This is not to deny that financial factors played a significant part as 
well, but rather to suggest that the initial enthusiasm for a purist view of PSB 
started to lose ground due to pragmatic considerations about how best the 
party might protect and consolidate its position.  
5.2.4 PSB as a Compromised Result   
Although expanding the PSB was what the DPP party included in its Election 
Manifesto, it wasn’t partially fulfilled under DPP’s administration until 2006. 
Developing the mounting demands for more effective insulation of main 
terrestrial televisions from pressures from political rivals and media academics, 
in 2006 the ‘Statute Regarding the Disposition of Government Shareholdings in 
the Terrestrial Television Industry’ was eventually passed (Liberty Times, 
04/01/2006, p. 6; United Daily News, 04/01/2006, p. 2). The significance of this 
legislation was to push forward the administration's bid to free the media from 
political, partisan and military influences. Precisely, it outlined that the 
government shares (74.95 percent) of the CTS would be donated to the Public 
Service Foundation for a proper public television transformation. Also, two other 
government-funded ethnic television stations would join the public television 
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transformation to form a public television group.  
  In the process of the passage of the ‘Statute Regarding the Disposition of 
Government Shareholdings in the Terrestrial Television Industry’, the legislation 
was passed after eight rounds of cross-party negotiations. 
  When being asked about her reflection on her experience of participating in 
the legislation process which formulated the ‘Statute Regarding the Disposition 
of Government Shareholdings in the Terrestrial Television Industry’ in 2006, a 
interviewed DPP legislator, Lin Shu-fen (林淑芬 ), indicated that long 
negotiations over this legislation, participated in by the DPP, the KMT and other 
small parties in their alliance with DPP or KMT, only produced a disjointing 
‘compromised result’ which satisfied no one. According to Lin Shu-fen: 
 
The negotiation process was actually full of compromise and disputes 
among the political parties. In my view, the most important item ‘political 
power out of the media’ is still not fulfilled. For example, in the legislature 
the first paragraph of Article VII lines out that the team who monitors the 
government share transferring process should be formed by the 
re-presenting ratio of current political parties. The DPP legislators were 
strongly against this Article for its potential room for political interference 
(from KMT). However, the KMT and PFP, also held their strong 
insistence for this [the two parties totally have more seats in the 
parliament than the DPP legislators].  For the passage of the legislation, 
it finally included in the consultation conclusions. 
 
Echoing Lin Shu-fen’s observation, another indigenous representative 
lawmaker in KMT party, Kung Wen-chi (孔文吉), also mentioned that the 
‘compromised result’ satisfied nobody. Kung Wen-chi indicated another 
example about the three other television channels going under the PSB 
umbrella during the negotiation. In his view: 
 
It is ridiculous to put Indigenous TV under the PSB umbrella. The 
ideology of the PSB expanding project is damaging the independence 
of indigenous culture. Ethnic television has its very specific target while 
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the PSB should provide its widespread service to the whole general 
public. This odd result of the legislature exposes one of the major 
shortcomings in the process of political negotiation. 
 
In response to the shortcomings in the process of political negotiation and the 
compromised result, another former legislator, Chou Yan-Shan (周陽山), who 
was also a PTS director in the boardroom, shared his insightful view from his 
previous experience of being a legislator. According to him:  
 
‘The intention of this plan to include TITV and Hakka TV with the PSB 
group is actually to satisfy ‘a hidden system of needs and interests’. A 
hidden distribution system is embedded in the plan. Certain interest 
groups were targeting on government budget and public money to gain 
their own profit. Most innocent “academic” directors in the television 
boardroom are too naive to realise what that really means in practical 
ways since they don’t really have the experience to get their hand dirty 
in the detail. There are many people hiding behind the curtain waiting 
for their own interests from concerning the government funding.’ 
 
  Some disconcerting issues did emerge after the other three televisions 
officially joined into the PSB umbrella in 2007 which appeared to provide some 
evidential support for Chou Yan-shan’s claims. Since Hakka Television (Hakka 
TV), Taiwan Indigenous Television (TITV) and Taiwan Macroview Television 
(TMT) received their funding from different government sectors to carry out 
their missions to provide service to Hakka people, indigenous people and 
overseas compatriot. Their different targeting groups of audience, funding 
sources and operating models actually undermined this PSB group as well 
(More detailed analysis on this issue will be addressed in following section 
focusing on public broadcasters). 
  In interviews, most of the legislators agreed that a substantial move to get to 
the root of these ‘new problems’ was an urgent need for a substantial revision 
of the Public Broadcasting Act.  
  The question is, would any such revision simply open up another set of 
claims competitions in the legislature, since the Blue Green divide remains as 
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great as ever? The then main advocate for the privatisation plan, the PFP 
legislator Lee Ching-an still held the view that a better solution should be selling 
the government shares of terrestrial television stations to the market. 
‘I recall there was a group of media scholars acting as bulldozers to push 
their ideas for public televisions, some radical scholars even advocated 
that all Taiwanese televisions should be totally transformed into public 
forms, all should become Britain's BBC. Although eventually I had to 
accept the compromised plan to only privatise one television (TTV) and 
to transform another one (CTS) into a public television, in retrospect I 
still do not believe the PSB thing is a practical suggestion for Taiwan. 
Now you, this young guy, can see the PSB project turned out to be such 
a sorry mess by first hand. Sigh!’ 
 
  There are grounds for questioning whether Lee’s insights were especially 
prescient, as the possible option of privatisation was clearly evident from the 
outset. In most DPP legislators’ views, privatisation would offer an open door 
for the wealthy KMT to buy back the terrestrial television back and control it 
again unofficially. Furthermore, in most media academics’ claims, privatisation 
would only aggravate the commercial competitions and deliver little positive 
influences on the unbalanced and crowded media market.   
  In Lee’s retrospective opinion, she mentioned a group of media scholars who 
really pushed their ideas for public televisions. This leads us to the focus of 
following section which discusses media scholars, social activists and 
activist-academics as another group of key claim-makers in the contested 
construction.  
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5.3 Academics’ Constructions  
In this section, the focus shift to another significant group of claim-makers in 
the PSB debate. This group were not formally part of the party political realm 
but they also sought to play an active role in the process of PSB formulation 
and implementation. 
In the eye of media academic community, the KMT’s heavy control over the 
terrestrial televisions had been a problem for a long time. However, in an 
authoritarian background, ‘before 1980s media academics mainly placed their 
criticism on the media performance or bias reporting rather than on the media 
structure, the ownership and the broader media ecology’ (Lin, 2002, p. 121).  
Following the lifting of martial law in 1987, alongside with a process of 
democratization with social movements of women, labour and environmental 
issues which played ‘an increasingly engaged role in trying to guide 
government policy’ (Fell, 2012, p. 234), and with a rapid growing commercial 
media market, in the early 1990s members in media academic field also raised 
the ‘problem’ existing in the media landscape and began to discuss possible 
actions to solve the ‘problem’ on two fronts: political interference and 
commercial forces (Lin, 2002, p. 123).  
5.3.1 PTS as A Flawed Design  
When the first PSB, Public Television Station, was officially launched in 1998, 
compared with the ferocious commercial media, PTS was too late for its entry 
and too small to compete with other commercial competitors in the media 
landscape. The ‘usually less than 1percent rating’ of PTS was one of salient 
examples to see the minority role of the PTS in the environment. Just like the 
way Tracey (1996) comments on American public television, ‘at 2 percent of the 
audience share, one has to question public television‘s claim to be a national 
broadcaster’ (Tracey, 1996, p. 162).  
  An interviewed media academic, Feng Chien-san (馮建三), who has been a 
key figure in the long-term PSB campaign, pointed the fundamental flaw in the 
design for PTS. In his words:  
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‘I disagree with the key ideology behind the Public Television Act 
because the meaning behind the idea shows that the public television is 
only to ‘compensate for the inadequacy of commercial television’. It 
implies that the commercial television is still the dominant actor in the 
consideration on the media landscape. In my opinion, I think the 
dominant actor in a better consideration must be public service 
broadcasting.’  
 
Following the disappointment that followed this first foray, in 1999 a group of 
critical media academics began to organise a collaborative community to 
discuss more effective ways to achieve substantial media transformation.  
  Before the 2000 presidential election, the ideas of these academics were 
noticed by the DPP party. Several critical media scholars were invited by the 
DPP's presidential campaign team to contribute their expertise into the 
presidential election manifesto (Lin, 2003, p. 148).  
  The PSB proposal, from these academics, allowed the DPP to develop its 
traditional complaints about KMT partisanship, control and interference in 
terrestrial television into a more positive, tangible and democratic vision for 
change in broadcasting policy and practice. Through the cooperation with 
political force, the academics seemed to gain more power to influence the 
media policy-making to fix the flaws in the first PSB, Public Television Station, 
when PTS served as a marginal alternative to the commercial market.     
5.3.2 PSB as an Elite Campaign    
After 2000 when the DPP came in office, these academic hoped to exploit this 
opportunity of power change to drive forward media reform. In November 2000, 
a campaign group ‘Campaign for Citizens' TV (CCTV) ’was launched. The 
establishment of this CCTV was described as ‘an unprecedented movement 
since it was the first pressure group organised by media academic intellectuals 
in Taiwan’ (Lin, 2003, p. 150). .  
The goal of CCTV was ‘to bring public values, professional standards and 
democracy into terrestrial televisions’ (CCTV newsletter, 15/11/2000, p. 1). The 
members of CCTV argued that the terrestrial televisions should not be 
privatized but transformed into public form. In the newsletter, active academics 
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claims that ‘it is the moment for active intervention by media scholars, whose 
long record of media scrutiny places them in a prime position to influence what 
happens next’ (CCTV newsletter, 2000, p. 1). 
 In pursuing their objectives, these academics engaged in elite lobbying with 
the DPP political actors and developed a good relationship with the media 
regulator, the Government Information Office (GIO). The head of GIO, Su 
Cheng-ping, used to be a journalist. With his experience of studying newsroom 
autonomy in Germany and being a chief editor in the Independence Post, Su 
was viewed as a reliable partner by these academics. ‘CCTV members 
frequently visited Su to address importance of the PSB expansion’ (Lin, 2003: 
159). At the time, the CCTV members held the view that the DPP government 
should quickly transform two terrestrial televisions, TTV and CTS, into 100 
percent public-oriented television stations and allow them to operate without 
any editorial meddling from government or commercial forces. However, in 
2001 the head of GIO, Su Tzen-ping, stated that ‘he only “personally” supports 
CCTV's proposal’ (Taipei Times, 18/12/2001, p. 3). This statement implied that 
although Su, as a media expert, was personally sympathetic to the PSB 
proposal but the DPP government behind him apparently had different thoughts 
from his view. This statement soon cast a chill over both the enthusiasm of the 
academics and the seemingly bright picture of the PSB future. 
After the GIO Director-General, Su, stepped down in 2002, the successors 
‘did not really have faith in the public media and adopted ‘minimal-change 
strategy to the PSB proposal’ (Lin, 2003, p. 159). The DPP government 
seemed not very keen to fulfil the promise after they came in power ‘since the 
PSB expansion no longer serve as a plan for political actors to come to power 
but, the other way around, became a stone on the way for the government to 
expand its power through the terrestrial televisions’ (Lin, 2003, p. 150).  
As a consequence, these academics developed new strategies and new 
claims in their attempts to secure lasting change in the Taiwanese broadcast 
environment. 
5.3.3 PSB as a Social Movement 
With frustration and disillusionment, a protest against the DPP government 
started to gain momentum. In 2002, the pressure group CCTV held a press 
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conference to announcing its dissolution. CCTV members blamed President 
Chen’s broken promises on PSB reform for the termination of the committee. 
With the press conference, in order to raise the publicity of their action, the 
CCTV also bought half-page newspapers advertisement with the title, ‘we will 
no longer tolerate [the DPP government]’. Three campaign members, Lin 
Hsiao-hsin, Shih Shih-hao and Kuo Li-hsin, offered their resignations of 
directors of terrestrial TV stations as further serious protest action against the 
DPP government (Protest against the delay of media reform, China Times, 
11/10/2002, p. 6). The CCTV announcements that demanded the DPP honour 
its promises on media reform (see Taipei Times, 10/10/2002: 8) were written by 
campaign members including the Director of TTV, Lin Hsiao-hsin, the Director 
of TTV, Shih Shih-hao and the Director of CTS, Kuo Li-hsin (2002), these three 
members strongly condemned Chen and the DPP for their equivocation on 
their promises regarding PSB and demanded a clear timetable for reform.  
The CCTV radical protest with the ‘dissolution’ attracted high media attention 
and gained huge publicity in newspaper coverage, especially in the pro-KMT 
newspapers. For instance, United Daily News (UDN) and China Times (CT) 
used the full page next to front page to report how the CCTV condemned 
President Chen and the DPP government. In contrast, another pro-DPP paper, 
Liberty Times (LT) published nothing about condemnation of the CCTV to the 
DPP government. As shall be shown in subsequent chapters, these specific 
differences were emblematic of wider trends in coverage where political 
partisanship had a major influence on how the PSB issue was defined by 
different press outlets (More details of the newspapers will be addressed in 
following chapters).   
5.3.4 PSB as a Long-Term and Bottom-Up Reform 
After the CCTV’s dissolution, in 2003, another pressure group, Campaign for 
Media Reform (CMR), was launched by core members of previous CCTV. 
These activist-academics shifted their campaign focus from lobbying political 
elites to mobilising public opinion more widely. This also meant a shift in 
emphasis from targeting short term policy changes towards addressing longer 
term objectives, such as increasing media literacy and mobilising a broadly 
based public movement around broadcasting reform issues. 
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  The CMR members kept their claim to be heard by interacting with other 
claims from politically polarised politicians and public broadcasters to ‘expand 
the scope of the problem to be seen in the public eye’ (Hilgartner and Bosk, 
1988). For example, the section of Letters to the editor in the mainstream 
newspaper was a battlefield for the CMR members to keep their voice to be 
heard in the society. The letter writing and media appearances played their part 
in developing this wider and longer term campaign strategy.  
  Alongside their reorientation of their campaign strategy, these academic 
critics had some major criticisms of the broadcasting reform programme that 
was still unfolding under the DPP’s incumbency.  
  As was discussed in earlier chapter, 2006 saw the passage of the Statute 
Regarding the Disposition of Government Shareholdings in the Terrestrial 
Television Industry that sought to eliminate partisanship and political and 
military control but neither recommended complete privatisation or public 
(re)orientation. When asked about her view of this compromised result, an 
active media academic, Weng Shieu-chi (翁秀琪), who was one of directors in 
the PTS board, pointed out the ideal design for Taiwanese PSB went to a 
different thing when facing reality. According to Weng Shieu-chi:  
 
‘In Taiwan, even perfect plans can turn out awfully in a surprising way 
when politics gets involved. What I can only confirm is the initiative 
motive the academics hold is good, though it might go on a bad direction 
after this plan involved with legislators and the government. The plan 
can work out perfectly if it could be carried out in a politics-free 
landscape. Unfortunately, it is always another story in reality.’ 
 
 
Apart from criticism that PSB did not go far enough under the DPP government, 
the interviewed chairman of the Media Watch Organization, Kuang 
Chung-hsiang (管中祥 ), indicated the PSB group is ‘only half-completed’ 
because another important half, strong connections with the public, still 
remained missing. In his words:  
 
‘I said the PSB is only half-competed because it doesn’t meet what it 
 112 
promised. The PSB group’s efforts, no matter on lobbying another better 
legislation or getting more financial supports, are way behind enough. 
From my perspective, it’s not good enough because the broadcaster 
needs to deliver their value as a social campaign or social movements 
which can connects to majority members in this society. Otherwise, it is 
just one of many channels in the market.’ 
 
Echoing this view about the connection with the public, the interviewed CMR 
founder and the once core member of CCTV, Wei Ti (魏玓), arrested there are 
missing links between the PSB and the citizens. According to Ti Wei: 
 
‘The most programming of the Taiwanese PSB are high quality and 
actually attracting numerous elite audiences. Most of them not only enjoy 
watching it, but also donate their money to support it on a regular basis. 
However, just like most commercial television, the way the PSB group 
work so hard to compete for people’s eyeballs in the media market is still 
treating their viewers as consumers. A real PSB needs to communicate 
and connect with people in order to know what the public really want to 
watch.’ 
 
Both of Kuang and Wei’s point of view claimed that where the PSB expansion 
went wrong is the reforms had not engaged with citizens and inspired the 
majority members in this society. From the discussions in the section we saw 
the media academics’ earlier actions and campaign, allied with political forces, 
had a streak of a top-down and paternalistic way which failed to stimulate the 
public imagination and enthusiasm. This also explained the latter refocusing of 
the CMR campaign towards engaging with citizens in a deeper and more 
dynamic way. 
 
5.4 Public Broadcasters’ Constructions   
After a review of the claims from various political and academic sources 
involved in the PSB debate, it is now appropriate to move to the views of 
claim-makers who are within the PSB group, including CEO, presidents of 
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different channels, and directors in the boardroom. With their first-hand 
experiences of running the PSB, their claims were strongly connected to the 
day-to-day difficulties that hurdle the PSB’s healthy development.   
5.4.1 A PSB with Internal Tensions        
When asked how to manage the different channels within Taiwan Broadcasting 
System (TBS) into a cooperative group, interviewed CEO, Feng Hsien-hsien 
(馮賢賢), admitted that this TBS group was not working as a cooperative group 
yet. According to Feng Hsien-hsien: 
 
‘Two key tasks still remain unaccomplished. First, there are still 25% 
shares of CTS is still private-owned. The Government needs to buy the 
shares back to make the CTS as a complete public media, and also the 
government needs to put more funding into CTS which has the deficits 
since 2002. Second, since Hakka TV, TITV and TMT received their 
funding from different government sectors to deliver their own missions 
respectively to Hakka people, indigenous people and overseas 
compatriots, how to cooperate the findings and the resources in a right 
way that can avoid interest conflicts is a tough challenge.’  
 
Feng’s view also displays the undercurrents of internal tensions behind the title 
of the Taiwan Broadcasting System. For PTS, this merger meant a significant 
expansion in its scale and resources. For CTS, this merger meant greater 
political independence from the state. For Hakka TV, TITV and TMT, the merger 
promised greater stability by removing their reliance on annual bids to 
government. Therefore, on the surface the establishment of the group seems a 
better solution for all members. However, alongside with the merging process, 
internal conflicts soon surfaced in the public eye via media coverage. For 
instance, the CTS, which has been an influential national terrestrial television 
and accumulated huge impact and assets for 35 years, was reluctant to be in a 
disposition under the umbrella organisation led by the fledging 8-year- old PTS. 
As then CEO of CTS Lee Yuan put it, ‘the merger of CTS and PTS is like a 35 
year-old lady married to an 8 year-old superman. Everyone is questioning what 
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kind of weird baby will pop out’ (United Daily News, 02/07/2006).  
  Some other clashes scattered in the process of merger. For instance, in a 
news story about ‘Invisible Hand into CTS’ (China Times, 26/12/2006: p4), the 
CEO in CTS, Yuan Lee, pointed out that CTS was losing its autonomy in the 
merger and claimed ‘if the PTS team continues to bully the CTS and depriving 
their autonomy in the merging process, I will quit to protest since I cannot 
protect the CTS’ fundamental right’ (China Times, 26/12/2006, p. 4). 
  More serious issues emerged when the other three channels officially joined 
in 2007. For Hakka TV, TITV and TMT, the merger transferred their bidding 
project from short-term bid projects to long-term developments. The interviewed 
Indigenous TV President, Masao Aki (馬紹 阿紀), pointed out that the merger 
provide TITV with a better environment for sustainability. In his interview, 
Masao Aki recalled that ‘before different bidders who ran the annual project had 
their different style so every year we had to adapt different style and 
programming standards from different team which executed the bid.’  After 
joining the group TBS, the three stations still received their funding from 
different government sectors to carry out their own missions to provide services 
to Hakka people, indigenous people and overseas compatriot respectively. 
Their different operations undermined this PSB as a group. The interviewed 
Hakka TV President, Hsu Chin-yun (徐青雲), revealed the real situation behind 
a group-like look of TBS. According to Hsu Chin-yun:  
 
‘With different missions respectively, in fact the five stations are not 
running by the same standards and principals. Cooperation or synergy 
hardly exists in the group.’ 
 
To the issue of the internal tensions, in interview an activist-academic Feng 
Chien-san, as an outsider of the organisation, provided insightful analysis for 
the reasons that lead to the original creation of Hakka TV, TITV and TMT. Feng 
Chien-san pointed out the three television services were created under political 
considerations since these television services could reach specific and focused 
ethic groups during elections with well-crafted messages. They were not meant 
to become public media inthe first place. According to Feng Chien-san: 
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‘The TMT was created by the KMT government and the Hakka TV and 
TITV were launched by the DPP government. The DPP government 
invested about six hundred million [about 12 million pounds] annually for 
Hakka TV and Aboriginal TV. The amount is not high but it is around 
two-thirds funding of PTS already. In contrast, it can be easily identified 
that the government has ‘relative generosity’ for the ethnic minorities. A 
speculation is generated here that there are election considerations 
behind this arrangement. Through well-crafted propaganda targeting on 
the particular groups, those in power try to secure their next win in 
elections.’  
 
Not only were the three members trapped in this confused grouping, another 
prisoner was CTS. CTS became a member of the TBS group after the Statute 
Regarding the Disposition of Government Shareholdings in the Terrestrial Television 
Industry came into effect in 2006. However, CTS remains a commercial TV station 
reliant on advertising revenue as its only source of income. In other words, the CTS 
was solely responsible for its operational profit and loss while the other members 
received government appropriations. Inevitable tensions between advertising 
revenue and public subsidy generated a constant debate between funding and 
operating models. The interviewed TBS CEO, Feng Hsien-hsien, mentioned 
that the incomplete ownership of CTS and the different funding models are also 
pitfalls in practice. According to Feng Hsien-hsien: 
 
 ‘We don’t have full ownership of the CTS since there are still some 
private shareholders [25%] of the CTS might express different opinions 
on our pubic-oriented management. They can make our work very 
difficult!’ 
 
These points of view above echo with observations from some legislators and 
media academics discussed earlier. For example, the PSB expansion including 
the three stations was viewed as ‘an odd and compromised result from political 
negotiation’ by legislator Kung Wen-chi, as ‘an uncertainty of political games by 
media academic Weng Shieu-chi, and as ‘a hidden system of needs and 
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interests’ by legislator Chou Yan-shan. The problem that the PSB is a group 
threatened by internal tensions not only reinforces the claim that the PSB 
expansion is a compromised result, but also illustrates one of the consequence 
that the elusive definition of the PSB played out as a disorganised and 
piecemeal process. 
5.4.2 A PSB with Unclear Positioning        
Another consequence from the elusive definition of the Taiwanese PSB is that 
the Nielsen rating system, adopted by most commercial televisions as a 
management tool, also became a key reference to run the PSB in 2008. ‘In 
order to enhance the core competence and impact, the TBS CEO Feng 
Hsien-hsien scrutinises the Nielsen rating report everyday’ (Liberty Times, 
21/01/2008, p. 4). 
  In her interview, the CEO restated that the low view rating of the PSB 
programming has been one of the ‘problems’ that confronted her on a routine 
basis. She adopted a daily review of the view ratings as a problem-solving 
move and found it is very helpful. According to the CEO Feng Hsien-hsien: 
 
‘This move is a very effective method because after I announced the 
move every section in the PSB group immediately improved their 
efficiency under this ‘number’ management. After all, it should be our 
responsibility to face the daily examination from the viewers’ choice.’  
 
However, this move soon invited ferocious criticism from media academics who 
claimed the PSB group had sunk to the low level of its commercial rivals, with 
their fixation with audience ratings (Media Watch, 2008, p. 24). In the academic 
eye, the Nielsen rating system is created to assess ‘commercial value’ of 
television advertisements for advertisers and therefore the logic of the rating 
system contradicts with the core principles underpinning the PSB, such as 
universality of appeal, particular attention on minorities, and the idea that PSB 
should encourage competition in good programming rather than for numbers 
(BRU, 1985).  
In interview the CEO Feng Hsien-hsien defended her decision. In her view, 
the ratings can also serve as a neutral survey tool to understand the viewers of 
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the PSB. According to Feng Hsien-hsien: 
 
The ratings have been demonised in Taiwan since now the ratings 
become currency in the world of commercial televisions. In this light, the 
ratings may override the other professional principals of the 
programming. However, in my view, the PSB programming has no 
concern over the commercial advertisement. Here the ratings can be 
used as a neutral survey tool to understand our viewers, including their 
gender, age, geographical distribution and their preferences. It is an 
important reference for the management team and the producers to 
make right decisions. 
 
Following her defence on the rating management, the CEO Feng Hsien-hsien 
shifted to her claim that the PSB group should expand its viewership and 
become dominant both in the rating and the quality in the media landscape. 
According to Feng Hsien-hsien: 
 
My goal is to compete with other commercial rivals. In doing so, I am not 
just saying to provide quality programming that commercial television 
cannot or unwilling to offer, but we also want to win over the mainstream 
audience to become a dominant role in the market.  
 
As discussed in the PSB history, later on in 2009 a ‘public value assessment 
system’ was gradually viewed as a more reliable reference for the 
decision-making process. As a TBS chairman Chen Sheng-fu (2011) noted in a 
newsletter as a response to the result of the public value assessment system, 
‘TBS has a greater social responsibility compared to other commercial 
broadcasters and its performance is assessed not only through “viewer ratings” 
(Chen, 2011, p. 1)’.  
   The clash of over the rating issue provides another example that the elusive 
definition of the Taiwanese PSB. It led the group to an ambiguous position and 
role in the media landscape. The following sections will further examine the 
ambiguous role of the PSB in relation to its funding and those of the 
government of the day. 
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5.4.3 A PSB with insufficient Funding   
In Smith’ account (1995), public television stations in American remained 
starved of funds and ‘the non-profit stations have often been accused of 
spending as much air time raising funds as the commercial stations do with 
their advertisements’ (Smith, 1995: 90). Similarly, in Taiwan, starving of funds is 
also a salient claim constantly made by public broadcasters. A former TBS 
CEO Hu Yuan-Hui (胡元輝) and his successor Feng Hsien-hsien both restated 
‘the insufficient funding has always been a tough challenge facing the PSB 
group’. The former CEO Hu Yuan-hui was in charge from 2004 to the end of 
2007. With his first-hand experience with the launching of the PSB group, in his 
interview Hu Yuan-hui stated the initiative PSB was a disappointment, and one 
of the causes was insufficient funding. According to Hu Yuan-hui: 
 
‘To be honest, the development failed to meet my earlier expectations. It 
frustrated me. Specifically, the government didn’t provide both sufficient 
financial resources and a sound legislation to support the transformation 
of the PSB. The lack of both disappoints me.’ 
 
On the other hand, a director in the boardroom which is the highest supervisory 
unit of the PSB group,  Peng Weng-jeng (彭文正 ), provided a different 
perspective to the problem of insufficient funds. With practical media 
experience and academic expertise, Peng Weng-jeng claimed that lots of 
money was wasted due to inefficiencies in the PSB group. He claimed that staff 
also did not work hard enough to provide full value for taxpayers’ money. In his 
words: 
  
‘Compared with any other commercial television stations in Taiwan, 
staffs in the PSB group really know how to have a good time during work. 
They are way out from efficiency to bring the value of the government 
funding. For example, if I make a phone call now [after 5:00 pm], it would 
hardly get answered since most of them have already gone home. With 
the public funding, they work like inefficient public servants who cannot 
survive in the competitive market. However, they keep complaining that 
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insufficient funding cause their inefficiency.’    
 
The clash over the funding and efficiency also opened a leak for political forces 
to squeeze in the battlefield. In 2008 when the KMT party came back to power 
again, the clash of claims on the ways the funding was used shifted from a PSB 
management dispute to a political struggle when a KMT legislator Lin Yi-shih 
suggested that, in order to avoid wastage of public money, the media regulator, 
Government Information Office, should review and scrutinise the detailed ways 
the PSB programming proposed to use their funding before the funding is 
distributed to the group. This claim was viewed as the revival of ‘government 
control’ by the public broadcaster alongside with many PSB-supporting civil 
groups. ‘More than 60 civic organizations staged a protest outside the 
Legislative Yuan and demanded the KMT legislator Lin Yi-shih reconsider his 
ingenuous proposal on “review” the PSB budget’ (Taipei Times, 13/12/2008, p. 
3). The CEO Feng Hsien-hsien indicated that KMT legislators had already 
frozen half budget of this year for PTS and claimed the PSB group could only 
receive the budget after the GIO approved the budget-review proposal (Taipei 
Times, 13/12/2008, p. 3).  
Many PSB supporters who joined the protest considered this action clearly 
abused the right of budget reviews and extended political influence into PSB. 
Some media academics claimed ‘this political intervention would destroy PSB’s 
core value which was to offer broadcasting services independent of any form of 
political interference’ (Tang & Jian, 2008, p. 8). This view leads us to the focus 
of next section addressing the claim of broadcasters in relation to political 
forces.  
5.4.4 A PSB with Political Interference    
One of PSB principles outlined in the BRU document is that the broadcasting 
should be distanced from all vested interests, and in particular from those of the 
government of the day (BRU, 1985). However, in Taiwan’s case, the distance 
between the PSB group and the political forces has been a key theme in the 
claim-competitions. Rumours scattered in newspapers have constantly 
questioned whether those in charge in the PSB group are politically expedient 
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appointees. For example, the election of the TBS chairman in 2007 led pro 
KMT papers to claim that the new chairman and CEO were both ‘appointed 
rather than elected’ by ‘invisible political hand’ of DPP government (Economic 
Times, 11/12/2007; China Times, 13/12/2007; China Times, 14/12/2007; China 
Times, 24/12/2007). 
To help interviewees address these issues directly, the news coverage listed 
above was used as a prompt during the interview.  The news reports in the 
pro-KMT newspapers, that allegedly claimed Feng Hsien-hsien can become 
CEO due to her hidden connection with the DPP and furthermore the PSB 
operations have been influenced by the power, were shown to one of 
interviewees, Feng Hsien-hsien. When being asked about her reflection on 
these reports, a furious response was given. In her words:  
 
‘Young guy! What you read in the news stories are all nonsense. I 
look down on these trash papers. These are all rumours and I know 
who is behind this. They are those political players try to intervene the 
PSB, they use the press as tools to make people they dislike look bad. 
These are not rational discussions. When these reporters wrote the 
reports, they had no evidence. They did not even bother to phone me 
to confirm and double-check.’ 
 
The related news reports in the pro-KMT newspapers also imply that then- 
acting chairman Cheng Tung-liao also has the connections and political 
preferences to the DPP. Although repeatedly approached, the chairman did not 
agree to be interviewed for this study.  
In interview, CEO Feng Hsien-hsien, defended herself by claiming that their 
media expertise and professional experience gave them their current status 
and she operated outside of the control of political forces. However, this claim 
did not get through the KMT government in 2008. After the KMT return to power 
in 2008, a reshuffle inside the PSB group soon began. The highest supervisory 
unit, the board of directors, split into rival factions. The directors filed lawsuits 
against each other. ‘It resulted in only five out of the 21 directors in the board 
being able to legally execute their positions’ (Taipei Times, 28/04/2010, p. 3). 
After edging out TBS chairman Cheng Tung-liao, ‘the KMT-supported board 
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then forced the CEO Feng Hsien-hsien to leave office’ (Taipei Times, 
04/10/2010, p. 8). The deposed CEO Feng Hsien-hsien soon called for a press 
conference to fight back and claimed that the reshuffle was a terrible political 
ploy from the KMT government (Taipei Times, 30/09/2010, p. 1).  
This reshuffle mirrors invisible circles and connections between broadcasters 
and political parties behind their claims. A director in the PSB board, media 
academic Fang Nien-hsuan, pointed out that after the constriction of the PSB 
group, the political struggle among parties was still operating inside the PSB 
group. According to Fang Nien-hsuan: 
 
‘Actually the power struggle inside the PSB probably mirrors what is 
actually happening in our current social context. It is hard for me to 
imagine there will be a system that can perfectly isolate the PSB from 
influences of political parties, governments and military force. In the 
current system there are many operating parts can be manipulated by 
politicians or governments. Eradicating all these manipulations sounds 
impossible now, but now what we can do is keep a healthy balance of 
these powers.’  
 
In the consideration over how to reach a healthy balance of power within the 
PSB, in his interview the former CEO Hu Yuan-hui pointed out the lack of public 
engagement and social support is a missing link to reach the balance: ‘I don’t 
think this PSB expansion has been practiced well since in institutional process 
of this PSB the general public should have been more aware of its existence 
and its importance. Unfortunately, it isn’t very successful in this aspect since it 
has always not been a popular issue that people concerned about.’ 
 
5.5 Features of the Claim-Competitions   
As discussed in chapter 2 that the PSB is a contested concept, the discussions 
on the different claims above also reflected an endemically contested process 
of a PSB debate involved with various key claim-makers in Taiwan. The 
priorities of these claim-makers were displayed when the legislators define the 
‘problem’ in the struggle of political power, the media academics point out the 
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‘problem’ in the media ecology, and broadcasters emphasis the ‘problem’ at an 
empirical level of PSB practice. More precisely, the legislators constructed the 
PSB expansion as a part of political struggle from their understandings that 
most policy formulations are embedded with invisible political interests and 
concessions. Behind the claims, it can be seen the concern of the political 
claim-makers was seeking to stay in power or to get back to power. 
Considerations about media reform were deemed a small side show of the 
political struggle. On the other hand, the broadcasters, with their empirical 
experience in running the PSB group, kept addressing the practical problems 
that they struggle with insufficient fund, internal tensions like channels with 
different goals and external pressures like political interferences to explain and 
justify the dysfunction of the PSB group from their position.     
As the issue entrepreneur who spotted and claimed that it was time for 
revolutionary change, the activist-academics translated their academic 
knowledge into practical actions to push the PSB proposal against the wave of 
privatization. With their claims based on their belief of the role of media, as 
public goods, should play, it can be easily argued that the efforts of the 
academic claim-makers paid off since the proposal of privatisation was 
squeezed out of the arena of the claim-competitions even the privatisation plan 
fell in to the ‘simple claims’ category which are usually more effective than 
complicated ones like the elusive PSB proposal. The Campaign for Citizens’ TV 
may be significant in media reform history in Taiwan but the academics still had 
their limits. The academics had a partial victory in keeping the privatisation 
option in abeyance, but their more dynamic vision of PSB reform was quickly 
side-lined when the DPP took power and this led them to rethink their strategy. 
The competing claims, displayed via the interview data in this chapter, 
inevitably posed a question: what is the truth then?  
In this competing process, Loseke (2003) states, what the truth is ‘does not 
matter’ since ‘the term claim conveys no meaning about truth’ and what matters 
lies in ‘which are believed to be true’ (Loseke, 2003, p. 35). In other words, 
what matters in is how the claims are perceived on all layers of society. In this 
light, an argument is developed that the relative success or failure of the claims 
may lie in the extent to which claim was explained in the mainstream media 
which consumed by the majority of the members in the society.  
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Thus, to answer the question about which claim was believed in the society, 
or, in a game term, which claim won, the media seems to be one of the best 
sites to uncover the manifestation and interplay of various powers in defining 
and interpreting the claims, especially when the contemporary media ‘play a 
pivotal role in organising the images and discourse through which people make 
sense of the world’ (Murdock & Golding, 2005, p. 60). Serving as one of 
primary outcomes of the claim-competition, a press representation of the PSB 
expansion will be discussed in following chapters in order to identify the 
dominant claim and further discover the boundary of inclusion and exclusion, 
which serves to focus the media attention but also detracts the attention away 
from what lies outside the boundary.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Results of Claim-Battles: Press 
Representation  
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter serve as an overview of one of major results of the claim 
competition over PSB expansion throughout its turbulent history. Drawing on a 
systematic content analysis of newspaper coverage related to the PSB 
expansion in Taiwan between 2000 and 2008 it examines how the mainstream 
press represented the competing claims and explores to what extent the 
coverage reflected and constructed debates around PSB and the rights and 
obligations that associate with it.  
  The research covers the distribution and content of PSB coverage in four 
main categories - news stories, editorials, commentary, and letters to the editor. 
The analysis begins with an assessment of the overall patterns of attention 
focusing on temporal and thematic changes in coverage. The results indicate 
which claim gained more public exposure and credibility, but also provide a 
foundational understanding for the detailed examination of editorials and letters 
in the two chapters that follow.  
 
6.1 Analytical Method of the Content Analysis 
The aim of this section is to describe the main features of the sample employed, 
including the selection of the time period covered, the sampling method, the 
coding categories employed, and the reasons underpinning the choices made. 
 125 
6.1.1 Sampling 
It was decided to focus on the three mainstream national daily newspapers with 
the highest circulations: the United Daily News, the China Times, and the 
Liberty Times.  
  In addition to their public reach (as indicated by circulation figures) these 
three titles were selected because they offer useful contrasts in their political 
affiliations. The United Daily News and the China Times are regarded as 
leaning towards a China-friendly position, while the Liberty Times leans toward 
a pro-Taiwan independence position. Disagreements on this fundamental fault 
line in Taiwanese politics also spill over to other public issues. As a 
consequence, as Kuo & Nakamura (2005) have pointed out, the United Daily 
News and the Liberty Times ‘tend to give different reports on certain 
controversial political issues’ (Kuo & Nakamura, 2005, p. 398). However, as 
Fell argues, although they tend to support polices advocated by the KMT, 
neither the China Times nor the United Daily News are simple ‘mouthpieces for 
the KMT’, as they were formerly (Fell, 2005, p. 881).  
  The sample period selected for analysis ranged from 1st -Jan-2000 to 31st 
-Dec-2008. The year 2000 was selected as the starting point because this was 
when the issue of PSB reform became a public issue in a way it had not been 
before. There were several reasons for this. 
  First, as noted in an earlier chapter, the unprecedented political transition in 
2000, with the defeat of the KMT and the election of a DPP led government, 
created a new opportunity for debate around media reform. As Feng, Shy, & 
Kuo (2002) point out, before the early spring of that year privatisation was still 
the mainstream option for changing the ownership of state-owned television 
stations while ‘Gong Gong Hua’ was an alternative mainly confined to media 
reformers. 
  Secondly, as also mentioned earlier, in 2001 an unexpected row involving 
serious insults between two legislators, when the DPP legislator, Lin Chung-mo, 
accused KMT legislator Sisy Chen of behaving like a prostitute by abusing her 
media power to promote criticism of President Chan, stimulated an intense 
public debate on the interplay between political actors and media and breathed 
new life into the long standing question of whether ‘all politicians should 
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withdraw their power from the media’ (Sisy Chen calls on political power out of 
terrestrial televisions, United Daily News, 14/12/2001, p. 3). Some active media 
scholars took advantage of the window of opportunity opened up by this 
incident to push the DPP government to follow through on its election promise 
of media reform (Scholars debating future of Taiwanese media, Taipei Times, 
17/12/2001, p. 3).  
  The end point of 2008 was selected because it marked the KMT’s return to 
government, placing renewed question marks against the restructuring of the 
PSB system that had been implemented by the outgoing PSB administration.    
6.1.2 Method of Sampling 
This press content analysis identified all items that focused principally on the 
PSB reform in the three newspapers. The search strategies involved key word 
searches of the digital news databases developed by both the United Daily and 
China Times. When digital archives were not available, as in the case of the  
Liberty Times for part of the nine year sample period, a manual search of hard 
copy versions held in the public library was undertaken. After initial reviewing, 
this archive assistance from editors at the Liberty Times was sought to double 
check the correctness and completeness of the sample by reference to their 
internal editing system.  
  Key words employed in the search, included: ‘PTS (Public Television 
Station)’, ‘PTS (Public Television Service)’, ‘TBS (Taiwan Broadcasting 
System)’, ‘Media Reform’, ‘Terrestrial television reform’, and the mandarin 
Chinese term for the PSB-oriented proposal, ‘Gong Gong Hua’ (公共化), which 
was used widely by Taiwanese newspapers and activist-academics to describe 
the transformation from a state-owned to the PSB model. 
  An initial review of the corpus of coverage collated revealed that some items 
flagged up by the key word search did not relate to debates and arguments 
about PSB but simply concerned the promotion of TV programmes, 
entertainers and celebrities. The research data base was then edited to remove 
these items so that sample included only items that addressed arguments and 
issues around PSB. In terms of genre, only news, editorial, columns, reviews, 
features, commentary, and readers’ letter were included in the analysis. 
Literary articles and advertisements were excluded. In total, 603 items met the 
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criteria for inclusion in the analysis (See table 6.1). Their distribution across the 
titles selected is shown in Figure 6.1. below.   
 
 
Table 6.1. Sample Size of Press Content Analysis  
Press name 
 
 
Number of press item 
 
Percent 
United Daily News 204 33.8 
China Times 247 41.0 
Liberty Times 152 25.2 
Total 603 100.0 
 
 
6.1.3 Construction of the Coding Categories  
Each item was treated as a single unit of analysis. For each item, the following 
details were coded: (a) the newspaper in which the item appeared; (b) the 
location of the item within the paper; (c) the genre of the item; (d) the main 
topic1; (e) the sub-themes; (f) evaluation on the themes, (g) the actors2; (h) 
sources (coding manual see appendix 4).  
6.1.4 Inter-coder Reliability 
A random sample of 70 news item was selected from the total sample (603) for 
inter-coder reliability testing. The minimum percent agreement for all variables 
was PAo = 0.883 . 
                                                 
1 The main topic was coded according to the length of the relevant discussion or the main focus of the 
item 
 
2 I identified three main categories of sources: political actors, economic actors and civil society actors. 
Within the category political actors, sub groups included, parliamentarians (Lawmaker), party president, 
spokespeople and members in different political parties, officials and representatives of government 
organisations, such as the Government Information Office, Executive Yuan (Ministers), council for 
Hakka affairs, council of indigenous peoples, and local governors. The category economic actors 
included, actors from within the broadcasting industry, the press, and general firms, including 
advertisers, and staff labour-unions. The category of civil society actors includes academics, media 
commentators, pressure groups, and the general public. 
 
3 To reach the agreement on the codes between two coders, Holsti’s method (1969; Neuendorf, 2002) 
was applied in this pilot. The calculation formula for percent agreement between two coders who code 
the same units is: PAo = 2A/ (nA + nB) Where PAo stands for “Proportion agreement, observed,” A is the 
number of agreement between two coders, and nA and nB are the number of units coded by coders A 
and B, respectively (Neuendorf, 2002). This statistic also ranges from .00 (no agreement) to 1.00 
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6.2 Findings: The Pattern of Press Coverage 
 
As Figure 6.1. below shows, press coverage over the sample period was 
marked by a series of peaks and troughs relating to significant news events in 
the PSB debate. 
 
6.2.1 Five Distinguishing Peaks 
In Figure 6.1., five significant peaks of news coverage can be clearly identified.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
(perfect agreement).The percent agreement of several variables from the pilot are Genre (PAo = 1.00); 
Topic (PAo = 0.92); Theme1 (PAo = 0.90); Evaluation 1 (PAo = 0.95); Theme2 (PAo = 0.90); Evaluation2 
(PAo = 0.94); Theme3 (PAo = 0.66); Evalution3 (PAo = 0.66); Actor1 (PAo = 0.94); Actor2 (PAo = 0.79); 
Actor3 (PAo = 0.92); Source1 (PAo = 0.98); Source2 (PAo = 0.85); Source3 (PAo = 0.85). The percent 
agreement for all variables above is (PAo = 0.88). 
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The First Peak 
The first peak occurred from December 2001 to January, 2002. The main 
stimulus was the abusive disagreement in the parliament between legislators 
Lin Chung-mo and Sisy Chen, mentioned earlier, and the concern over the 
collusion between political organizations and the media which it reignited. 
Headlines included; ‘Withdraw State-and-Military Control from the Media; KMT 
Urges to Release Its Shares to Free Market and Opposes the “Gong Gong 
Hua” Plan’ (Liberty Times, 19/12/2001, p. 6); ‘Sell them? Make them Public? 
Battles between Two Options’ (United Daily News, 26/12/2001, p. 2); ‘Hidden 
Interests behind Public policy Fights; KMT’s and DPP’s Intentions Both 
Doubtful’ (United Daily News, 27/12/2001, p. 4); ‘KMT Party Claim: Gong Gong 
Hua Is a Prelude of a ‘DPP-lisation’ of Media (China Times, 27/12/2001, p. 4). 
This debate was newsworthy for the newspapers because it was full of 
conflicts not only between the two main political parties, but also between two 
proposals for possible reform of the terrestrial television stations.  
The idea that political forces should withdraw from interfering with media was 
widely agreed, but the question of how best to cut the state-owned television 
stations’ strong ties to political forces was the focus of heated debate between 
advocates of privatisation on the one hand and ‘Gong Gong Hua’ on the other. 
For instance:  
 
DIVISIVE ISSUE: The competition of two visions for reducing political influence on the 
media threatens to derail the reform efforts. The two opposite sides are being urged to 
cooperate. …… (Legislators split on how to reform media, Taipei Times, 26/12/2001, p.  
2)       
 
These competing visions were most visible articulated at the time by two lobby 
groups, the Alliance for the Democratization of Terrestrial Television (ADTV), 
and an alliance led by People First Party (PFP) legislator Diane Lee.  
The ADTV argued that the government should invest more public money in 
terrestrial television with the provision that television stations should be run by 
an appointed but independent, professional boards of directors.  
In sharp opposition to this, the alliance led by legislator Diane Lee promoted 
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privatisation, insisting that forcing the government and political parties to sell 
their shares in terrestrial television and creating a ‘free’ commercial market in 
broadcasting was the only way to solve the problem.  
In response to this privatisation plan, the ADTV claimed that if the 
government sold its shares and left television solely to the market there would 
no effective way to exercise its control over program quality. Lee, however, 
replied that in its present state of development the political environment of 
Taiwanese society, with its relatively brief experience of democratisation, was 
not yet mature enough to implement the ADTV’s ideal model effectively (Taipei 
Times, 26/12/2001, p. 2).  
Other voices most notably KMT legislator Apollo Chen, called for 
compromise arguing that, ‘the two sides should try reach a consensus on the 
issue as soon as possible; otherwise, I am afraid no reform can really happen’ 
(Legislators split on how to reform media, Taipei Times, 26/12/2001, p. 2).   
 
The Second Peak 
The main stimulus behind the second peak in coverage, between September 
and November 2002, were the protests from the pressure group ‘The 
Campaign for TV Democracy which had held a press conference to protest, in 
a very public way, at President Chen’s failure to follow through on his 
presidential campaign promises to reform state-owned media. This campaign 
reinforced its bid to put the issue on the public agenda by buying half-page 
newspapers advertisements headed ‘We Will No Longer Tolerate’ expressing 
their disappointment with the DPP government’s inaction on media reform 
since it accession to power in 2000. 
  This protest attracted news media attention because it was initialled by 
media academics that had played a leading role in drafting the media policy 
advocated in the DDP’s election campaign. The ensuing disagreement between 
the DPP government and its erstwhile academic supporters was seen as 
particularly newsworthy by the KMT friendly newspapers as in the following 
item from the China Times:  
  
‘The Campaign for TV Democracy’ held a press conference to condemn President 
Chen Shui-bian and the Executive Yuan for their delay on the practice of ‘public 
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television’ and other media commitments from his presidential campaign 
promises.…….‘ADTV’ Convenor Feng Chien-san urged President Chen and the ruling 
party immediately fulfil its media reform which outlined in his presidential campaign 
promises. (Protest against the delay of media reform, China Times, 11/10/2002, p. 6) 
 
The differences in the amount of coverage given to the protest can be seen in 
Fig 6.1., with the United Daily News giving it the most coverage and the DDP 
inclined Liberty Times, the least. In addition, most of the coverage from the two 
KMT-friendly newspapers, the United Daily News and the China Times, 
adopted a hostile attitude towards the campaign’s complaints. Headlines 
included: ‘Media scholars offer endorsement for presidential campaign now 
face ordeal’, (China Times, 24/9/2002, p. 13); ‘Media academics drafting 2000 
Mass Media White Paper  part from President Chen’, (United Daily News, 
11/10/2002, p. 4); ‘Return to social movements; pressure to implement 2000 
Mass Media White Paper, (China Times, 11/10/2002, p. 6). More details of the 
political stance of the newspapers and their biases will be addressed in the 
next chapter when taking a closer look at editorials, the place where newspaper 
most clearly articulate their positions on key issues.   
During this second peak, The Campaign for TV Democracy released a 
protest statement: ‘DPP must keep the promises for a better media 
environment’ (Taipei Times, 10/10/2002, p. 8) endorsed by three prominent 
television executives and key campaign members, the Director of TTV, Lin 
Hsiao-hsin, the Director of TTV, Shih Shih-hao and the Director of CTS, Kuo 
Li-hsin (2002) arguing that the Campaign had long argued that the most urgent 
task was to turn the state-run TTV and CTS channels into larger and more 
efficient public service broadcasters. This view tallied precisely with Chen's 
policy, as laid out in the 2000 Mass Media White Paper published during his 
presidential campaign. The statement concluded by arguing that Campaign 
members were not only condemning the DPP government for their 
equivocation on their own promises, but also urging them to begin 
implementing changes immediately and to give a clear timetable for reform 
(The Campaign for TV Democracy, 2002). 
 
The Third Peak 
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The third peak in coverage occurred between May and July 2004. Rumours 
had been circulating for some time that the media regulator, the Government 
Information Office, was thinking of privatizing the two state-owned channels, 
TTV and CTS (Taipei Times, 18/05/2004, p. 2), prompting protests and press 
conferences by several pressure groups. For example:  
 
Various civic groups and media watchdog organizations yesterday called for the 
Government Information Office (GIO) to turn TTV and CTS into a public television 
channels. (Activists decry privatizing TV stations, Taipei Times, 18/05/2004, p. 2) 
  
PUBLIC PROGRAMMING: Several civic groups called upon the government to turn 
TTV and CTS into public stations and do the same to at least six other radio or TV 
stations…… (Civic groups back TV reforms, Taipei Times, 09/06/2004, p. 2)  
 
However, the detailed content analysis suggests that the main stimulus for the 
coverage were the complaints and arguments that surrounded the appointment 
of Chiang Hsia, an actress and a long-time supporter of the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) and a close friend of President’ family , as the general 
manager of the state-controlled CTS.  
  This appointment caused a stir in media circles because it suggested that 
President Chen Shui-bian was not heeding warnings to avoid political 
appointments to media management positions. Suspicions deepened when 
Chiang claimed that her appointment was indeed a political reward for loyal 
support. According to the news report: 
 
Actress Chiang Hsia, a long-time supporter of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 
yesterday took over as general manager of state-controlled Chinese Television System 
(CTS) amid harsh attacks from opposition legislators on her professionalism and her 
political loyalties.……In a TV interview broadcast last night, the outspoken Chiang told 
the  host, "My new position is indeed a reward and it makes perfect sense because I 
support President Chen Shui-bian." ……Atop her priorities for her new job will be 
banning soap operas produced in China. (Pro-DPP actress takes CTS helm, Taipei 
Times,  25/06/2004, p. 2)  
 
This controversial appointment fuelled the disillusion with the DDP government 
already mounting among PSB advocates. Their disappointment was particularly 
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sharp since before 2000, as a main opposition party, the DPP had strongly 
criticised then ruling party, the KMT, for using its ownership of key channels to 
advance its own political interests. They saw the appointment as a return the 
familiar KMT tactic of exercising control by gerrymandering key appointments.  
The DPP’s seeming abandonment its former position once in power, 
attracted particularly hostile comment from the two KMT inclined titles, the 
China Times and United Daily News. For instance, ‘Chiang Hsia Designated 
CTS- Media Scholars and Civil Groups Show Dissatisfactions and Question on 
the Political Rewarding’, (China Times, 13/06/2004, p. 3); ‘Political Manipulation: 
Negative Impression for Public Media’, (China Times, 13/06/2004, p. 3); ‘DPP 
Control Media Worse than the Martial-Law Era’ (United Daily News, 12/07/2004, 
p. 4). At the same time, the DDP inclined Liberty Times published an editorial 
supporting the decision, headed ‘the Meaning and Controversy behind the CTS 
General Manager’ (Liberty Times, 03/07/2004, p. 3).  
In quantitative terms, this third peak is the most intense point of media 
comment on PSB issues throughout the whole sample period. Consequently, 
the difference in the newspapers’ political biases can be seen more clearly. The 
differences in more detail will be explored in the next chapter when an 
examination of editorial coverage, including the Liberty Times’ editorial just 
mentioned, is conducted to show more details.  
 
The Fourth Peak 
The fourth peak ranged from December 2005 to January 2006 and coincided 
with the passage of new legislation that regulated the release of government 
holdings in terrestrial TV stations.  
This provision, ‘The Statute Regarding the Disposition of Government 
Shareholdings in the Terrestrial Television Industry’, which was eventually 
passed after eight rounds of cross-party negotiations, was designed to push 
forward the administration's bid to free broadcasting from political, partisan and 
military influences.  
  As mentioned in an earlier chapter, this legislation embodies two major 
changes. Firstly, the Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV) was to become a 
private station while the Chinese Television System (CTS) would become a 
public one with the government shares (74.95 percent) ceded to a Public 
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Service Foundation. Secondly, two other government-funded ethnic television 
stations would join the public television transformation to form an enlarged 
public television group.  
  In addition to selling its assets in the national terrestrial channel - China 
Television Company (CTV), the KMT also divested its interests in the national 
wide radio network - the Broadcasting Corporation of China (BCC) and the film 
production company - the Central Motion Pictures Corp to the private film, the 
China Times news group, which therefore benefitted financially directly from the 
reforms. 
Some of the coverage, particularly form the two other titles, focused on the 
compromised nature of the settlement arrive at with headlines which included: 
‘Failure to the Completion of Media Freedom; GIO Blame KMT Lawmakers and 
Civil groups Blame GIO’, (United Daily News, 26/12/2005, p. 1); ‘Failure to 
Withdraw the whole State-and-Military Control from the Media; DPP and KMT 
Blame Each Other’ (Liberty Times, 27/12/2005, p. 3).  
At the same time, there was also discussion of possible next steps in the  
expansion of PSB with headlines, including:  ‘Passage of the Bill “the Statute 
Regarding the Disposition of Government Shareholdings in the Terrestrial 
Television Industry”  to withdraw State and Military from the Media: a New 
Public Era Finally Arrive’ (Liberty Times, 04/01/2006, p. 6); ‘Party, State and 
Military to Withdraw from the Terrestrial Television; Completion of Legislation 
but an Uncertain Timetable’ (United Daily News, 04/01/2006, p. 2); ‘PTS 
Requires More Resources and Supports; CTS Claims ‘Gong Gong Hua’ Is an 
Out-of-Date Solution”, (China Times, 04/01/2006, p. 4). 
 
The Fifth Peak 
The fifth peak appeared in December after the KMT defeated the DPP in the 
general election and was returned to government. This political shift renewed 
debate on PSB from two opposed groups of actors: lawmakers within the KMT 
party and broadcasters and pressure groups advocating an extended role for 
PSB.  
 
More than 60 civic organizations staged a protest outside the Legislative Yuan 
yesterday, demanding KMT party caucus reconsider a proposal on controlling the 
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budget for Public Television Service (PTS). The KMT caucus froze the NT$450 million 
(US$13.5 million) budget for PTS for the second half of this year and has come up with 
a proposal that all programming budget be approved by the Government Information 
Office (GIO) first. (Scores of civic groups rally in support of Public Television Service, 
Taipei Times, 13/12/2008, p. 3) 
 
With the budget for PSB frozen for a year, the new legislature tried to pass a 
proposal that regulated the use of public broadcasting budgets. The proposal 
stated that details of all expenditure for planning, production and broadcasting 
of news and other programs must be approved by competent authorities before 
a budget could be implemented. Radical media academics who had been 
prominent in the lobby for PSB considered this actions clearly aiming at using 
budget reviews and control over staff appointments to extend the KMT’s 
political influence over the Public Television Service and undermine PTS’ 
original purpose, which was to establish a television station independent of any 
form of political interference (Tang & Jian, 2008, p. 8). 
  Headlines included: ‘Do Parties, State, and Military Really Withdraw from the 
Media?’ (China Times, 14/12/2008, p. 11); ‘Lawmaker Intervene Public Media 
Scholars Mourn the Death of Democracy’ (Liberty Times, 19/12/2008, p. 2); 
‘Fight between Public TV and Lawmakers; KMT Lawmakers: Public TV Proven 
Themselves as DPP Political Warriors’ (United Daily News, 19/12/2008, p. 10); 
‘Auditing or Intervening? Government Information Office and the Public 
Television Station in Inter-Criticism’ (Liberty Times, 20/12/2008, p. 4); ‘It’s Time 
to Reconstruct the Monitoring System for Public Television’, (China Times, 
17/12/2008, p. 12); ‘Rescue Public TV; Go for Protest on the New Year's Day’, 
(Liberty Times, 29/12/2008, p. 2).   
  All five peaks in coverage detailed so far indicate that, despite their differing 
political orientations, editors and journalists on all three national newspapers 
shared the same professional sense of what was newsworthy in the debate, 
with the result that the coverage in all three displayed significant peaks at the 
same time in response to particular events or statements that were seen to 
have high news value (The Correlation between the three titles is significant at the 
0.01 level .82). 
  The five peaks are all related to the PSB policy process but the focus of 
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debate shifts over time as the process unfolds.  
  At the first peak, the main concern is with the competing proposals for 
restructuring state-owned terrestrial television stations, privatisation or ‘Gong 
Gong Hua’. The second peak focused on the emerging conflict between the 
advocates of PSB and the DDP, which had come into government for the first 
time but was seen, by PSB lobbyists, to be dragging its feet on its election 
promises for reform. The third peak emerged around a renewed debate on the 
abuse of political power within the television system prompted by a 
controversial appointment to a senior administrative position widely seen as a 
reward for political loyalty to a party, the DPP, which had loudly condemned 
cronyism while in opposition. 
  Then the fourth peak shifted attention to legislative process and the 
negotiations between the two main political parties. At the fifth peak, with the 
KMT returned to power, old debates and arguments about political influences 
re-appeared.  
  Looking across the five peaks, however, they showed that they were all 
highly connected to political initiatives and arguments rather than to the 
performance of the PSB system. Looking at the two peaks related to wider 
political transformations (peaks 1 and 5) it is important to note that the debates 
occurred after, not before, the elections that led a change of government 
suggesting that despite being a focus of cross party conflict PSB reform did not 
feature as a prominent electoral issue.  
6.2.2 Location and Genre 
Quantification of the timing of PSB news coverage provides some insight into 
the newsworthiness of the issue, but there is a need to go beyond this and look 
in greater detail at the content of the sampled items to see whether the 
convergences noted in the overall pattern of attention are also evident in other 
aspects of the coverage. As a first step, this section examines the location and 
genres of PSB coverage during the sampled period. 
  Looking at the location of the articles analysed (see Table 6.2), the result 
revealed that more than half appeared in the main news section (55%). In 
contrast, as the findings reported in Table 6.2 show, only 11.6% appeared in the 
entertainments/media sections even though the proposed changes in the 
 138 
media landscape would have major implications for these industries. This 
marginalisation confirms that when PSB issues appeared in the press, they 
appeared mainly as ‘hard’ news in the main news section, focused on political 
initiatives and disputes, rather than ‘soft’ news in the entertainments/media 
section exploring issues related to the range and quality of programming. 
  As Table 6.2 shows, however, when PSB related issues were covered in the 
main news section almost no stories (0.3%) were judged important enough to 
be printed on the front page. This strongly suggests that while the PSB debate 
can be seen conceptually as having far reaching cultural and political 
implications for Taiwan’s process of democratisation, its immediate 
newsworthiness was relegated to a relatively minor role by other issues.  
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Table 6.2. Distribution of Coverage by location 
Location 
 Number of press item Percent (N=603) 
Main News pages 330 54.7 
Letters and Forum 148 24.5 
Entertainments/Media 70 11.6 
Editorial 28 4.6 
Local News 14 2.3 
Others 11 1.8 
Front Page 2 0.3 
Total 603 100.0 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3. Distribution of coverage by Genre 
Genre 
 Number of press item Percent (N=603) 
Pure news stories 345 57.2 
Readers’ letters 142 23.5 
Commentary/analysis 85 14.1 
Editorial 29 4.8 
Others 2 0.3 
Total 603 100.0 
 
 
One distinguishing feature of the PSB press coverage was that the letters and 
forums section showed the second high rate (24%) of amount of coverage after 
the main news section. This relative prominence is confirmed by the figures 
reported in genres of Table 6.3. which shows that although the majority (57%)  
of items sampled were news stories, readers’ letters accounted for almost a 
quarter (23.5%).   
  At first sight, the relatively generous amount of space given over to reader’s 
letters might suggest that citizens achieved a significant degree of participation 
in the media coverage and debate. Verification of this, however, requires further 
analysis of the authorship of the published letters, a matter which is addressed 
further in later sections. 
  The important role played by letters as forum for the expression of views is 
further confirmed by the relatively small amount of space taken up by editorials 
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(4.6%) This suggests that the coverage was relatively open to a range of 
opinions and social groups rather than being closed around the newspaper’s 
own preferred position. Once again however, this conjecture needs to be 
examined further and it will be revisited in following sections presently.  
6.2.3 News Sources  
We can go some way towards addressing this issue by identifying the main 
sources quoted in the coverage and assessing whose claims were given the 
most prominence.  
6.2.3.1 Sources Cited in News Reports  
In Table 6.4., actors are shown separately for all press items and for pure news 
reports. 
It is important to make this separation since whereas in news items, actors’ 
views are filtered through the quotations selected by journalists and editors, in 
other genres, particularly readers’ letters, they have actively authored the item 
themselves.  
  Looking across all press items in Table 6.4., although more than thirty groups 
of actors were identified, five groups stand out as major sources in the battle 
over PSB. They are, in order of prominence: pressure groups specifically 
lobbying for the PSB (15%), public broadcasters (14%), the Government 
Information Office (11%), media academics (10%), and press/newspaper 
interests (9%). These figures confirm the prominent role played by pro PSB 
pressures groups and the critical media academics supporting them who 
together account for almost a quarter (24.6 %) of all sources mentioned. This 
result raises questions about why they were so successful in gaining attention, 
which will be addressed in the conclusion of this chapter. The Table also 
reveals the relative prominence of actors from the two media sectors most 
directly affected by proposed changes, public broadcasters and those working 
for state owned broadcasters ,who together account for just over a quarter 
(26.5%) of all sources mentioned. In contrast, Government sources only 
account for 14.6% of the total, led by the Government Information Office 
(10.8%) with parliamentarians accounting for only slightly more (11.4%).   
  The prominence of both groups increases if looking solely at news items, 
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with Government sources accounting for 18.8% and parliamentarians, 15.8% 
but once again, these political sources are eclipsed by the attention accorded 
to pressure groups and their academic supporters (21.7%) and to those 
working in state owned and public broadcasting organisations (26.5%), with 
public broadcasters overtaking pressure group spokespeople as the most 
referred to sources (17.2 % as against 14.7 %)  
  Overall, these patterns suggest that although it was successive political 
events and interventions that prompted surges in coverage, once in play the 
debate was presented primarily as a discussion between ‘insiders’ dominated 
by broadcasters with a direct institutional stake in change and lobby groups in 
which academics with a professional interest in the issues , played a key role. It 
was these groups, rather than elected parliamentarians, who took on the role of 
speaking on behalf of the ‘public’. This relative closure of debate is confirmed 
by the fact that no members of the public were mentioned in the news items 
sampled and that they accounted for only 3.6% of the sources mentioned 
across all the items. 
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Table 6.4. Actors in the press representation 
 All Press Items (603 items)  Pure News Items (345 items) 
      N Percent  N Percent 
Media Sector 336 33.5%  208 30.1% 
-Public broadcasters 137 13.7%  120 17.2% 
-Press/newspaper interests 93 9.3%  4 .6% 
-State-owned broadcasters 81 8.1%  63 9.3% 
-Staff/Labour unions & associations 21 2.1%  19 2.9% 
-Private broadcasters 3 0.3%  1 .1% 
-TV Celebrities 1 0.1%  1 .1% 
Pressure Groups/Unions 183 18.2%  134 19.4% 
-Pressure groups specifically lobbying for 
PSB 145 14.5% 
 102 14.7% 
-Other civil society groups 38 3.8%  32 4.6% 
Governmental Sources 146 14.6%  130 18.8% 
-Government Information Office 108 10.8%  99 14.2% 
-Executive Yuan 10 1.0%  9 1.4% 
-Other Governmental Sources 9 0.9%  6 1.0% 
-President 6 0.6%  5 .7% 
-Local governors 5 0.5%  5 .7% 
-Council of Indigenous Peoples 4 0.4%  4 .6% 
-Council for Hakka Affairs 2 0.2%  2 .3% 
-Military sector / associations 2 0.2%    
Academics/Media Commentaries 120 12.0%  59 8.5% 
-Media academics 101 10.1%  49 7.0% 
-Academics (outsides Media) 19 1.9%  10 1.4% 
Parliamentarians 114 11.4%  109 15.8% 
-Lawmaker (DPP Party) 38 3.8%  36 5.2% 
-Lawmaker (PFP Party) 37 3.7%  36 5.2% 
-Lawmaker (KMT Party) 36 3.6%  34 4.9% 
-Lawmaker (Taiwan Solidarity Union Party) 3 0.3%  3 .4% 
Private business interests 39 3.9%  25 3.6% 
-Professionals in Marketplace 27 2.7%  13 1.9% 
-Other business interests 11 1.1%  11 1.6% 
-Advertisers 1 0.1%  1 .1% 
General Public 36 3.6%  0 0.0% 
-General Public 36 3.6%  0 0.0% 
Other Party Political Sources 29 2.9%  26 3.8% 
-Representative(KMT) 12 1.2%  11 1.6% 
-Representative(DPP) 5 0.5%  5 .7% 
-President of Party(DPP) 3 0.3%  3 .4% 
-President of Party(PFP) 2 0.2%  2 .3% 
-Members(KMT) 2 0.2%  2 .3% 
-Members(DPP) 2 0.2%  2 .3% 
-Members(TSUP) 2 0.2%    
-Representative(TSUP) 1 0.1%  1 .1% 
Total 1003 100.0%  691 100.0% 
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6.2.3.2 The Absence of the Public  
This radical marginalisation of voices from the ‘public at large’ is particularly 
ironic in the context of a debate centred so forcefully on promoting changes in 
the name of serving the public. Given that public service television is expressly 
aimed at providing the full range of cultural resources people need to become 
informed and engaged citizens and members of a public with reciprocal 
obligations, rather than simply consumers making personal choices in the 
marketplace, the symbolic silencing of public views and aspirations is an 
obvious absence. This marginal presence of ‘public voices’ had the effect of 
reproducing Reith‘s foundational paternalism that viewed public broadcasting, 
as something best left to experts, professionals and political elites to decide on  
and determine since in a highly commercialised media landscape ‘ordinary’ 
people could not be expected to make wise choices without proper ‘guidance’.  
6.2.3.3 Significant Activist-Academics  
The findings reported in Table 6.5. show that members of the general public 
featured more often in the readers’ letters sampled (19%), but that even here, 
in a space ostensibly designed to provide a platform for ‘ordinary’ people, the 
opportunities to voice opinion were more often commandeered by media 
academics (23%) and pressure groups lobbying for the PSB (22%). These 
results suggest that despite the prominent role played by readers’ letters in the 
overall coverage, noted earlier, ordinary citizens were by no means the 
dominant voices in this context. Rather, they became an arena in which the 
intellectual and activist elites involved in the PSB debate battled for 
ascendency.  
  
 144 
 
 
 
Table 6.5. Actors in Readers’ Letters  
 N Percent 
Academics/Media Commentaries 46 27.2% 
-Media academics 39 23.1% 
-Academics (outsides Media) 7 4.1% 
Pressure Groups/Unions 40 23.7% 
-Pressure groups specifically lobbying for PSB 37 21.9% 
-Other civil society groups 3 1.8% 
General Public 32 18.9% 
-General Public 32 18.9% 
Media Sector 29 17.2% 
-Public broadcasters 15 8.9% 
-State-owned broadcasters 7 4.1% 
-Press/newspaper interests 4 2.4% 
-Private broadcasters 2 1.2% 
-Staff/Labour unions & associations 1 0.6% 
Private business interests 11 6.5% 
-Professionals in Marketplace/ Private consultants 11 6.5% 
Governmental Sources 6 3.6% 
-Government Information Office 5 3.0% 
-Military sector / associations 1 0.6% 
Parliamentarians 4 2.4% 
-Lawmaker (KMT Party) 1 0.6% 
-Lawmaker (DPP Party) 2 1.2% 
-Lawmaker (PFP Party) 1 0.6% 
Other Party Political Sources 1 0.6% 
-Representative(KMT) 1 0.6% 
   
Total 169 100.0% 
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6.2.4 Main Topics and Sub-themes  
As Table 6.6. shows, the most popular topic within the sampled coverage was 
the transitional ownership of state-owned television networks (24%).  
 
 
Table 6.6. Topic of Items 
 Press name  
Topic 
United 
Daily 
News 
China 
Times 
Liberty 
Times Total 
% 
(N=603) 
Debates on transitional ownership of state-owned TV networks 55 47 42 144 23.9% 
PSB institutionalisation 51 52 14 117 19.4% 
The reasons for TV Reform 28 49 26 103 17.1% 
Personnel 35 46 16 97 16.1% 
Governance, regulation and supervision on PSB 15 16 20 51 8.5% 
Legislature 12 18 15 45 7.5% 
PSB Performance 5 9 8 22 3.6% 
Digitalisation/Digital Switchover 2 7 8 17 2.8% 
Comparisons 0 3 2 5 0.8% 
Debates on PSB Funding 1 0 1 2 0.3% 
Total 204 247 152 603 100.0% 
 
 
 
Although, as they have been seen, there were sharp disagreements over the 
appropriate method of reform, between proponents of privatisation and ‘Gong 
Gong Hua’, both camps agreed that one of the main justifications for reform 
was the need to address the question of political bias and interference. At the 
same time, both sides used this rationale to bolster their preferred solution. 
Two examples of letters from the United Daily News illustrate how this space 
was used as a battleground between advocates of the opposed positions. The 
first supports privatisation as a dynamic force for growth and dismisses 
opponents’ proposals as ‘utopian’:  
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Title:  State-run Media: A System Full of Moral Crisis 
. ……In Taiwan's political climate, this sort of utopian idea is almost a mission 
impossible..... A model full of moral crisis can hardly be called a reasonable 
model...... on the other hand, in Western countries the booming media industry is 
coming from highly competitive commercial mechanisms ….. (Shu-Ling Lin, 
United Daily News, 18/12/2001, p. 15)  
 
The second, written by a leading academic campaigner for PSB, who studied 
for his doctoral degree in the United Kingdom, bolstered his argument by 
contrasting the continuing political partisanship of the privately owned British 
press with the more balanced presentation of the BBC: 
 
 
Title: Private Media Not Better on Insulation from Political Interference 
……The First level is those in power intent to directly interfere the content of 
programme and the second one is interferences through the appointment of 
senior personnel. The private media, which could hinder the second level of 
political interference, might be deemed to run better than the public media to play 
the fourth estate. However, take the actual performance of British media for 
example, British newspapers are privately owned, but their strong partisan gains 
lots of criticism. By contrast, BBC can maintain a better balance on their reports 
on various political parties….. (Jen-San Feng, United Daily News, 20/12/2001, p. 
15) 
 
In order obtain a finer grained overview of the topics and issued covered up to 
four sub-themes in each item were coded. Table 6.7. below shows the 
distribution of these themes.  
  As Table 6.7.shows, all the coverage in all three newspapers sampled gave 
particular prominence to the sub-themes: existing political control systems and 
political bias in the media and transformation to pure public media (First line of 
the themes in Table 6.7.: UDN: 15.50%; CT: 15.30%; LT: 13.40%).  
 147 
 
Table 6.7. Themes in Coverage 
 Press name 
Theme UDN China Times Liberty Times 
Existing political control systems and political bias on Media 15.50% 15.30% 13.40% 
Transform to pure public media 15.50% 13.00% 10.00% 
How the PSB project is practiced 12.90% 10.20% 2.10% 
Personnel of PSB 7.10% 6.90% 4.20% 
to free Market logic/competition 5.50% 3.50% 4.60% 
Personnel of state-owned TV 5.50% 5.50% 2.10% 
Governance, regulation and supervision on PSB 4.70% 3.10% 9.20% 
Government budget and support 4.50% 5.10% 5.00% 
Laws for Terrestrial TV Reform 3.40% 4.90% 4.60% 
Plans for local PSB branches 2.90% 2.20% 1.30% 
Debates on PSB Performance 2.60% 2.60% 3.80% 
UK  2.60% 3.70% 1.30% 
to a Mixed Method 2.40% 2.00% 0.40% 
The performance of existing Commercial System 2.10% 2.20% 4.60% 
PSB get Government Funding 1.80% 2.40% 3.30% 
Debates on expanding project 1.60% 1.60% 2.90% 
JAPAN  1.30% 2.60% 0.40% 
KOREA  1.00% 1.00% 0.40% 
Minority interests 0.80% 1.00% 5.00% 
Diversity of Programme 0.80% 0.80% 0.00% 
Commercial ads 0.80% 0.20% 0.00% 
USA  0.80% 0.20% 0.40% 
Debates on PSB legislature 0.50% 0.40% 0.00% 
Digitalisation 0.50% 0.60% 0.40% 
Secure Citizenship/Democracy 0.50% 2.60% 2.50% 
State-owned but more PSB programme 0.50% 0.80% 2.50% 
Laws for PSB legal basis 0.50% 0.40% 0.40% 
Protect public goods from Privatisation 0.30% 0.40% 3.80% 
Levels of Existing Public Provision 0.30% 0.40% 0.40% 
Imported programming squeezes local production 0.30% 0.60% 1.30% 
to Trust: to build the sovereign body 0.30% 1.00% 0.00% 
Hong Kong  0.30% 0.20% 0.00% 
Debates on PSB Institutionalisation 0.00% 0.40% 0.40% 
Preserve National culture 0.00% 0.00% 0.40% 
PSB go free market/private companies 0.00% 0.00% 0.40% 
Shareholding by government 0.00% 0.00% 2.10% 
Increasing number of channels bring diversity to Media 0.00% 1.40% 4.60% 
Budget for digitalisation 0.00% 0.20% 0.40% 
AUSTRALIA  0.00% 0.00% 0.40% 
New Zealand  0.00% 0.00% 0.80% 
Tailand 0.00% 0.20% 0.00% 
 Total    
                                                                               
Count  
100.0% 
(371) 
100.0% 
(471) 
100.0% 
(237) 
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In relation to several other key themes however, while there was substantial 
convergence between the two KMT inclined titles, the United Daily News and 
China Times, the Liberty Times, displays a different pattern.  
  The themes in table 6.7 can be grouped to highlight the ways in which the 
newspapers are divided. A prime example is that it pays less attention to the 
theme ‘How the PSB Project is Practiced (United Daily News: 13%; China 
Times: 10%, Liberty Times: 2%)’, but displays markedly more concern than the 
other two newspapers with the sub-theme ‘Governance, Regulation and 
Supervision of PSB’. This theme appeared in the Liberty Times mostly in 2008 
after the KMT was returned to power. Two examples:  
 
Public television budget has been frozen by the Legislative Yuan. A war continued. The 
Government Information Office yesterday pointed the arrow to the public television, 
saying that the PSB chairman, Cheng, agreed them to understand the cash flow of 
Public TV. Now Public TV is misleading it to a story about the GIO tended to audit……. 
(Audit PSB? GIO and PSB Attack Each Other, Liberty Times, 20/12/2008: 4)  
 
The war between the KMT and the PSB has confused the society with the truth. This 
war in the media landscape should be divided into three dimensions to view…..(PSB 
should be supervised by all citizens, Liberty Times, 19/12/2008: 2) 
 
 
Since it was a conflict with newsworthiness, the other two titles also covered it,  
but with markedly less emphasis than the Liberty Times (United Daily News 5%, 
China Times 3%, Liberty Times 9%).  
  These variations require further analysis of the three titles’ political stances 
which will be addressed in next chapter with a close look at the editorials they 
printed.     
 
6.3 Summary  
This chapter has mapped the way the national daily newspapers represented 
the debates around PSB expansion as they unfolded over and eight year 
period, covering the crucial run-up to the major reform of the system and its 
immediate aftermath.  
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The findings identified five distinguishing peaks in the coverage over time 
convincingly which it was argued were generated primarily by general political 
events rather than changes in the operation and performance of broadcasting. 
It was further argued, on the basis of the overall amount of coverage, which 
despite its cultural and political salience to arguments around Taiwan’s 
progress towards a full and mature democratic polity the issue of broadcasting 
reform was never a major policy priority.  
The analysis of the main actors featured in the coverage suggested that the 
PSB debate was driven primarily by media academics and pressure groups 
that successfully employed readers’ letters as a platform for their views. Their 
relative prominence fed into a more general press framing of the debate as a 
cultural struggle between state power and civil society rather than a political 
battle between the major political parties and an issue that revolved around 
competing professional expert evaluations rather than political positions. 
The relative dominance of media elites’ was also indicative of a particularly 
striking point: the marginal presence of general public voices. As a 
consequence, the debate was rooted in a contradiction. Advocates of PSB 
claimed to speaking on behalf of the ‘public interest’ but in the major public 
arena of the national press, their voices were markedly more prominent. 
‘Members of the public’ were objects not subjects, talked about and evoked but 
accorded few opportunities to speak for themselves.  
  This chapter has offered a general overview of the press representation of 
the PSB debate as one of outcomes of claim-competition. The next two 
chapters pursue this examination further with close examinations of editorials 
and the letters to the editor, two spaces that reveal the extent to which press 
institutions reinterpret ‘popular’ themes in relation to their own political stances 
and support particular positions through their own overt advocacy.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Mainstream Newspapers as Claim 
Makers 
 
 
 
 
 
In last chapter an overview picture of the claim-competition in the press 
presentation was illustrated to show how the PSB expansion was defined by 
the mainstream newspapers. This chapter will further explore the picture by 
examining the role of the mainstream newspapers themselves as an invisible 
claim-maker. More specifically, since editorials are ‘the spaces sanctioned for 
the manifest assertion of press’s judgements and concerns’ (Deacon and Wring, 
2002, p. 200), this chapter intends to analyse the political arguments the 
mainstream newspapers advanced in the debate over the PSB expansion. This 
analysis investigates how the broader political stances of these various 
newspapers affect their interpretations and evaluations of this debate. 
This editorial analysis is underpinned by chronological and thematic 
principles. Chronologically, this chapter adopted the collective phases in the 
formation of public opinion identified by Foote and Hart (1953; cited in Price, 
1992, p. 30) – problem phase, proposal phase, policy phase, programme 
phase and appraisal phase – to examine the frequency and content of the 
editorials in relation to the different stages of PSB implementation.  
Thematically, this chapter will explore how the editorial definitions and 
concerns of different newspapers developed as these policy phases unfolded. 
Further, this chapter will consider weather and to what extent the structure of 
the attention of the editorials in each of the papers coincided or diverged from 
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the structure of news attention outlined in the content analysis in the previous 
chapter. 
 
7.1 Political Biases of Newspapers  
News organisations are not only active participation in public debate (Le, 2003) 
they can be conceived of as political organisations in their own right (Cook, 
2003). Seen in this light, editorials represent the most obvious manifestations of 
the position of the press and serve as sites ‘where ideological biases can be 
more readily discerned (Hackett and Zhao, 1994, p. 512).’ The bias and political 
preferences of newspapers is also anticipated to play a key role in constructing 
the issues they engage with and the positions they take.  
In this study, in order to show the political and ideological biases of the three 
newspapers, this section first revisits the history of Taiwanese newspapers 
briefly to provide a better understanding of their political preference.  
7.1.1 Newspapers Restriction   
Since 1949 when the KMT came to Taiwan from mainland China, newspapers 
in Taiwan had been heavily regulated by three restrictions: control over entry, 
control over printing, and regulation of the number of pages. From the 1960s to 
1988 the total number of newspapers was frozen at 31 because the 
government would not grant new press licences. ‘It is evident that most 
publishers of privately owned papers were more or less associated with the 
KMT before the deregulation in 1988 (Chen, 1991, pp. 126-132)’. 
One of dominant national daily newspapers, the China Times, was founded 
in 1950 under the name Credit News and focused mainly on price indices as a 
financial news sheet. In 1968, the name changed to the China Times.  
Another main competitor in the market, the United Daily News was founded 
in 1951, as a merger of three local newspapers, the Popular Daily, the National, 
and the Economic Times.  
Under the KMT’s authoritarian regime, political issues were deemed too 
sensitive for the press to touch. Unlike the China Times which focused on 
financial and economic news, the United Daily News tended to attract readers’ 
attention by sensational crime news. 
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During the period of the press bans, the United Daily News and the China 
Times gradually became the mainstream press accounting for two-third of 
newspaper circulation in Taiwan in the 1970s. Chen (1998) indicates that those 
elites who ran the United Daily News and the China Times were permitted to 
run the newspapers because of the loyal support they provided to the KMT. 
During the martial law period, owners of both parties maintained close 
relationships with the KMT leadership.  
7.1.2 Patron-client Relationship  
Lin (2001) applied the concept of ‘patron-client relationship’ to describe the 
relations between the KMT and the two major newspapers in an analysis of the 
transformation of the client press in Taiwan from 1949 to 1999. As the clients 
for the KMT's authoritarian regime, the two newspapers’ elites enjoyed privilege 
in the market (Lin, 2001).  
Although the two major newspapers ran as ‘party-state media’, they had to 
compete to each other. Further, the label ‘pro-KMT’ masked important political 
differences within the KMT party and to which these two newspapers aligned 
differently when they involved in political struggle within the KMT (Chin, 2006). 
For instance, in the 1970s when there were fractions between two forces - 
conservative and liberal – with in the KMT party, ‘the United Daily News leaned 
towards the conservative wing while the China times collaborated with the 
liberal wing’ (Lee, 1993, p. 16).  
Amid Taiwan’s political transition the press ban was lifted in 1988 and this 
press deregulation buried the seeds of crisis for the market of newspapers (Lin, 
2008). Without any further proper regulation ‘concerning concentration of 
ownership’, the existing big newspapers soon won the unfair competition by 
their strong positions in the market (Lin, 2008, pp. 138-142). For instance, as 
soon as the government lifted restrictions in 1988, both China Times and 
United Daily News increased their number of pages but maintained their prices 
at the same level as other smaller newspapers. In order to compete with the 
Independent Evening Post, Taiwan’s most reputable evening newspaper at that 
time, the two newspapers also launched evening newspapers, China Times 
Express and United Evening News. The Independent Evening Post soon found 
the challenge from the aggressive marketing strategies adopted by the China 
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Times Group and the United Daily News Group too difficult to deal with, and 
thus starting from 1994 lost influence, readers and its previous financial muscle 
(Lin, 2008, pp. 192–193). 
When the two newspapers were dominant in the market, another alternative 
press, The Liberty Times, was launched in 1980 by a local businessman. As a 
liberal paper with alternative view and strong financial muscle, Liberty Times, 
became famous for supporting the DPP and their alliance (Chen, 1998). By 
1997 it had the third highest circulation and in 2005 surpassed United Daily 
News and China Times in terms of market share and advertising revenue (Lin, 
2008, pp. 198-200). The rise of the Liberty Times marked the arrival of the first 
modicum of political pluralism in the national newspaper sector in Taiwan. 
The most distinguishing point to differentiate the mainstream newspapers is 
the perspective of the cross strait relationship between China and Taiwan. 
Since the United Daily News and the China Times’ founders were mainlanders 
moved from China with the KMT military in 1949 and also core members of the 
KMT party, there was, and remains a preference to support a reunification 
between the mainland and Taiwan. In contrast, partially as a consequence of its 
roots in Taiwanese entrepreneurial culture, the Liberty Times has always placed 
more emphasis on local Taiwanese values and advocated independence from 
China. 
Despite the transition from regulation to deregulation, coverage of Taiwanese 
politics remained firmly biased in accordance with the political preferences of 
proprietors. Since there were no developed professional norms to prevent 
direct intervention from newspaper owners, their political preference are easily 
passed down through core editorial staff (Hsi, 2006, pp. 302-351) and to 
promote the owner’s political interests (Lin, 2008, p. 138). Thus, most editorials 
principally tended to reflect the owners' view rather than internal staff or the 
ideas from readers (Hsi, 2006, pp. 302-351). 
Following the political and ideological biases within the history of the three 
national newspapers discussed above, with a further examination on the 
editorials related to the PSB expansion, their general political positions and the 
links between press owners and political/business elites will be brought into 
more considerations, as well as the conflicts of interest that could occur when 
the PSB expansion threatened their commercial and political self-interests. 
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7.2 Valance of Editorial  
Twenty nine editorials addressing PSB were found across the whole textual 
corpus sampled. Compared with other genres, the number (5% of all items) is 
limited. For instance, commentary pieces accounted for 14% of all the items 
coded and ‘reader’s letters’ for 24%. One obvious explanation for the limited 
amount of editorials might be explained that daily newspapers usually contain 
dozens of news reports but only one editorial on any given day of news 
production. Further, this relatively limited amount of editorials coincides with the 
findings in last chapter which showed that press attention toward the PSB 
expansion was intermittent and that the topic never dominated the front pages. 
Therefore, an additional reason for the rather small editorial numbers may be 
due to the topic’s limited news value. 
 
7.2.1 The Main Concern of the Editorials  
Table 7.1. shows the main topics of the editorials coded in three different 
national newspapers, United Daily News (UDN), China Times (CT) and Liberty 
Times (LT).  
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Table 7.1. Topic of Editorial 
 Press name  
Topic UDN CT LT Total 
The reasons for TV Reform 
 5 4 0 9 
Debates on transitional ownership of state-owned TV networks 
 3 3 0 6 
PSB Performance 
 1 1 0 2 
Personnel 
 1 2 1 4 
Legislature 
 0 2 0 2 
PSB institutionalisation 
 1 1 0 2 
Governance, regulation and supervision on PSB 
 0 3 0 3 
Comparisons 
 0 1 0 1 
 
Total 11 17 1 29 
 
 
The most prominent issue addressed in the editorials was the reasons for 
television reform (9 editorials). The next most frequently apparent topic was the 
transitional ownership of stated-owned television (6 editorials).  
  In table 7.1. when these general frequencies are disaggregated, some 
notable differences emerge between the three newspapers. The most 
significant is the almost complete absence of editorialising on PSB by the 
Liberty Times. Furthermore, there was some variance between the editorial 
concerns of the other titles, with the China Times providing three commentaries 
on the ‘Governance, regulation and supervision of PSB’, two on the role of the 
legislature in the process, and one making comparisons with other media 
systems. None of these issues were dealt with in UDN editorials. 
  It is difficult to escape the conclusion that these differences reflected the 
different political affiliations of the titles. The higher number of editorials in the 
pro-KMT papers suggests they had a greater willingness to highlight political 
issues and difficulties associated with the PSB policies advanced by the DPP. 
In contrast, the Liberty Times imposed an almost total embargo on discussion, 
presumably in part to avoid increasing pressure on the DPP on this topic, and 
in part to assist the party in downplaying the significance of the policy in the 
 156 
DPP’s portfolio. (For example, as was noted in earlier chapters, once the DPP 
attained office, its enthusiasm for PSB reform notably reduced.) The only 
editorial found for the LT had the headline, ‘The Implication and Controversy 
about the Appointed CTS General Manager’ (Liberty Times, 03/07/2004, p. A3). 
From the perspective of protecting local media production, the editorial 
defended the controversial personnel of CTS general manager and the 
manager’s statement of banning imported Chinese programmes. More detailed 
analysis of this editorial will be addressed in the following sections.  
7.2.2 Chronological Distribution  
In order to show how the concern of the press shifted over time, it is important 
to examine its chronological distribution. Table 7.2. below shows the 
chronological changes of published editorials across the sample period.  
 157 
 
 
Table 7.2. Frequencies of Editorials from Three Press over Time 
 
Press name 
Total 
Stages of 
the Policy Process UDN CT LT 
Year 2000 0 0 0 0  
 
Proposal Phase 
2001 0 1 0 1 
2002 3 0 0 3 
2003 0 2 0 2 
2004 1 7 1 9  
Policy Phase 
 
2005 3 3 0 6 
2006 1 0 0 1 
2007 3 1 0 4 Programme Phase 
2008 0 3 0 3 
Total 11 17 1 28  
 
 
Since the public opinion is formed through a sequence of stages, the idea of 
Foote and Hart (1953; cited in Price, 1992, p. 30), which outlines five collective 
phases in the formation of public opinion, was adapted in this section to 
distinguish different phases in the PSB expansion in Taiwan. The original five 
phases can be summarised as follow: 
1) Problem phase: some situation is determined to be problematic by a 
particular person or group and over time becomes generally understood as 
such. During this early stage, a lack of definition surrounds both the problem 
and its consequences, and for this reason the relevant public is indeterminate.  
  2) Proposal phase: one or more potential lines of action are formulated for 
responding to the problem.  
3) Policy phase: the stage during which the merits and weaknesses of 
alternative proposals, having now been determined, are actively debated.  
4) Programme phase: the time when the approved course of action is 
executed.   
5) Appraisal phase: periodic re-evaluations of the effectiveness of the policy 
are undertaken, particularly by those unconvinced minorities that formed during 
the course of public debate.  
  In this section, the five phases were reduced to three, proposal phase, policy 
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phase and programme phase, to fit the sample period of the press content 
analysis.  
As was discussed in earlier chapters, the problem in the media landscape 
was defined long before 2000 where the DPP came to power. The sample 
period, from 2000 to 2008, was selected because the 2000 power-shift and in 
2001 there was an intense period of public debate about the ownership 
transformation of state-owned terrestrial television. 
At that time, one or more potential lines of action were formulated for 
responding to the problem when proposals about how to transform the 
state-owned media surfaced. Thus, the time from 2000 to 2003 was defined as 
the proposal phase.  
From the end of 2003 to 2006, the PSB gradually outran the privatisation 
plan and the PSB group was cemented in 2006. It can be viewed as a period 
during which the merits and weaknesses of alternative proposals, having now 
been determined, were actively debated. Thus, I defined this period as the 
policy phase. 
The Taiwanese PSB group launched in 2006 and completed the merge in 
2007. From 2007 to 2008 is the time when the approved course of action is 
executed so this time was named as the programme phase. Table 7.2. above 
illustrates the chronological changes of the three newspapers.  
  Alongside the three phases of the formation of public opinion in Table 7.2., it 
is clear that in the Proposal phase and the Programme phase the amount of 
the published editorials shows lower levels of press attention to the PSB 
expansion than the Policy phase from 2004 to 2006. This feature coincides with 
the third and fourth distinguishing peaks of news coverage amounts which were 
found in last chapter. In the press content analysis the third peak occurred in 
2004 when there were some protests and press conferences held by several 
pressure groups against government’s privatizing plan on the two state-owned 
television stations, and also stimulated by a controversial political appointment 
of the general manager of the state-controlled television station CTS. And the 
fourth peak in 2005-2006 coincided with the passage of a new piece of 
legislation that regulated the release of government holdings in terrestrial 
television stations. 
In 2006, the PSB television group, Taiwan Broadcasting System (TBS), was 
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officially launched and the time shifted from the policy phase to the programme 
phase and Table 7.2., shows a significant drop in the amount of editorials. This 
reduction implies the media attention toward the PSB expansion once again 
moved to the margins of the media agenda.  
Further, there are some distinguishing points can be seen in a comparison of 
the newspapers. For instance, during the Proposal phase from 2000 to 2003 
there are only six editorials which were all from the UDN and CT. These 
editorials appeared even though the PSB issue had yet to feature with any 
prominence in the news agenda suggests that these titles were seeking to 
stimulate debate on the advisability of PSB reform, rather than just reflect wider 
discussions in the media and political domain. 
However, this is not to suggest that editorials were completely detached from 
the wider news agenda, as the year with the most editorials (2004) also 
coincided with the highest peak found for general press coverage (see previous 
chapter). These peaks in turn reflected a noted intensification of public debate 
and controversy regarding the plans. For example, this was the year when 
rumours began to circulate that the media regulator, Government Information 
Office, was thinking of privatizing the two state-owned channels, TTV and CTS 
channels (Taipei Times, 18/05/2004, p. 2) which in turn stimulated protests and 
press conferences by pressure groups advocating PSB reform (see chapter 5). 
Another major stimulus in 2004 was the controversial appointment of the 
general manager of the state-controlled CTS. Significantly, this year was the 
only year in which LT made the only editorial intervention on the PSB 
expansion to defend the appointment for the DPP government. The relationship 
between LT and the DPP is evidently illustrated in this example.     
 
7.3 Exposition of the Editorials   
Consideration of the thematic and chronological frequency of editorials 
provides some suggestive indications of how political predispositions shaped 
the editorialising of different papers on this issue. In the section that follows, the 
expositions in these editorials are examined in closer detail. 
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7.3.1 The Proposal Phase  
As was mentioned earlier in Chapter 5, according to legislator Lee Yong-ping’s 
account, the KMT friendly newspapers, UDN and CT, both published their 
coverage with a ‘sceptical view toward the ‘Gong Gong Hua’ proposal and 
claimed this proposal would be another type of government control hidden 
under the guise of PSB. In the sampled editorials, the two newspapers’ 
sceptical’ attitudes toward the PSB expansion were also identified.    
With the sceptical tone, a CT editorial in 2001 clearly shows the paper’s 
preference for privatisation and a belief in the free market. The CT editorial, 
‘Review the Debate over Political Interference’ (China Times, 12/12/2001, p. 
A2)’, claimed the DPP government should let ‘the market competition’ to decide 
the future of the state-run terrestrial televisions. Further, the editorial also 
claimed that what really needed to be done was to establish a proper 
monitoring mechanism on the unbalance media landscape. An excerpt of the 
editorial is as follows:   
 
Excerpt  
…… As for the TTV and CTS, please let their future decided by the market competition. 
What Taiwan really needs is a monitor mechanism to protect the whole media 
landscape from over market-oriented and over-commercialization. We can learn from 
France to set a supervisory committee within the Ministry of Culture to manage and 
sanctions the media market. …….(China Times, 12/12/2001, p. A2) 
 
Similarly, a UDN editorial published in 2002 exposed its strong support for 
privatisation with a strident title: ‘Privatisation is the Best Way to Withdraw 
Political Control from the Media: (United Daily News, 02/01/2002, p. 2)’, an 
excerpt of the editorial is as follows: 
 
Excerpt  
To get political power out of the media is the primary mission on the agenda. In this 
context, "privatization", of course, is more qualified to achieve the goal than the 
proposal of "public television" …… The ultimate aim is to improve the domestic media 
environment and its compatibility to international media market, then the "privatization" 
is a more tangible approach than "public television". (United Daily News, 02/01/2002, p. 
A2) 
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These editorials clearly aligned with the position of the KMT at that time, with 
the enthusiasm for the privatisation option. During the Proposal phase, the 
lost-power KMT seemed to be against the PSB-oriented transformation and 
preferred the privatisation idea. The main concept of the KMT proposal was ‘to 
sell the state-own televisions to free market and to establish a committee to 
supervise the free market (United Daily News 19/12/2001, p. 4).’ 
  What is striking is that the Liberty Times made no counter-case during this 
the Proposal phase, extolling the preferability of the PSB option 
7.3.2 The Policy Phase  
During the Policy phase, issues of principles tend to be foreground. In the study, 
among the all identified editorials, the editorials published by the three 
newspapers in 2004 raised questions about the principles ignited by the 
controversial appointment of general managers in CTS. More specifically, the 
limited management expertise and the overt political preference of the general 
manager were the main criticisms made in the CT and UDN editorials. The 
UDN editorial, ‘A Better PSB Solution than the Executive Yuan's Plan’(United 
Daily News, 10/07/2004, p. A2), vented people’s anger at the appointment as a 
political manipulation which assumes it would mean a waste of taxpayers’ 
money on the PSB plan and an erosion of citizens’ rights. An excerpt of the 
editorial is as follows: 
 
Excerpt  
(After the DPP came to power), it looks like the new Government tends to withdraw its 
hand from the media. However, in fact, the DPP Government’s another hand just tries 
to grasp media power by the name of "government supervision." Looking on how the 
DPP government’s involvement of the media, such as the manipulation of personnel 
appointment for political reward, or the abuse of "Product Placement" in programme. In 
the future, it is no doubt that such practices will damage the public television group. 
From the personnel arrangements to the program review, the PSB will be not immune 
to manipulation by those people in power. It will be very challenging for the PSB to stay 
objective, neutral or independent. And the victims are all taxpayers and citizens……. 
(United Daily News, 10/07/2004, p. A2)  
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Politically, this excerpt from the United Daily News shows its concern about 
how the relative autonomy of the PSB was in danger and how the professional 
decisions might not be able to be insulated from shadow of the government. 
Economically, it implies that the PSB group would be a big money-waste since 
the government-funded PSB had no realistic chance of becoming neutral or 
independent.  
With the strong sceptical view on ‘the capability of the PSB plan to be 
immune from manipulation by those in power’, the UDN editorial revealed its 
preference for funding PSB. With repeated emphasis upon possible political 
control from (DPP) government, the editorial concluded by advocating 
privatisation as the pathway to free media landscape. An excerpt of the editorial 
is as follows: 
 
 
Excerpt  
In short, to choose between the PSB group or privatization is really " a painful choice 
from two terrible options." With the support form taxpayers’ hard-earned money, the 
‘public’ media has no guarantee for its quality and value but has lots of suspicions 
about when and how the government's Black Hand will stretch into it. It would be a 
better solution to let the public goods go to the private sectors for collecting rents and 
use the rents for the existing public television's financial resources. With the regulation 
of the radio and television law, the private media could take into account public interest 
and should be more possibility for the dream of "government interferences from the 
media" turning into reality. (United Daily News, 10/07/2004, p. A2) 
 
 
Compared with the UDN editorial, another CT editorial also projected a strong 
mistrust on the ‘Gong Gong Hua’ policy because it could possibly just be ‘a 
transition from one political party’s control (KMT) to another party’s hand (DPP)’ 
(China Times, 25/06/2004, p. A2). An excerpt of the editorial is as follows:   
 
 
Excerpt  
The principle is straight forward. Withdrawing the political powers from the media will 
be beneficial to the country and political interferences in the media is damaging to the 
state. Authority is responsible for the media regulation and management. However, if it 
is only a transition from one partisan hand to another partisan hand, the diversity of the 
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media still has no room for survival. From this point of view to examine recent reports 
about the media personnel disputes, the answer is clearer. (China Times, 25/06/2004, 
p. A2). 
 
Although the CT editorial also showed as sceptical a point of view towards the 
possible government control and political manipulation as the UDN did, there 
were differences between the two KMT-friendly newspapers in their 
editorialising in 2004. While UDN still acted as an advocator for the privatisation 
proposal, by contrast, a CT editorial seemed to reluctantly accept the coming 
PSB-oriented transform with a premise: a healthy governance mechanism must 
be needed to help the PSB isolated from political interferences. An excerpt of 
the editorial is as follows:  
 
Excerpt  
Some experts have advocated the public-oriented transform for the state-owned 
televisions, but before the social consensus to respect for the media freedom and to 
safeguard freedom of speech develop a solid basis, the public-oriented transform for 
the state-owned televisions means the government’s power will expand rapidly in the 
absence of effective monitoring mechanism. Such a media weapon could be over 
powerful without balance……the freedom of the media could not just rely on the 
goodwill of those in power. At this critical moment, the establishment of an independent 
monitoring organisation is perhaps more necessary.…… (China Times, 25/06/2004, p. 
A2). 
 
From this excerpt, the emphasis on building an efficient mechanism to 
supervise the public media group also coincides with what were found in the 
distributions of the main topics which shows that CT seems to have more 
‘active participation in public debate’ on ‘the Governance and supervision on 
the PSB (3 Editorials)’ while the other two press have said nothing on this 
governance topic. It is striking how these differences correlate with the wider 
political differences discussed earlier in these pro KMT titles. As discussed, 
UDN is appreciably more conservative politically than CT, which would suggest 
they are more likely to advance the case for full privatisation and confidence in 
the ability of ‘the market’ to deliver media freedom and plurality. 
  In contrast to the stance of UDN and CT, a LT editorial, ‘The Implication and 
Controversy about the Appointed CTS General Manager (Liberty Times, 
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03/07/2004, p. A3)’, defended the DPP government and stated that the 
appointment in CTS is a professional decision. The LT editorial also summoned 
the ghost from the authoritarian KMT era by mentioning the abuse of patronage 
is the KMT’s tricks not the DPP’s. An excerpt of the editorial is as follows:  
 
Excerpt  
In the democratic process, those in power have the right to appoint professional people 
to share their expertise. The appointees are responsible for this one in power. By 
contrast, the term ‘political rewording’ is another matter. It means those in power abuse 
their influence on specific personnel cases to benefit their loyal and trusted servants 
and political partners without concern about the appointees’ competence. Before, in the 
authoritarian era, the KMT personnel arrangements were always chosen by the 
appointees’ political background, ethnicity, or their connection with those in power. Now, 
in a democratic era, we should abandon the political rewarding conventions. In fact, if 
the DPP government really want to benefit Chiang Hsia, the general manager of CTS 
which is a highly demanding job could not be deemed as a nice rewarding at all. 
(Liberty Times, 03/07/2004: A3) 
 
The excerpt of the LT editorial delivers two messages. First, politically, this 
editorial tends to link the negative image of the political appointment to the 
previous KMT’s ruling convention in order to remind their readers that KMT 
used to manipulate the media personnel as well. It also asserted that the first 
concern of the DPP government was the appointee’s ‘expertise’ rather than the 
appointee’s political preference. Refuting KMT allegations, this editorial 
suggests that principles of the relative autonomy of broadcasters are secured in 
the DPP time. Second, the editorial emphasised the professionalism of the 
appointee. In terms of media management issues, this editorial claimed that the 
DPP government arranged this appointment because they trusted the 
appointee’s competence. This editorial also mentioned the high demands 
placed on the general manager of CTS which in turn demanded the 
appointment of somebody with high levels of professionalism and expertise. 
  In particular, the editorial made no mention of the claim-competition between 
privatisation and ‘Gong Gong Hua’ in the same way as the other two 
newspapers did. It extends the scope of the debate to the cultural implications, 
characterising it as an ideological fight related to local production and national 
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identity, especially when it comes to the newly appointee’s plan to boycott 
Chinese drama programme from Great China. An excerpt of the editorial is as 
follows:     
 
Excerpt  
Chiang Hsia’s assertion on boycott Chinese drama is worth exploring further. . . . . . she 
refuse to buy Chinese drama with clear motives aimed at enhancing the local 
production and protecting the prospects of Taiwanese entertainment staff. Due to 
cultural similarities and bargain prices, Chinese drama programme is much more 
capable in replacement of local drama than Japan and South Korea drama 
programme….. (Liberty Times, 03/07/2004, p. A3) 
 
 
Central to the excerpt of the LT editorial are two themes: culturally and 
economically this editorial offered its support to Chiang Hsia’s assertion on 
boycotting Chinese drama. To back Chiang Hsia’s point of view, the editorial 
indicated that due to cultural similarities between China and Taiwan, and the 
inexpensiveness of Chinese drama, they are much more capable of replacing 
local production than other Asian countries such as Japan or Korea. In this 
point that importing Chinese drama programmes causes more damages to 
Taiwanese local programmes than other countries. Compared with criticism that 
Chiang Hsia’s assertion came from her anti-Chinese bias rather than a 
professional judgement, this editorial claimed that the input of Chinese content 
was a cultural and economic threat and justified the banning of Chinese drama 
on these bases. 
This editorial further suggested that the PSB has a primary responsibility for 
protecting and developing national culture by ‘enhancing the local production 
and protecting the prospects of Taiwanese entertainment staff’. In pursuit of this 
aim, programmes should be nationally produced rather than imported.  
This is a salient point that differentiated the LT editorial from the other two 
newspapers whose main focus was on the political intervention. This LT 
editorial also echoed with their political stance of pro-Taiwan independence 
which is also a core value of the DPP party.  
The Policy phase marked the most intense period of editorialising on the 
PSB issue. However, it is also important to look at the tone and content of 
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editorials produced during the Programme phase. It is to these matters that the 
discussion now turns. 
7.3.3 The Programme Phase 
Once the policy has been implemented, more practical questions tend to come 
to the fore to question if the policy is working efficiently. During the Programme 
phase, there is a change of the role of the two KMT-friendly newspapers can be 
identified. Both of them shifted from ‘advocators of the best solution’ to ‘severe 
critics of the PSB practice’ By scrutinising where the legislation had been 
enacted and how the institutional and financial organisation of the PSB group 
was being developed. 
  An UDN editorial, ‘A Promise for the PSB future? Why Not Give Us an 
Explanation for the Mess First! (United Daily News, 22/12/2007, p. A2)’, 
claimed that even if the TBS has been established, its autonomy and 
independence still remained with a big question mark since the sign of the 
political influence from the DPP government was so obvious. An excerpt of the 
editorial is as follows 
 
Excerpt  
When Taiwan Broadcasting System (TBS) launched in 2006, it carried with the 
expectations to be "everyone’s media" so it also naturally benefit from the nearly 2 
billion (NT Dollars) subsides a year from government's huge budget.  
Today, when we have not yet been familiar with "TBS" programme, we learn lots of 
negative news of "TBS" first. Even those civil groups and media academics who 
advocated a "Public-oriented Media Reform" in the past now become sceptical on 
"TBS"……."TBS" started its concrete operations only more than one year, so far we 
cannot evaluate its effectiveness. However, the manipulation on the personnel is 
definitely the typical political products……. (United Daily News, 22/12/2007, p. A2) 
 
In 2008, the DPP had just lost its power and ended its eight years long 
governance and the KMT came back in office. During this power shift, as a 
KMT-friendly newspaper, a CT editorial, ‘Those in Power Should Remember 
Lessons from the Past’, 14/12/2008, p. A11), addressed anger and 
disappointments toward the political manipulation from the new KMT 
government. Around the same time, unsurprisingly another KMT-friendly 
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newspaper, the UDN, had no editorial on this issue (see table 7.2.). This 
example echoes what mentioned earlier in the review of Taiwanese press 
history about the difference of the two KMT-friendly newspapers in their 
different closeness with the KMT. An excerpt of the editorial is as follows 
 
Excerpt  
An old saying ‘It will never be too late for a gentleman to take revenge’ just projects 
what the current ruling KMT government is doing! Since last year when they came to 
power, the KMT legislators have battled with public broadcasters over the PSB annual 
budget. Recently, the legislation of the budget was passed with a bizarre resolution. It 
includes some agenda like expanding number of the PSB directors, future programme 
plans must be reported beforehand etc……. what the KMT is doing is not only doing 
less well than before, but also go backward into the authoritarian era……In short, in 
Taiwan this strange territory where a blue (means KMT) – green (means DPP) are 
always against to each other, any "public" affairs could be mission impossible. (China 
Times, 14/12/2008, p. A11)  
 
Further, from the CT editorial, there is the same key theme about political 
control. It illustrates that even if the government changed the same old problem 
still remained unchanged. Throughout the sampled period of the press content 
analysis, the concern over political control has been the key theme which has 
gone through the three phases of the formation of public opinion over different 
governments. It suggests that both political parties cannot be trusted on 
maintaining the independence and autonomy of the PSB. This point also 
echoes one conclusion in last chapter that the newspapers have portrayed the 
PSB debates as a cultural fight between the state power and the civil society 
rather than a political war between political parties. It could be defined as a 
professional debate rather than a political debate. 
 
7.4 Summary 
Comparing the attention of the editorials with the structure of news attention 
outlined in the content analysis in last chapter, it is evident that the two only 
directly coincided in 2004 when the policy was being developed and 
discussions of principles were to the foreground. By contrast, in the Proposal 
phase and the Programme phase, the attention of the editorials diverged from 
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the structure of news attention outlined in the content analysis by showing very 
limited attentions to the debate. This feature demonstrates the mainstream 
newspapers, as an invisible claim-maker, actively participated in the 
claim-competition during the shaping time of the PSB policy.   
From the editorials published during the Policy phase, it can be argued that 
the unsettled question of whether to go ahead with the PSB gave United Daily 
News and China Times space to put their arguments for privatisation and 
against the ‘Gong Gong Hua’ project which was going to be conducted by the 
DPP government.  
 When the arguments against the ‘Gong Gong Hua’ were deemed to be lost, 
the attention of the two newspapers shifted from questions of principle to 
criticism on practice. The two newspapers, the United Daily News and the 
China Times, raised issues about the workability of the PSB system and about 
its independence from government. It is an issue that is given added impetus 
because there is now a DPP government in power rather than a KMT 
administration, so criticism on PSB also provided a means for attacking the 
DDP administration. 
On the other hand, 2004 was also the only year that the Liberty Times 
published an editorial. In this editorial the newspaper raised the question of 
national production and imports from Greater China. This was in line with their 
general pro-independence stance which is shared by the DPP. Here it could be 
argued that whereas in the policy formation stage the Liberty Times did not 
need to intervene since the case for PSB was being won. When the system 
was in place it was important to raise the key issue about the PSB’s 
responsibility for defending national culture as against the emphasis on 
economic and political issues focussed on the two KMT supporting papers. 
Moreover, it was important because their case was likely to get a sympathetic 
hearing and be influential given that it chimed with the DPP government’s own 
general position on independence. 
It was in these editorials that the various newspapers inserted their own 
voices into the PSB debate. But newspapers are supposed to respond to public 
opinion as well as lead it, so it is important to also consider the extent to which 
they provided opportunities for their readers to contribute and comment on this 
important policy matter. It may be that when these other areas of coverage are 
 169 
considered, their collective coverage is revealed as more pluralistic and less 
closely politically aligned than is suggested by this analysis of editorial content. 
This analysis will be provided by the discussion in the next chapter, which looks 
at the publication of readers’ letters. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Representing ‘Public’ Opinion: 
Letters to the Editor  
 
 
 
 
 
In last chapter editorials were explored as a space in which the newspapers 
could express their own political positions and advocate the polices they 
favoured. In this chapter, the focus turns to the space where ‘outside’ voices 
appear in ostensibly unmediated form, the readers’ letters column, and 
examine the way the selection and presentation of items operated to construct 
a particular version of ‘public opinion’. 
  This may seem like a surprising choice for detailed analysis since readers’ 
letters are not normally singled out for sustained attention in research on the 
press coverage of contentious issues. They may be mentioned but they tend 
not to be a major focus. However, as the results of the content analysis, 
reported in Chapter 6, showed, in the case under discussion here letters to the 
Editor stood out as an important component of press representation. At the first 
glance, this finding might suggest that the newspaper coverage was hospitable 
to a wide range of voices, including the voices of the ordinary citizens in whose 
name changes were being proposed. Existing research would lend this 
assumption some support since letters to the editor seem to be ‘typically 
understood’ as ‘a public forum of facilitating public discussion’ (Wahl-Jorgensen, 
2001, p. 305) and a means ‘of promoting reader participation and obtaining 
useful guidelines about local opinion’ (Jackson, 1971, p. 152). However, the 
verification of this assumption requires further analysis of the published letters 
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to see how far this ‘forum’ did in fact provide a space for the general public to 
participate in the PSB debate in Taiwan. 
8.1 Letters to the Editor as a Public Forum  
Over the last two decades, a number of scholars have investigated the function 
of the letters to the editors section of newspapers (Buell, 1975; Volgy et al., 
1977; Sigelman and Walkosz, 1992; Hynds, 1994). Most of these studies set 
out to test ‘empirically the degree to which letter writers are similar to the 
electorate’, or whether they differ from the ‘public’ (Buell, 1975; Volgy et al., 
1977, p. 32). Other studies have looked at the degree to which the letters page 
can be considered a ‘public opinion thermometer’ (Sigelman and Walkosz, 
1992) while other again have embraced the democratic potential of the section 
and proclaimed letters to be ‘among the few outlets available to the public for 
voicing opinion’, ‘the community’s heartbeat’, and ‘a debating society that never 
adjourns’ (Kapoor & Botan, 1992, p. 5; Kapoor, 1995) Other commentators 
however have sounded a note of caution, arguing that letter page is, at best, 
‘hazy reflections of public opinion’ (Grey and Brown, 1970, p. 450) since letter 
writers tend not to be representative of the general population.  
  By identifying and critiquing the rules employed in selecting which letters to 
publish, Wahl-Jorgensen points out that editors operate as ‘gatekeepers of the 
public sphere’ (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2001, p. 304) and determine whose voices 
and concerns are systematically privileged, and whose never stand a chance of 
being heard.  
Similarly, Richardson & Franklin (2004) argue that the readers’ letters are 
‘selected and shaped by editorial teams whose motives were not driven by the 
dictates of deliberative democracy but by the need to fill the page in a balanced 
and interesting way’ and that ‘such prosaic concerns cut across the prevailing 
academic and professional conceptualizations of the letters’ page as a public 
forum for deliberative debate (Richardson & Franklin, 2004, p. 476)’.  
  In his analysis of the institutional goals of newspapers, Tunstall (1977) points 
out that the correspondence section fits very well with the commercial needs of 
popular papers since the letters submitted indicate which topics or stories are 
more appealing to readers. Pounds (2006, p. 32) similarly indicates that papers 
not only publish letters with the laudable intent of fostering public participation 
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in the life of the community, but also because they recognize that letters have 
selling power.  
  Richardson & Franklin (2004) however take the argument a step further, 
arguing that letters are selected for publication not simply according to their 
newsworthiness but ‘to reflect the identity of the newspaper, to meet the 
perceived preferences of readers, as well as the more prosaic requirements of 
availability of space and editorial imperatives concerning balance (Richardson 
& Franklin, 2004, p. 459)’. Carefully selected letters can ‘echo the newspaper’s 
concerns’ and ‘increase the readers’ impression that the papers are 
representing them (Bromley, 1998, p. 151)’.  
Following the chronological and thematic principles applied in the last chapter, 
the first aim of this present analysis is not only to identify variations in the flow 
of letters printed in the three newspapers over time, but also the extent to which 
the structure of attention of the letters in each of the papers coincided with or 
diverged from the structure of news attention revealed in the general content 
analysis. Secondly, adapting the model developed in Pounds’ study (2006) this 
chapter proposes an analytical typology in order to further examine the role of 
writers and readership.  
 
8.2 Principles for the Examination of Letters  
Generally speaking, two main types of letter can commonly be found in 
newspapers: letters asking regularly featured experts or columnists for advice 
on specific issues (usually personal or financial), and letters addressing 
opinions to the editor. In this study, only the second category letters addressing 
opinion were sampled. 
There are potentially a range of motivations that might inform a person’s 
decision to write a letter to the editor as a way of sharing and publicising their 
opinions. In order to examine these motivations this study will adapt Pounds 
(2006)’ analytical typology and divide the reasons into three main groups: 1) 
expression of criticism, 2) appeal for action, and 3) other reasons for writing.  
  Further, in order to examine the way strings of letters functioned, or did not 
function, as dialogues on the page (one of the key requirements of the 
operation of media as components in a public sphere rooted in deliberation), 
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four features of presentation were considered: 
1). the structure and the form of the string: indicates how far it is open 
only to privileged players or also to members of the general public. 
2). Footing and affiliation for writers: ‘Footing’ is a concept derived from 
discourse analysis which explores how the content of a message is attributed 
to a source (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Deacon et al., p. 17). The attributions 
accorded to a published letter by either the editors or other respondents signal 
to what extent the letter writer’s expertise and authority is publicly 
acknowledged. In the PSB debate some writers’ professional titles or official 
position were printed directly after their names to indicate their affiliation and 
thereby their authority to speak on the issues. Conversely, in some letters the 
writers use ‘footing’ to undermine their opponents’ credibility and signal that 
their claimed expertise or experience gives them no special status in the 
discussion;  
3). Presentation of the Public: this explores the extent to which the public 
evoked in the letter is constructed as the general public, the fictional public or 
invisible consumers;  
4). The rationally of discussion and criticism: examine whether the way 
the writers expressed their opinions accords with the spirit of rational 
deliberation, that Habermas, following Kant’s foundational definition of the 
principle of enlightenment, provides the cornerstone of a democratic culture. 
Democratic practice requires participants to reduce the emotional temper of 
deliberation to a minimum and to provide room for plural voices. Insisting on the 
self-evident validity of a single point of view or reducing argument to binary 
oppositions is the direct antithesis of this.  
8.2.1 Coding Criteria for Letters    
From Table 6.3. Distribution of coverage by Genre in previous Chapter 6, there 
were 142 of letters to the editor identified for this study. The coding data of the 
newspaper in which the item appeared, from chapter 6, was applied here, so 
did the coding data of main topic and the actors in the sampled items (coding 
manual see appendix 4) as identifications for the main topic of the letters and 
letter writers.  
  In order to further distinguish reasons for writing letters, this chapter adapted 
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Pounds (2006)’ analytical typology and divided the reasons into three groups: 
expression of criticism, appeal for action, and other reasons for writing. A 
coding manual for reasons of writing letters was generated by following this 
typology (detailed coding manual see appendix 5). 
8.2.2 Inter-coder Reliability (reasons of writing Letters)  
To test the coding manual for reasons of writing letters, a random sample of 20 
news item was selected from the total sample (142) for inter-coder reliability 
testing. To reach the agreement on the codes between two coders, Holsti’s 
method (1969; Neuendorf, 2002) was applied in this pilot. The calculation 
formula for percent agreement between two coders who code the same units is: 
PAo = 2A/ (nA + nB) Where PAo stands for “Proportion agreement, observed,” 
A is the number of agreement between two coders, and nA and nB are the 
number of units coded by coders A and B, respectively (Neuendorf, 2002). This 
statistic also ranges from .00 (no agreement) to 1.00 (perfect agreement).The 
percent agreement of from the pilot are Reasons of Writing Letters (PAo = 
0.90). 
 
8.3 Fabrics of the Sampled Letters 
Table 8.1. below shows the chronological changes of published letters related 
to the PSB debates across the study period in the three national newspapers 
sampled, the United Daily News (UDN), the China Times (CT) and the Liberty 
Times (LT).  
 175 
 
 
 
Table 8.1. Frequencies of Letters to the Editor from Three Press 
 
 Year(2000-2008) Total 
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 
UDN (Frequency) 3 13 4 5 6 5 3 0 10 49 
 
(Percent, N=49) 
 
6.1 
 
 
26.5 
 
 
8.2 
 
 
10.2 
 
 
12.2 
 
 
10.2 
 
 
6.1 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
20.4 
 
 
100.0 
 
CT (Frequency) 2 1 3 2 9 14 4 3 14 52 
 
(Percent, N=52) 
 
3.8 
 
 
1.9 
 
 
5.8 
 
 
3.8 
 
 
17.3 
 
 
26.9 
 
 
7.7 
 
 
5.8 
 
 
26.9 
 
 
100.0 
 
LT  (Frequency) 0 3 0 0 6 4 10 10 8 41 
 
(Percent, N=41) 
 
0.0 
 
 
7.3 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
14.6 
 
 
9.8 
 
 
24.4 
 
 
24.4 
 
 
19.5 
 
 
100.0 
 
  Total (Frequency) 5 17 7 7 21 23 17 13 32 142 
 
(Percent, N=142) 
 
3.5 
 
 
12.0 
 
 
4.9 
 
 
4.9 
 
 
14.8 
 
 
16.2 
 
 
12.0 
 
 
9.2 
 
 
22.5 
 
 
100.0 
 
 
Policy Stages 
Proposal Phase       
25.3% 
Policy Phase 
43.0% 
Programme Phase 
31.7% 
 
 
8.3.1 Interventions in the Letter Section 
The level of editorial intervention is sometimes easier to analyse by considering 
the corpus as a whole rather analysing the sample than letter by letter (Pounds, 
2006, p. 45). 
Differences can be identified both across time and across papers. Looking at 
the chronological distribution shown in table 8.1., it can be seen that in the rate 
of letters published is highest (43.0%) during the Policy phase when the form of 
the practical proposals for change was being thrashed out. It is lower in the 
Programme phase (31.6%), when the new structure was up and running, and 
lowest during the Proposal phase (25.3%) when competing ideas for change 
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were being floated. These figures coincide with the findings for the distribution 
of the editorials sampled from the three newspapers. The concentration of 
Letters during the Policy phase also coincides with the news peak in 2004.  
On the surface, this result could be seen as supporting the conclusion that 
readers’ letters were selected primarily according to their news value. However, 
the variation in the distribution of letters across the three newspapers suggests 
that newsworthiness was not the only criterion of selection.  
The peak years occurred in the UDN in 2001, in the CT in 2005 and 2008, 
and in the LT in 2006 and 2007. These differences in the space accorded to the 
‘public voice’ suggests that the UDN employed letters to articulate concerns 
more often during the initial stage of policy process, when competing proposals 
were still being debated, whereas both the CT and the LT focused more 
concertedly on the later phases after concrete plans had been drawn up and 
were being implemented.  
The finding clearly shows that the letters were not chosen simply according 
to their newsworthiness, but ‘to reflect the identity of the newspaper and to 
meet the perceived preferences of readers’ (Richardson & Franklin, 2004, p. 
459). The compositions of these differences in readership will be examined in a 
later section: the writers of letters. 
8.3.2 The Main Concerns expressed in the Letters  
As mentioned earlier the coding procedure adopted nominated one main topic 
for each item and up to three sub themes. 
As Table 8.2. shows, the main concerns expressed in readers’ letters were 
‘the reasons for TV Reform’ (30%), ‘Debates on transitional ownership of 
state-owned TV networks’ (16%) and ‘PSB institutionalisation’ (15%). 
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Table 8.2. The Main Topic Addressed in the Letters 
 Percent  
 
 
 
Topics 
The reasons for TV Reform 29.6 
Debates on transitional ownership of state-owned TV 16.2 
PSB institutionalisation 14.8 
Governance, regulation and supervision on PSB 10.6 
Personnel 9.9 
PSB Performance 9.2 
Digitalisation/Digital Switchover 4.9 
Legislature 4.2 
Comparisons with Other PSBs in the World 0.7 
Total 100.0 
(N=142) 
 
 
 
8.3.3 The Reasons for Writing 
Sharing one’s opinions can take many forms, such as: expressing protest, 
outrage, criticism, providing or requesting clarification and information, or 
advocating a course of action (Pounds, 2006, p. 32). As mentioned earlier, in 
order to codify the main reasons for writing letters to the editor, this study 
adapted Pounds (2006)’ analytical typology and divided the reasons into three 
groups: expression of criticism, appeal for action, and other reasons for writing.  
  Expressions of criticism are manifest in positive or negative evaluations 
relating to the assessment of events, states of affairs and people. Appeals for 
action are identified or inferred in relation to assertions of normative value 
grounded in evaluations of particular courses of action and the agents expected 
to carry them out. Other reasons for writing were also common. These included: 
requesting information or clarification on a particular issue, warning, and 
disagreeing with another correspondent. Although in most letters more than 
one reason could be identified, the main theme of a letter was coded as the 
main reason.  
  Following by this typology, the differences of reasons to write letters to join 
the PSB debate can be separated into the three groups and identified as 
applying this schema across the whole corpus of letter sampled produces the 
distributions shown in Table. 8.3.. 
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Table 8.3. Reasons of Writing Letters 
  
% 
TOTAL 
% 
Criticism 
Criticism on existing political control on TV stations 15.5  
 
 
56.4 
How the plan (PSB institutionalisation) is practiced 9.9 
Criticism on PSB Performance 8.5 
Criticism on governance, regulation on PSB 7.0 
Criticism on the personnel issues of PSB 6.3 
The performance of existing Commercial System 4.2 
Criticism on the personnel of state-owned TV 3.5 
Criticism on privatisation of media 1.4 
Appeal 
Appeal for a public media 7.7  
 
 
 
 
   35.1 
Appeal to release state-owned TV to free Market competition 4.9 
Appeal a PSB to secure Citizenship and Democracy 4.9 
Appeal a PSB to secure minority interests 4.2 
Appeals for local PSB branches 3.5 
PSB legislature 3.5 
Laws for Terrestrial TV Reform 1.4 
PSB Funding Model: maintain state-owned & PSB programme 1.4 
Comparison with Other PSBs (BBC in the UK) 1.4 
PSB Funding Model: establish a Trust foundation  .7 
PSB Funding Model: PSB get Government Funding .7 
Diversity of Programme .7 
Others 
Digitalisation vs. PSB  4.9     8.5 
Replying to another correspondent  3.5 
   
Total 100.0 
(N=142) 
  100.0 
(N=142) 
Inter-coder Reliability: a random sample of 20 news item was selected from the total sample 
(142) for inter-coder reliability testing. To reach the agreement on the codes between two 
coders, Holsti’s method (1969; Neuendorf, 2002) was applied in this pilot. The percent 
agreement of from the pilot are Reasons of Writing Letters (PAo = 0.90). 
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As table 8.3. shows, expressions of criticism (56%) are more frequent than 
appeals for action (35%) and criticism most often focus on questions 
surrounding the political control and bias on TV stations (16%), and, to a lesser 
extent, how the PSB institutionalisation is practiced (9%).  
  The letters appealing for action, cluster around the two opposing proposals 
for reform, the appeal to privatise state-owned TV (5%) and, more prominently, 
the call for a new public media system (8%) [‘Gong Gong Hua’ ] and the 
associated arguments for PSB reform as a force for the greater representation 
of minority interests (4.2%) and for local PSB services (3.5%).   
  Although some letters express the writer’s disagreement with another 
correspondent very few strings of argument were identified where successive 
writers engage with and reply to each other’s positions and are prepared to 
modify their position when faced with a stronger case, responsiveness that 
Habermas identifies as central the process of truly democratic deliberation. 
Rather, the letter columns operated more as a space for the unilateral 
announcement and restatement of positions already fully formed.  
The next section will explore the organisation of strings of letters further, but 
before this exploration the distribution of motivations for letter writing across the 
three sampled titles and across time needed to be examined.  
 
Table 8.4. Reasons For writing Letters in Different Newspapers 
     
Reasons 
 
Press 
Criticism  Appeal Others 
 
Percent  
 
Percent  
 
 Percent  
 
UDN 
 
33.8 
 
38.0 
 
25.0 
CT 40.0 32.0 33.3 
LT 26.2 30.0 41.7 
Total 100.0 
(N=80) 
100.0 
(N=50)        
100.0 
(N=12) 
 
As table 8.4. shows, differences can be identified across papers. The highest 
proportion of letters articulating criticisms were published by the China Times 
(40%) whereas the United Daily News published the most (38%) containing 
appeals. 
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Table 8.5. Variation of Reasons over Time 
 
 
 
Year 
Reasons 
Criticism  Appeal Others 
Frequency Percent (N=80) Frequency 
Percent 
(N=50) Frequency 
Percent 
(N=12) 
2000 4 5.0 1 2.0 0 0.0 
2001 11 13.8 6 12.0 0 0.0 
2002 3 3.8 4 8.0 0 0.0 
2003 5 6.3 2 4.0 0 0.0 
2004 10 12.5 10 20.0 1 8.3 
2005 8 10.0 10 20.0 5 41.7 
2006 10 12.5 6 12.0 1 8.3 
2007 6 7.5 4 8.0 3 25.0 
2008 23 28.8 7 14.0 2 16.7 
Total 80 100.0 50 100.0 12 100.0 
 
 
However, these synoptic differences need to be placed in the context of the 
debates as they evolved over time. As Table 8.5. shows, the highest level of 
criticism is found in 2008 (29%) when the proposals decided on were being 
translated into concrete experience and the DDP government , under which 
the proposals had been finalised, was replaced by the KMT’s return to power.  
  The highest level letters voicing appeals occurs in 2004 and 2005, coinciding 
with moment when a new PSB policy was being implemented following 
amendments to ‘the Broadcasting and Television Act, Cable Television Act, and 
Satellite Broadcasting Act’ at end of 2003. As noted earlier, the implementation 
of these amendments at the beginning of 2004, required government and 
political parties to withdraw their investments by 2006, but left the structure of 
any new system open to debate.  
 8.4 The Writers of the Letters 
The content analysis findings presented in the preceding chapter showed that 
Letters to the Editor stood out as a major component of the overall coverage 
of PSB issues. However, the examination of these letter writers showed an 
elite-oriented streak of these writers in the debate. They were mainly media 
academics (23%) and members of pressure groups (22%). These findings 
coincides with the results of other studies that view Letters to the Editor as an 
instance of a genre dominated elite discourse rooted in claims to expertise 
(Fradgley and Niebauer, 1995; Sparks, 1999). 
8.4.1 Selections of Writers  
The elite-oriented streak confirmed that in the process of constructing this 
version of the ‘republic of letters’ editorial ‘mediations’ tend to systematically 
favour the voices and concerns of particular groups of actors while relegating 
other groups to the margins or to silence. However, these selections are not 
uniform across the three newspapers respectively. Letters sampled in each 
paper shows their particular preferences. These differences are detailed in 
Table. 8.6.. 
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Table 8.6. Composition of the Letter Writers in the Three Newspapers Respectively  
 
 United Daily News  
Main Actors Year 
Total 
% 
(N=57) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Academics 0 6 0 1 3 3 2 0 4 19 33.3 
General Public 1 3 2 2 1 0 1 0 1 11 19.3 
Pressure Groups/Unions 1 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 1 8 14.0 
Private business interests 1 1 0 1 2 2 0 0 1 8 14.0 
Media Sector 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 8.8 
Parliamentarians 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 7.0 
Governmental Sources 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1.8 
Other Party Political Sources 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.8 
Total 3 13 5 6 6 7 5 0 12 57 
 
100.0 
 
China Times  
Main Actors Year 
Total 
% 
(N=71) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Pressure Groups/Unions 0 1 3 0 6 7 3 4 4 28 39.4 
Academics 3 0 2 0 3 3 2 0 3 16 22.5 
General Public 0 0 0 1 2 3 1 0 6 13 18.3 
Media Sector 1 0 1 1 0 3 0 1 3 10 14.1 
Governmental Sources 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 4 5.6 
Total 5 1 6 2 11 17 7 5 17 71 
 
100.0 
 
Liberty Times  
Main Actors Year 
Total 
% 
(N=41) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Media Sector 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 8 2 14 34.1 
Academics 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 1 4 11 26.8 
General Public 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 1 1 8 19.5 
Pressure Groups/Unions 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 4 9.8 
Private business interests 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 7.3 
Governmental Sources 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2.4 
Total 0 3 0 0 6 4 10 10 8 41 
 
100.0 
 
(N.B.: in the sampled letters, sometimes one letter can be co-authored by two or more than 
two writers. Thus, in the Table 8.6. above, the total number of all writers is 169, which is 
higher than the total number of sampled letters, 142, in pervious Table 8.1. to Table 8.5.). 
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As Table. 8.6. shows, the most frequent letter writers appearing in the United 
Daily News are academics and media commentators. For instance:  
 
Hamilton Cheng, Lecturer in Fu Jen University.  
(‘The plan to free state-owned TV to market only accelerates political and 
commercial interventions on media. Media development in free markets like the US 
already proved self-regulation did not work at all ’, United Daily News, 26/12/2001, p. 
15) 
 
Chien-San Feng, journalism professor at National Chengchi University. 
('Don’t Give Me ‘Green [DPP] Political Terror’. Just Give Me the PSB Legislation', 
United Daily News, 25/06/2004, p. 15) 
 
In contrast, the most frequently published correspondence in the China Times 
comes from pressure groups. For instance:  
 
Ti Wei, a convener of the Campaign for Media Reform  
Chung-Hsiang Kuang, Chairman of Media Watch Organization. 
 (‘Talks on Reform. Don’t Forget State-Owned TV’, China Times, 15/12/2005, p. 
A12) 
 
Ti Wei & Chad Liu, executive members of the Campaign for Media Reform. 
(‘Reinventing New Supervision Mechanism for PSB’, China Times, 17/12/2008, p. 
A12) 
 
Compared with the other two newspapers, in the Liberty Times writers from 
the media sector are most likely to get their letter published. For example:  
 
Fisher, Executive Director of CTS. 
(‘How the CTS Transform to a Public TV’, Liberty Times, 26/8/2005, p. 15) 
 
Qui-Xian Chen, Director of Public TV Station.  
(‘The Hakka News Lacks of Objectivity’, Liberty Times, 12/11/2007, p. 15) 
 
Although writers’ identity and social status are always printed with their letters, 
in the sampled letters some writers shift their identities by utilising different 
titles and claims to expertise at different times. Some shift their identities from 
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media professor to a member of pressure group, or from broadcasters to 
media academics for example. 
8.4.2 Formation of ‘Public Opinion’  
In her analysis, Wahl-Jorgensen (2002) usefully identities four main editorial 
criteria for the selection of letters: relevance, brevity, entertainment, and 
authority.  
  Claims to authority are rooted in the demonstration of ‘cultural capital’ 
(Wahl-Jorgensen, 2002, p. 76). Consequently, letters with the expressions are 
ungrammatical or in unconventional styles are more likely to be rejected. The 
deployment of this criterion in the present sample is demonstrated by the fact 
that many of the letters ostensibly coming from ‘the general public’, were in 
fact written by MA students who could demonstrate their possession of higher 
levels of cultural capital than writers with only a basic education. For example:  
 
Zh-Ching Lin, MA student. 
(‘Give Me a Political-Free Media Environment’, United Daily News, 14/12/2001: 15)  
 
Ren-Jun Hong, MA student.  
(‘PTS Is Not Servant for Political Power’, China Times ,31/03/2005: A15)  
 
Jin-Tang Lin, MA student. 
(‘Can lawmakers name themselves 'fair people from society' to join the PTS 
Directors and Supervisors Review Committee?’ China Times, 09/10/2008: A22) 
 
Graduate students are also more likely to fulfil the criterion that letters should 
be well written letters (Pounds, 2006). This finding suggests that far from 
being ‘general’ the ‘general public’ as represented in this debate was highly 
restrictive and that this selectivity, combined with the preference for 
contributions from those who could claim relevant expertise and involvement 
in the issues, closed the debate around letters from the ‘civically minded, 
politically involved, knowledgeable’ (McNair, 2000, p. 109). 
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8.5 Strings of Letters: Dialogue or Monologue?  
Despite the relative lack of diversity in the voices in the letters section it would 
still be possible to argue that it represented a (partial) demonstration of the 
public sphere in action, if it provided a space for genuine deliberation. As 
noted earlier however, a closer look at strings of correspondence reveals that 
that are predominantly ‘monologic’ rather than ‘dialogic’. 
  Most letter writers appeared to view themselves as engaged in an implicit 
dialogue between themselves and an imagined rather than an actual 
opponent (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992). This stance has two 
consequences. Firstly, writers are relatively disinterested in responding to 
points put by other contributors. Secondly, when they do respond they are 
more likely to restate their own position, dismissing alternative arguments 
rather rationally than evaluating them.  
8.5.1 Configuration of Letter Debate 
We can explore these issues further by looking at the longest string found in 
the sample. This was published in the China Times in 2005 when political 
withdraw from media by 2006 had been decided on but the future of state 
owned television after that date was still a matter of deep contention.  
  The string contains five letters written by four writers; two media academics, 
an executive in the transitional state-own broadcaster and a public 
broadcaster. It was initiated by the two media academics who wrote a letter 
analysing the internal clash within the CTS and appealing for a solution based 
on ‘Gong Gong Hua’. Three days later, a reply from a CTS executive manager 
was published. The media academics and the CTS executive manager then 
responded to each other in turn. The string ends with a letter from a public 
broadcaster. The full details of the five letters can be found in Appendix 6. 
8.5.2 Features of the String of Letters 
Structure  
Reading the letters in published order, a clear binary structure can be 
discerned with the four writers expressing opposed views on how best to 
address the internal clash in the CTS and the best way to sort it out. These 
differences are also clearly rooted in their more general pro- and anti ‘Gong 
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Gong Hua’ positions. None of them modify these stances from beginning to 
the end in the exchange on the page. Take the conclusions of letter 3, letter 4, 
and letter 5 for example. In letter 3, the conclusion represents a strong fight 
back from the two academics supporting an extended public service solution 
in response to the previous attack when the executive director of CTS claimed 
that the ‘Gong Gong Hua’ movement is more like a religion for these media 
academics. 
 
Historically, when someone intends to describe certain proposal or ideas form social 
reform as a ‘religion’ or ‘sacred mission,’ it is always proven that he is using a 
suppression tactic to against the idea and concept (Letter 3, Line 59-60). 
 
In the conclusion of letter 4, the executive director of CTS reasserts his view 
that he cannot accept the ‘Gong Gong Hua’ project:  
 
Although the Government Information Office (GIO) ordered the CTS to merge with 
PTS, in this ‘marriage’ three parties (CTS, PTS and GIO) are lack of talks. We don’t 
mind if the GIO has no intention to meet us, but in the GIO proposal the CTS is 
renamed to be the PTS 2. In this marriage, we become PTS's small mistress, how 
can we accept this? (Letter 4, Line 31-33) 
 
In letter 5, the manager of PTS concludes by defending his own institutional 
position, asserting that the PTS won’t take all the blame for the situation 
because they cannot be considered ‘responsible for the whole media 
environment’:  
 
For these issues, we do not reckon that we are responsible for the whole balance of 
the media environment, but we won’t avoid any commitments and social expectations 
the public ask us to carry out (Letter 5, Line 32-35).  
 
It is clear that genuine dialogue is not present in this exchange. All the 
contributors claim expertise in media matters, based either on their academic 
credentials or their professional practice, and present opinions based on their 
‘existing position’ and their ‘cultural acceptability’ in this debate (Shattuc, 
1997). Arguably, this emphasis on conflict, which is also characteristic of news 
reporting more generally, is the key reason why mediated discussion only 
 187 
provides opportunities for different opinions to be expressed and not for 
genuine deliberation as required by the ideal model of the public sphere 
(Livingstone & Lunt, 1994). In this case, both sides stand firmly by their 
existing positions and communication between them remains at the level of 
‘assertion of their own belief’ and ‘against other’s opinion.’ In the other words, 
process is a series of monologues rather than a genuine dialogue. 
   
Footing  
In most of the letters sampled in this study the identity of the writers is clearly 
shown, usually by way of the individual’s name and profession (e.g. 
researcher, student, policymaker, and broadcaster): for instance: 
 
Letter 2 
CTS with the Same Resentment as Zhao-Jun Wang’s   
by Fisher, Executive director of the CTS 
 
Letter 4 
Media Reform Requires Procedural Justice 
by Fisher, Executive director of CTS 
 
Letter 5 
Digitalisation Can Expand PSB 
by Hui-fang Hou, Marketing Manager in PTS 
 
Even if, in their exposition, the writers speak mainly or wholly in their personl 
voice as individuals, the footing accorded to them may identify them as 
belonging to specific organizations or supporting particular interests. For 
example, at the end of Letters 1 (and 3) written by the two media academics, 
the name of the campaign group they were involved with was also printed:  
 
Letter 1 
Appeal for an Ending to the CTS farce 
by Wei Ti, Chad Liu 
……….. 
……….. 
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(Wei Ti is assistant Professor in Dept. of Mass Communication at Tam Kang University. 
Chad Liu is assistant Professor in Dept. of Communication at Chung Cheng University. 
Both of them are executive committee from Media Reform Society) 
 
In the letters themselves, in footing the previous writer’s (s’) name or giving 
the newspaper a positive mention is employed as a polite form of address: 
 
Letter 2: 
On 11th your honourable newspaper published a letter, ‘Appeal for an Ending to the 
CTS farce’ written by Wei Ti and Chad Liu. As an executive director of the CTS, I am 
writing this letter to officially respond the letter you published (Line1-3). 
 
Letter 3: 
We are pleased to see a commencement of discussions since Mr. Fisher respond us 
from a different perspective. To the opinion of Mr. Fisher, here we would like to briefly 
clarify and discuss more (Line1-3). 
 
Letter4: no footing in the opening. 
 
Letter5 
In Mr. Fisher’s letter, ‘CTS with the Same Resentment as Zhao-Jun Wang’s’, mentioned 
a number of issues related to the Public Television Station, I would like to clarify some 
points for the PTS officially (Line 1-3). 
 
In the example of letter 2, the writer, immediately after mentioning the 
previous writers’ names, announces his own institutional position in order to 
legitimise his right to reply and confirm the authority of his opinions. Another 
example is as follows:  
 
I am the Executive director of the CTS. Although this title is a no-pay and voluntary job, 
I still feel confident to call myself a leader in the managing team since I monitor finance 
and digital media development (Letter 2, Line 39-42).  
 
 
On the other hand, writers from with the industry tend to use ‘footing’ to 
undermine their academic opponents’ credibility, claiming that their position as 
‘outsiders’ gives them no authority to speak on the operations of institutions 
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they have no practical experience of. For example: 
 
Maybe next time when any other television stations have personnel conflicts and 
internal clashes, the two scholars can help all of them just by ‘Gong Gong Hua’ them. If 
this makes sense, all professors in business and management departments can be 
replaced by media scholars (Letter 2, Line 19-23).  
 
Representation of ‘The Public’  
In the string of letters under discussion here, ‘the public’ are mentioned a 
number of times but the figures evoked differ at different times. For instance, 
‘the public’ in the example below refers to an imagined general public:  
 
We won’t avoid any commitments and social expectations the public ask us to carry 
out (Letter 5, Line 35). 
 
In the following two examples, in contrast, ‘the public’ assumes a more 
concrete form, as actively complaining about the present state of affairs and 
as potential political actors in debates around PSB: 
 
If you insist that the attempt of the CTS managing team to expand the news 
programme has nothing to do with political motive but only because of the news 
report is gaining more creditability and popularity, then we are happy to invite the 
whole public to make a fair judgement together (Letter 3, Line 28). 
 
Despite there are a large number of complaints from the public and the CTS 
professional journalists toward this programme replacement, we can do nothing to 
stop this (Letter 1, Line). 
 
In this example ‘the public’ is constructed even more concretely, as the 
constituency and audience served by a public broadcasting organisation, 
CTS:  
 
Now the CTS is in a transition and it is not just a private media firm so the CTS 
managing team should accept any criticism from the public. (Letter 3, Line 8-10).  
 
To sum up; the analysis presented here strongly suggests that Letters to the 
Editor are organised around two binary oppositions, between competing 
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media reform proposals (public interest vs. private interests; pro vs. anti-’Gong 
Gong Hua’) and competing political parties (DPP vs. KMT).  
As Pounds notes newspapers not only publish the letters to foster public 
participation but also because of their selling power (Pounds, 2006, p. 32). 
Consequently, in order to dramatise debates, opposing concepts are 
presented less as a way of balancing the arguments, and more in an effort 
attract and hold the attention of readers.  
The findings presented here tend to support this pessimistic view of the 
potential of the Letters to the Editor section to act a genuine public forum 
under the constraints of the commercial system.  
 
8.6 Summary   
Overall, the analysis of letters to the editor suggests that the newspapers 
employed this space, as a compliment to the overt expression of preferred 
opinions in editorials, to covertly construct and convey their political views and 
make claims. This strategy has the obvious benefit of shifting ‘part of the 
political risk from the news organizations to the individual writers’ (Lee, 2000).  
In this seemingly most public of forums, typically claimed as a site ‘of 
promoting reader participation and obtaining useful guidelines about local 
opinion ‘(Jackson, 1971, p. 152) it is ironic to find that the general public were 
relegated to a marginal position. Whereas members of academic, civil society, 
and institutional elites appeared frequently in the letter columns, ‘ordinary 
people’ tended to fall at the hurdles presented by processes of editorial 
selection that favoured the possession and expression of high levels of 
cultural capital (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2002). As a consequence, members of the 
‘public’, though frequently evoked and referred to in the letters, almost never 
had the opportunity to speak in their own voice.    
They were supporting actors or stage props on an elite-level platform. This 
situation conforms to Habermas’ notion of refeudalisation (Habermas, 
1962/1989) in which the public ceases to be a community of citizens, actively 
participating in public debates on issues of the day, and is once again 
relegated to the role of audience for performances orchestrated elsewhere. 
Since the voice of the general public was only marginally represented in 
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debates around PSB expansion, the key question is ‘who had the greatest 
impact on the formation of public opinion and policy?’  
Since media academics and members of pressure groups emerge as the 
main letter writers, on the surface a hasty judgement would be that they had 
the greatest impact.  
As was observed earlier, Binderkrantz’s work (2005) demonstrates that the 
repertoires of action employed by interest groups include both direct contact 
with bureaucrats and parliamentarians and indirect activities such as media 
campaigns and mobilizations of members, and as he points out, there is no 
contradiction between pursuing insider access to decision-making and 
applying pressure on decision makers through media contacts and 
mobilizations (Binderkrantz, 2005).  
From this perspective, being a dominant voice in the media presentation is 
only half of the story. The other half of the story suggests two possible 
scenarios. The first scenario is that pressure group activists have successfully 
combined insider participation in the policy making process, with strategies 
designed to influence decision makers by mobilising public platforms.  
The second scenario is that activist elites are dominant in media space 
precisely because this is the only space open to them. In other words, they 
are in the position of surrounding the building in which the decision makers 
are sitting, but are unable to enter the rooms where debates are taking place 
and deals are being done because the doors are closed to them.  
  Overall, the evidence collected in the course of this present research tends 
to support the second scenario. This scenario can also account for why the 
development of the fledgling PSB has been so turbulent.  
This leads us to next point. Chapters 6 to 8, which have presented the 
results of the press analysis, have demonstrated that the public was, 
throughout the PSB debate, as Dalhgren notes, just ‘a group of spectators’ 
(Dalhgren, 1995: p8) rather than real participants. 
Seen in this light, it can be argued that despite the concerted efforts of its 
most vociferous and mobilized supporters an expanded PSB system failed to 
become a significant public issue and a civic choice with wide support from 
the society.  
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Chapter 9 
 
Conclusion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Chinese ancient folktales, a ‘monster-revealing mirror’ is known for its 
ability to expose the true identity of evil creatures concealed behind 
human-shape disguises. As was observed earlier in this thesis, the mirror held 
up by the process of PSB expansion did not reflect the bright vision of the 
PSB project initially promised but displayed the flawed face of a policy 
process under pressure from both political and commercial forces.  
  PSB was originally seen as a device for protecting citizens against the twin 
threats of political propaganda and the crass commercialism of market-driven 
programming (Keane, 1993). The Taiwanese experience provides a prime 
case of both these threats. Looking at the series of setbacks that threw PSB 
expansion into disarray, some critics argued that it was an accident waiting to 
happen since the PSB-oriented group, the TBS, failed to isolate itself from 
political forces, leading a former DPP legislator to describe the power clashes 
inside boardroom between ‘the independently professional directors’ 
(according to Lui’s own claim)' and KMT-related directors as ‘a battle between 
light and darkness’ (Lui, 2010). In a letter to the editor headed: ‘How they 
trash the PSB project together during those year’ (Tsai, 2012; TBS, 2012b), a 
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documentary producer, speaking for many programme makers, criticised the 
broadcasters for dancing with political forces at a dangerously close distance.  
  The former CEO of TBS group Feng Hsien-hsien, with her first-hand 
experience with the PSB expansion, claimed on a televised talk show that the 
political forces were targeting the PSB group due to the rich resources it 
commanded, which included its broadcasting facilities, valuable land in the 
heart of capital city, and media influence, especially during election time. She 
argued that the old habit of viewing terrestrial television as a propaganda tool, 
which had prevailed under the non-democratic rule of the KMT, had continued 
into the democratic era with political actors continuing to regard media as 
personal assets and key instruments in the political gameplays (Feng, News 
Wow Wow Wow, 10/08/2011).  
Given by the evidence from this study, it is hardly a surprise to see the 
continuous disarray of the TBS group since throughout this thesis we have 
seen the seeds of the chaos were sowed during the process of the PSB 
expansion.  
 
9.1 Three Key Dimensions of Taiwan’s PSB  
Although the British model, BBC, has been viewed as a key reference in 
Taiwan’s PSB expansion, as Smith argued (1995), of the all broadcasting 
organisations in the world, ‘the BBC has been the most widely admired but 
has none the less proved difficult for others to copy successfully’ (Smith, 1995, 
p. 80). To address reasons why Taiwan has difficulty to copy the ideal model 
successfully, this thesis examined the ways in which public service 
broadcasting (PSB) expansion were accessed in Taiwan, and the cultural and 
social consequences of it. In this study, the battle for public broadcasting in 
Taiwan can be addressed into three key dimensions: 
  
1. Taiwan was going against the grain of international trends of public 
service broadcasting while a number of media commentators in the 
PSB traditional heartlands have been asking whether the PSB idea 
has now outlived its usefulness; 
2.  The argument for PSB was going against the grain of the growing 
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enthusiasm for privatisation and market-led solutions - not just in 
broadcasting but within the economy as a whole as it moved from 
state management; 
3. The practice of the advocates of PSB went against the grain of their 
professed claims to be representing the general public. 
 
  To address the three dimensions, this study explored how the expansion of 
PSB in Taiwan was socially defined and constructed, and by whom. After 
introduction provided a prime example of Taiwan’s media coverage of Japan 
disastrous earthquake to show a urgent call for PSB, Chapter 2 revisited the 
core values and principles of ideal PSB and argued that in practice these 
ideals had faced a variety of context-specific challenges in different nations, 
so the prescription for Taiwan’s PSB expansion must be necessarily 
context-specific rather than just copy a model from other country.  
  To understand the context, Chapter 3 presented a profile of the specific 
social background of Taiwan, a country in the process of making the double 
transition from an authoritarian system to a liberal democracy and from a state 
directed to a more market driven system, and traced the impact of both these 
processes on the media landscape.  
  Then Chapter 4 reviewed the history of Taiwanese PSB and the main 
issues that have attended different phases of its development and then 
outlined the central research questions and the research methods. Chapter 4 
argues that, there were from the outset, fundamental problems in the basic 
design of Taiwanese PSB. 
Through the analysis of the interview data, Chapter 5 explored further to 
identify the reasons why the PSB expansion project was not working arguing 
that this was primarily because it was being pulled in different directions by 
various claims from different groups. Specifically, the legislators constructed 
the PSB expansion as a part of political struggle from their understandings 
that most policy formulations are embedded with invisible political interests 
and concessions. Behind the claims, it can be seen the concern of the political 
claim-makers was seeking to stay in power or to get back to power. 
Considerations about media reform were deemed a small side show of the 
political struggle. On the other hand, the broadcasters, with their empirical 
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experience in running the PSB group, kept addressing the practical problems 
that they struggle with insufficient fund, internal tensions like channels with 
different goals and external pressures like political interferences to explain 
and justify the dysfunction of the PSB group from their position.     
As the issue entrepreneur who spotted and claimed that it was time for 
revolutionary change, the activist-academics translated their academic 
knowledge into practical actions to push the PSB proposal against the wave 
of privatization. With their claims based on their belief of the role of media, as 
public goods, should play, it can be easily argued that the efforts of the 
academic claim-makers paid off since the proposal of privatisation was 
squeezed out of the arena of the claim-competitions even the privatisation 
plan fell in to the ‘simple claims’ category which are usually more effective 
than complicated ones like the elusive PSB proposal. The Campaign for 
Citizens’ TV may be significant in the media reform history but the academics 
still had their limits. The academics had a partial victory in keeping the 
privatisation option in abeyance, but their more dynamic vision of PSB reform 
was quickly side-lined when the DPP took power and this led them to rethink 
their strategy. 
 
9.2 Inclusion and Exclusion  
Serving as one of primary outcomes of the claim-competition presented in 
Chapter 5, a press representation of the PSB expansion was conducted to 
identify the dominant claim and the boundary of inclusion and exclusion, 
which serves to focus the media attention but also detracts the attention away 
from what lies outside the boundary. 
  Chapter 6 first mapped the way the national daily newspapers represented 
the debates around PSB expansion as they unfolded over the nine-year 
period, covering the crucial run-up to the major reform of the system and its 
immediate aftermath. Five distinguishing peaks of amount identified in the 
findings generated primarily by general political events rather than changes in 
the operation and performance of broadcasting. It was argued, on the basis of 
the overall amount of coverage, which despite its cultural and political 
salience to arguments around Taiwan’s progress towards a full and mature 
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democratic polity the issue of broadcasting reform was never a major policy 
priority. Further, the analysis of the main actors featured in the coverage 
suggested that the PSB debate was driven primarily by media academics and 
pressure groups that successfully employed readers’ letters as a platform for 
their views. Their relative prominence fed into a more general press framing of 
the debate as a cultural struggle between state power and civil society rather 
than a political battle between the major political parties.  
  The relative dominance of media elites’ was also indicative of a particularly 
striking point: the marginal presence of general public voices. As a 
consequence, the debate was rooted in a contradiction. Advocates of PSB 
claimed to speaking on behalf of the ‘public interest’ but in the major public 
arena of the national press, their voices were markedly more prominent. 
‘Members of the public’ were objects not subjects, talked about and evoked 
but accorded few opportunities to speak for themselves.  
  Chapter 7 evidently demonstrated the mainstream newspapers, as an 
invisible claim-maker, actively participated in the claim-competition during the 
shaping time of the PSB policy. It was in these editorials that the various 
newspapers inserted their own voices into the PSB debate. Then the analysis 
of letters to the editor in Chapter 8 suggests that the newspapers employed 
this space, as a compliment to the overt expression of preferred opinions in 
editorials, to covertly construct and convey their political views and make 
claims. It is ironic to find that the general public were relegated to a marginal 
position: when members of academic, civil society, and institutional elites 
appeared frequently in the letter columns, ‘ordinary people’ tended to fall at 
the hurdles presented by processes of editorial selection that favoured the 
possession and expression of high levels of cultural capital. As a 
consequence, members of the ‘public’, though frequently evoked and referred 
to in the letters, almost never had the opportunity to speak in their own voice.    
They were supporting actors or stage props on an elite platform.  
  Overall, the analysis showed that the triggers for mediated debate were 
mainly associated with battles within the general political arena rather than 
considerations of public interest or the concerns of media professionals. It 
also demonstrated that although this contest between competing claims was 
being waged in the name of the ‘public’ it was, in practice, conducted within 
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the closed circles of competing elites with the voices of viewers being largely 
excluded. 
 
9.3 Conceptual and Structural Confusions  
This elite centred debate was shown, in the analysis of readers’ letters, to be 
conducted as a ‘war of positions’ with each side using the opportunities 
presented by periodic peaks in press interest, to restate and reaffirm their 
original viewpoints rather than to engage in open deliberation. Interestingly 
however, both of the core positions in play in the debate- the advocacy of 
privatisation and the argument for an extended PSB structure - derived in 
large part from western models.  
  This was less of a problem for champions of privatisation since they could 
claim to be riding a wave of change that had already transformed the global 
economic landscape in country after country and industry after industry.  
The proponents of extending PSB had more of a problem however. They had 
to explain why a model of broadcasting, which was under pressure and in 
retreat in many other countries, including a number of its original homelands 
in Western Europe, should be adopted as the preferred solution for Taiwan. 
  Given that in accordance with the purpose of the establishment of public 
television around the world, in the picture of the press representation, the 
significant absence of the general public is quite remarkably ironic while public 
television is meant to create strong connections to the general public. The 
marginal presence of ‘public voices’ in the mainstream newspapers 
convincingly demonstrates a vestige of the earliest conceptualisations of 
public service broadcasting: a paternalistic, Reithian idea that experts, 
professionals and political elites decide and determine what the public 
interests are and how the public are catered for. Two general points can be 
deduced here. First, this representation picture orchestrated by the sources 
suggests a dialogue of elites and no room for ordinary citizens. Second, it also 
highlights the PSB expansion seems not a partisan fight on policy but a fight 
between the state power and the civil society actors. It was a professional 
debate rather than a political debate. 
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  By the funnel-down analytical framework applied in this thesis, this study 
argues that the representation of the PSB expansion is conceptual and 
structure confusion.  
  Conceptually, what exactly that public service broadcasting means still 
remains contested and elusive while the key actors, in pursuit their own 
sectional interests, have engaged in the debate with respective monologue 
rather than dialogue.  
  When one asks a political question, one will receive a political answer. As 
the PSB debate is overly politicised in Taiwan, the answers produced were 
unavoidably political ones. As was discussed earlier in the review of the PSB 
concepts and practice, the core issues of PSB should have been about what 
PSB is, why Taiwan should have PSB and what the key difference between 
PSB and commercial television in Taiwan are. However, as was observed in 
the analysis, these issues have become inadequately addressed in the PSB 
debate. 
  Structurally, the mediated debate has lost sight of the need to remain 
relevant to the general public while politicians, broadcasters, campaigners 
and academics are competing to define what the best is for the public.  
  This thesis evidently demonstrated that the opinions and concerns of the 
general public were largely missing from a debate dominated by political and 
academic elites. Against the grain of their own claims to be representing the 
public key actors constructed public debate as a series of monologues, 
advancing their own sectional and paternalistic interpretations of the public 
interest. The findings point to the supremely ironic conclusion that a process 
ostensibly dedicated to reconstructing broadcasting as key element in a new, 
democratic, public sphere, excluded the public from active participation and 
relegated them to the role of spectators. 
  The confusions not only lead the Taiwanese PSB to face conceptual and 
structural obstacles, but also inevitably pose a question concerning the 
adaptability of the PSB idea in the specific social context of Taiwan. 
 
9.4 Transplanting a Western Tree into an Eastern Land  
With regards to the shifting relations between states, markets and civil society 
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in structuring the operating environment for media in democratic societies, in 
recent years the balance struck in the post war period has been substantially 
tipped in favour of private enterprise by the processes of marketization and it 
in this context, of an over-commercialised media landscape, that the 
argument for PSB expansion needs to be located. 
9.4.1 A Reverse Development from Other Iconic Public Broadcasters   
The first consequence of this situation is that, compared with other historical 
and powerful public broadcasters (which began as public monopolies), 
Taiwanese PSB was created within in an already-highly-commercialised 
market with a mission to provide a complement to commercial forces.  
  This context provided PSB with a legitimate reason for its existence in 
Taiwan and invested it with an important cultural role. At the same time, the 
view of a PSB as a complement to commercial provision had the effect of 
confining its potential development within certain boundaries and barring it 
from playing a leading role in the media landscape.  
9.4.2 Paternalistic Characteristics    
In order to differentiate itself from its commercial competitors within the 
Taiwanese media landscape, PSB aimed to produce high quality programmes, 
but in implementing this goal it adopted vestiges of the earliest 
conceptualisation of public broadcasting: the paternalistic, Reithian, idea that 
elites have a responsibility to decide and determine what the public interest is 
and how it should be catered for. The appeal of paternalism is likely to be 
particularly strong in a highly commercialised media landscape, like Taiwan, 
where both programme quality and diversity are declining.  
9.4.3 A Top-Down Approach     
A number of media studies argue that the primary responsibility for the 
dysfunctional operation of TBS as a public service broadcasting grouping lies 
with the government since it is the responsibility of government to take the 
leading role in formulating policy and in ensuring that the provisions decided 
on are properly implemented (see: Fan, 2011; Tang, & Jian, 2008; Weng, 
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2008; Feng, 2006,  Lee, & Li, 2006; Huang, & Huang, 2005; Cheng, 2003, 
Feng, Shy, & Kuo, 2002). This thesis partly agrees with this point but argues 
that it overlooks the significant absence of the public voice in the development 
of proposals for PSB and the subsequent estrangement of the structures 
decided on from popular support and endorsement. As was observed, the 
PSB was largely the result of concerted lobbying by pressure groups 
organised by activist academics rather than representatives of public 
organisations played the leading role.  
This leads to the next point of the interaction between the government and 
the media academics. The activist academics took full advantage of the 
opportunity presented by the defeat of the KMT and the formation of a DPP 
government on a platform that had included PSB reform (along lines that they 
had proposed) to drive their PSB proposal forward. Although the peaceful 
transfer of power from the KMT to the DPP was widely regarded and 
celebrated as a demonstration of the strength of democracy in Taiwan, in 
retrospect it is clear that it was a transfer between political parties rather than 
a realignment of the relations between the state and members in civil society. 
The activist academics’ pushed to outrun the privatisation plan and pressed 
the case PSB expansion was premised on the assumption the incoming DPP 
government would follow through on its pre-election endorsement of an 
extended PSB system. Under this approach, the government’s failure to do so 
left them in disarray.  
  In the exploration of whose claims gaining a public hearing it was argued 
that relative success or failure depended on how adroitly a group exploited the 
opportunities presented by shifts in the political environment. The evidence 
presented here suggests that the pro PSB campaign were more adept at 
seizing these opportunities and were consequently accorded more press 
attention. However, the newspapers consistently portrayed the PSB debate as 
a cultural battle between contending groups within civil society rather than a 
political struggle between the main parties, and the case for expansion was 
defined as an argument outside the orbit of parliament and government.  
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9.4.4 An Unrealistic Compressed Transplant       
This study suggests that their model for an extended role for PSB in Taiwan 
was not translated into a workable organisational structure. This was partly 
because principles inevitably bumped up against political expediency but 
arguably it was also because it was unrealistic to expect that working models 
that had been introduced in specific circumstances and been developed and 
adapted over a long period, by organisations like the BBC and NHK, could be 
transplanted without problems in a compressed period and in a media 
environment with a very different organisational history and structure.  
 
9.5 Remarks  
This thesis has sought to explore the way power operated to shape the 
course of PSB expansion: how it was deployed, enacted, and what the 
outcomes were.  
  This thesis is distinctive since it serves as:  
  1) An unorthodox case of PSB development in the worldwide PSB debate;  
  2) An alternative view to transitional countries and societies which intend to 
introduce or are introducing PSB;  
  3) A wake-up call to PSB advocates in Taiwan. 
  The results of this analysis suggest that a radical re-think of the PSB project 
in Taiwan is needed, not least among its most vociferous supporters. Overall, 
through this thesis, I can understand the reasons why the media academics 
chose the path, with elite campaign, the paternalistic character and the 
top-down approach, to push the PSB expansion forward. However, I myself 
disagree with that path because I do not believe that the path would lead to 
where I would wish the Taiwanese PSB to go. 
The future of a healthy PSB will, I would argue, depend, more than anything 
else, on breaking the elite domination of policy debate, and bringing the 
‘public’ into the centre of debate and decision making, not as imagined figures 
to be rhetorically evoked but as live voices.  
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9.6 Research limitations and Suggestions  
Looking back on the study, in a re-consideration of research methods, this 
study mostly relied on secondary sources- particularly press stories- when 
summarising or quoting from both official sources (e.g.: parliamentary debates) 
and the materials produced by lobby groups. This makes it difficult to identify 
certain arguments and statements that failed to get written up in the 
newspapers when there were opinions and positions that were floated but did 
not reach the public domain. It is the limitation of the research design to miss 
out the unpublished opinions. 
  On the other hand, while it is entirely legitimate to focus on the mainstream 
national press as core institutions within the mediated public sphere, this 
study made no mention of on-line platforms and arenas of publicity and 
debate. The increasingly important role of the internet in publicising 
campaigns and mobilising support might be able to offer possibility of 
circumventing the 'gatekeeping' role of established media. 
  This is rather ironically since, have noticing the public absence from the 
political debate and the media debate, they are also absent from my research 
design.  
  It was not only because of limitation of time and resources, but also 
because the PSB debate during 2000 to 2008 was a debate mostly held 
‘offline’ rather than online. As was observed earlier, it was lobbying groups 
behind closed doors where elites talking to elites and passing scraps 
information on to the tanginess that has been in one way or the other. It was 
an elite debate between elite figures; however, within the time period this 
study dealt with, particularly the latter part of the period, it was changing since 
the media academics tried to embrace more ordinary Taiwanese people and 
to bring these kinds of debates closer to people.  
  I see this as a research opportunity for the future. Particularly now the issue 
entrepreneurs are going to get closer to the public. Now it is a better time to 
engage this research with talking this with the public about what they are 
hoping for the PSB reform. To get a view of what ordinary people would look 
for in public service broadcasting and how they would like it today and how 
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people are aware of the PSB reform, audience research like quantitatively 
online-survey on viewers or qualitatively focus-group research with the public 
and analysis on the content of online debate are suggested as future research 
agenda.   
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Appendix 1: The Details of interviewees and interview 
date 
 
 
1. Feng Hsien-hsien (馮賢賢), the CEO of the Taiwan Broadcasting System & PTS 
Foundation, 05-Feb-2008. 
2. Hu Yuan-hui (胡元輝), Previous CEO, the Taiwan Broadcasting System & PTS 
Foundation, 05-Feb-2008.   
3. Chen Jen-ran (陳正然), President of Chinese Television System in the TBS, 
21-Mar-2008. 
4. Hsu Chin-yun (徐青雲), President of the Hakka TV in the TBS, 27-Jan-2008.  
5. Masao. Aki (馬紹  阿紀), President of Taiwan Indigenous TV in the TBS, 
31-Jan-2008.  
6. Lin Leh-chyun (林樂群), President of the Taiwan Macro View TV in the TBS, 
13-Mar-2008. 
7. Weng Shieu-chi (翁秀琪), Previous Director of PTS/ Professor, the Department 
of Journalism, National Chengchi University, 21-Jan-2008. 
8. Fang Nien-hsuan (方念萱), Previous Director of PTS/ Professor, the Department 
of Journalism, National Chengchi University, 21-Jan-2008.  
9. Chou Yan-shan (周陽山 ), Previous Director of PTS/Previous Legislator, 
29-Feb-2008.  
10. Peng Weng-jeng (彭文正), Director of PTS/ Director, Graduate Institute of 
Journalism, National Taiwan University, 24-Mar-2008.   
11. Cheng Chung-ming (程宗明), Associate Research Fellow, R&D department in 
PTS, 17-Jan-2008.  
12. Feng Chien-san (馮建三),Department Chair, the Department of Journalism, 
National Chengchi University, 24-Jan-2008. 
13. Kuang Chung-hsiang (管中祥 ), Vice-Professor, Shih Hsin University/The 
Chairman of the Media Watch Organization, 4-Mar-2008.  
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14. Wei Ti (魏玓), The founder of the Campaign for Media Reform/Assistant 
Professor, Institute of Communication Studies, National Chiao Tung University, 
6-Mar-2008.  
15. Hung Chen-ling ( 洪 貞 玲 ), Convenor of the Campaign for Media 
Reform/Assistant Professor, Graduate Institute of Journalism in National 
Taiwan University, 29-Feb-2008.  
16. Lee Yong-ping (李永萍), Previous Legislator (PFP, People First Party) , 
20-Feb-2008.  
17. Lee Ching-an (李慶安), Legislator (KMT Party), 13-Mar-2008.  
18. Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱), Legislator (KMT Party), 13-Mar-2008  
19. Lin Shu-fen (林淑芬), Legislator (DPP Party), 25-Mar-2008.  
20. Kung Wen-chi (孔文吉), Legislator (KMT Party), 10-Mar-2008. 
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Appendix 2: The Information Sheet for Interviewees 
 
Participant’s Information Sheet in English/Chinese 
 
 
 
 
Participant’ s Information Sheet／研究介紹與訪問工作說明 
 
 
 
 
Reinventing Public Service Broadcasting: Lessons from Taiwan 
公共廣播之反向演進－全球公廣潮流中的台灣經驗 
 
 
Chun-Wei Daniel Lin／PhD student in Loughborough University 
林俊偉／英國羅芙堡大學社會學系媒體研究組博士班 
 
 
 
1. What is this study all about? 
The research of this project is interested in the compelling phenomenon of 
expanding public broadcasting services in Taiwan by transforming formerly 
state-owned TV stations and ethnical TV channels into a new public broadcasting 
group while many public service broadcasters around the world have faced increasing 
pressures from the accelerating commercialization and fragmentation of the 
broadcasting environment. This project tries to examine the reasoning behind the 
forms which it has been financed and institutionalized. 
 
1.  研究介紹： 
  在高度商業化、分眾市場抬頭與利潤極大化的媒體生態中，當前世界各國的
公共廣播體制與價值無不遭受嚴峻挑戰。台灣在既有歷史脈絡下的媒體變革方
向，恰巧與西歐各國逆反而行，一個以「公共廣播」為名的電視媒體集團正在台
 207 
灣擴張。本研究將檢視公廣服務在各國的價值及建制方式上的異同，以剖析台灣
擴大公廣服務的社會情境與主要動機，進而探究其創設過程的各項爭議、經費來
源與社會定位，據此解釋公廣服務在台灣與全球發展軌跡中的歷史意義。 
 
 
2. Who is conducting this project? 
This project is the basis for a PhD study, which is conducting by a PhD student, 
Chun-Wei Daniel Lin. Mr. Lin is currently supervised by Dr. Graham Murdock from 
the Dept. of Social Sciences in Loughborough University in the UK. 
 
2.   研究者介紹： 
  本研究是一項博士論文研究，研究者林俊偉目前就讀英國羅芙堡大學社會學
系媒體研究組，指導教授為葛拉漢．梅鐸。 
 
 
3. How will this project be done? 
The aim of this project is to obtain a better understanding of the implications 
from the development of the Public Broadcasting Service. This project will be carried 
out the interviews on four main groups of interviewees. They are broadcasters, 
lawmakers, media reform activists and media academics. 
All the interviews will be semi-structured.  
 
3.  研究進行方式： 
  本研究為了深入研究主題，將分別針對公廣服務及商業電視經理人、立法委
員、媒體學者及推動媒體改革運動者進行深度訪談。 
  訪談設計為半結構式訪問，預先提供受訪者訪談大綱，但會視受訪者的專長
和回應內容，在訪問進行時彈性調整訪問內容。 
 
 
4. How long will the interview take? 
Each interview would last for no longer than 60 minutes. 
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4.  訪談所需時間： 
  每次訪談所需時間預計為 40到 60分鐘，以不超過一個小時為原則。 
 
 
5. How long will the whole project take? 
According to the current name list, on the first stage there will be around 20 
interviews in this project. This stage may take 4 weeks in all to complete though it 
depends on the interviewees’ availability. This project is the basis for a PhD study, 
which requires 3 years to finish it. 
 
5.  研究計畫長度： 
依據訪談名單，本研究的深度訪談部分預計在四週內進行二十位相關人士的
訪談。本研究為一博士論文研究，預計三年完成相關資料分析並總結研究發現。 
     
 
6. Will the information collected be treated as confidential? 
All information collected in this study will be treated in strict confidentiality. The 
raw data will not be made available to those who are outside this project. 
 
6.   資料保護： 
  所有訪談內容在研究過程中不會外流給研究以外的任何人或單位機構。 
 
7. Will participants be told about the result of this study? 
A written summary of the findings will be prepared for participants who have 
contributed to this study. 
 
7.   訪談後與受訪者的互動： 
  本研究在總結研究發現後，將會寄給受訪者一份相關研究成果的摘要報告。 
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*If you have any queries about any aspect of the project, or you would like to discuss more detail of the 
project, please contact either  
Chun-Wei Daniel Lin <C.Lin@lboro.ac.uk>  
 (TEL “UK”: +44772-658-5611; TEL “Taiwan”: +886-913617513)  
or Graham Murdock <G.Murdock@lboro.ac.uk>. 
 
若您對於本研究有任何賜教，請聯絡林俊偉（英國羅芙堡大學社會學系媒體研究組博士班） 
行動電話：0913-617-513 
電郵：bcc0200@yahoo.com.tw  
即時通訊: Magnus1122@hotmail.com 
或 
英國羅芙堡大學社會學系教授葛拉漢．梅鐸(Graham Murdock) 
G.Murdock@lboro.ac.uk 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix 3: The Questions in the Interviews 
 
According to the interviewees’ affiliated professions and the positions listed in 
Appendix 1, this study roughly separated the interviewees into three 
categories:  
  1) Legislators (parliamentarians) from different political parties;  
  2) Media scholars, social activists or activist-academics; and  
  3) Broadcasters. 
  In respect of the likely differences in the structuring of their responses (Marshall 
& Rossman, 1989), different interview schedules and questions were also 
designed in the semi-structure interview for each category of interviewees.  
  Generally speaking, public broadcasters were asked about their perceptions and 
experiences in PSB practice, the challenges they face and the possible solutions 
they seek. Social activists, media academics or activist-academics were asked 
about their visions for media reform and actions they took to realise the visions. 
Legislators were asked about their position, judgments and experiences during the 
policy formation.  
  The overall interview for all interviewees generally include the questions like why 
the issues were believed to be problems, the way the problems were defined in, 
who has more or less power to do the defining, and what kind of cultural and social 
resources were accessed in defining the issues as social problems. To help 
interviewees address these issues more efficiently, press coverage of some PSB 
news events were used as prompts during the interviews. 
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Appendix 4: Coding manual of press content analysis 
 
Press 
1  United Daily News 
2  China Times 
3  Liberty Times 
 
Page (Location) 
1  Editorial 
2  Main News pages 
3  Entertainments/Media 
4  Letters and Forum 
5  Local News 
6   Others 
7   Front Page 
 
Genre 
1  Editorial 
2  Pure news stories 
3  Commentary/analysis  
4  Readers’ letters  
5  Others 
 
Size   
The number of words 
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Topic 
 
1  The reasons for TV Reform 
  
2  Debates on transitional ownership of state-owned TV networks 
 
3  Debates on PSB Funding 
 
4  Debates on PSB Performance  
 
5  Debates on Personnel  
 
6  Debates on Legislature  
 
7  Debates on PSB institutionalisation  
 
8   Governance, regulation and supervision on PSB 
 
9  Digitalisation/Digital Switchover 
 
10 Comparisons with other PSB provisions around the world 
 
11  Others 
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Interpretation (Themes in News) 
 
1  The reasons for TV Reform 
  -10 Protect public goods from Privatisation   
  -11 The performance of existing Commercial System 
  -12 Levels of Existing Public Provision 
  -13 Existing political systems and political bias on Media  
  -14 Preserve National culture  
  -15 Secure Citizenship/Democracy 
  -16 Minority interests  
  -17 Local programme production 
  -18 Digital Switchover TV industry  
  -19 Diversity of programme  
  -20 Others  
 
2  Debates on transitional ownership of state-owned TV networks 
  -21 to remain State-owned but introduce more PSB programme on the TV networks 
  -22 to free Market logic/competition  
  -23 to pure public media (Government subsidy and donation the ownership from state to 
PSB ) 
  -24 to Trust: to build the sovereign body and its independent trustees. 
  -25 to a Mixed Method   (e.g.: half public half private) 
  -29 Others  
 
3  Debates on PSB Funding model   
  - 31 PSB go free market/private companies 
  - 32 PSB get government Funding 
  - 33 License fees  
  - 34 Shareholding by government budget 
  - 35 Shareholding by private sectors  
  - 36 Commercial ads  
  - 39 Others 
 
4   Debates on PSB Performance  
   
5  Debates on personnel  
  - 51 Personnel of state-owned TV 
  - 52 Personnel of PSB 
  
6  Debates on legislature  
  - 61 Laws for Terrestrial TV Reform 
  - 62 Laws for PSB legal basis  
 
7  Debates on PSB Institutionalisation  
 - 71 Debates on expanding project  
 - 72 How the plan has been practiced 
 - 73 Government budget and support 
 - 74 Plans for local PSB branches 
 - 79 Others 
 
8    Governance, regulation and supervision on PSB 
 
9    Digitalisation  
 - 91 Increasing number of channels bring diversity to Media landscape 
 - 92 Budget for digitalisation 
 - 99 Others 
 
10 Comparisons 
     -101 USA  
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     -102 UK  
     -103 EUROPEAN  
     -104 ASIAN 
       -1041      JAPAN 
       -1042      KOREA 
       -1043      Hong Kong 
       -1044      Tailand 
       -1049      OTHER 
     -105 AUSTRALIA  
     -106 New Zealand  
     -107   CANADA 
     -109 Other 
 
999  Others 
 
 
Evaluation on Themes in News 
 
1 Solely/ mainly negative  
2 Solely/ mainly positive  
3 Balanced  (two or different sides) 
4 Neutral/ descriptive / factual    
9  Unclear 
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(Actors): 
Group A: Political Actors------------- 
 
1   Parliamentarians (Lawmaker) 
11  KMT Party  
12  DPP Party  
13  PFP Party 
14  Non-Partisan Solidarity Union 
15  New Party 
16  Taiwan Solidarity Union Party 
19  Others 
 
2   Political Parties 
21  KMT Party  
-211  President of Party 
-212  Spokespeople & Representative 
-213  Members 
 
22  DPP Party  
-221  President of Party 
-222  Spokespeople & Representative 
-223  Members 
 
23  PFP Party 
-231  President of Party 
-232  Spokespeople & Representative 
-234  Members 
 
24  Non-Partisan Solidarity Union 
-241  President of Party 
-242  Spokespeople & Representative 
-243  Members 
 
25  New Party 
-251  President of Party 
-252  Spokespeople & Representative 
-253  Members 
 
26  Taiwan Solidarity Union Party 
-261  President of Party 
-262  Spokespeople & Representative 
-263  Members 
 
29  Other Parties 
 
3   Officials & Government org. 
31  President 
32  Government Information Office 
33  Executive Yuan (Ministers) 
34  Council for Hakka Affairs 
35  Council of Indigenous Peoples 
36  Local governors 
39  Others 
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Group B:  Economic Actors-------------- 
 
4   Broadcasters, Press and Firms  
 
41  Public broadcasters 
42  Private broadcasters 
43  State-owned broadcasters 
44  Advertisers   
45  Press/newspaper interests (Editorial 
      & Reporters)   
46  Other business interests 
47  Media staff labour unions / associations 
48  Military sector/department  
49  Others 
 
Group C: Civil Society Actors--------------- 
 
5 Academics, Media Commentators and Pressure groups 
       
51  Members of pressure groups specifically lobbying for PSB 
 
52  Members of other civil society groups (e.g. women’s groups or ethnic groups) 
 
53  Media academics 
54  Academics (outsides Media) 
55  Professionals in Marketplace/ Private consultants 
59  Others 
 
6 General Public (no stated affiliations) 
 
7   TV Celebrities  
 
9 Others 
 
 
 
Sources of the actors 
 
1 Authors author their own material  
2 Quoted directly in stories 
3 Mention Only/ have their ideas/arguments referred to  
9 Other 
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Appendix 5: Coding manual for Reasons of Writing Letters 
 
1  Criticism 
101  Criticism on existing political control on TV stations 
102  How the plan (PSB institutionalisation) is practiced 
103  Criticism on PSB Performance 
104  Criticism on governance, regulation on PSB 
105  Criticism on the personnel issues of PSB 
106  The performance of existing Commercial System 
107  Criticism on the personnel of state-owned TV 
108  Criticism on privatisation of media 
 
2  Appeal 
201  Appeal for a public media 
202  Appeal to release state-owned TV to free Market competition 
203  Appeal a PSB to secure Citizenship and Democracy 
204  Appeal a PSB to secure minority interests 
205  Appeals for local PSB branches 
206  PSB legislature 
207  Laws for Terrestrial TV Reform 
208  PSB Funding Model: maintain state-owned & PSB programme 
209  Comparison with Other PSBs (BBC in the UK) 
210  PSB Funding Model: establish a Trust foundation  
211  PSB Funding Model: PSB get Government Funding 
212  Diversity of Programme 
 
3  Others 
301  Digitalisation vs. PSB  
302  Replying to another correspondent  
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Appendix 6: Full Texts of the Letter String 
 
Letter 1: Appeal for an Ending to the CTS farce 
by Wei Ti, Chad Liu. 
 
The recent clash in the CTS, among vice president Li-xi Zhu, News director 1 
Ji-fang Chen, and Wei-jian Hong (executive assistant of the general manager Xia 2 
Jiang), not only displayed the poor profession of journalism and management, but also 3 
exposed some inappropriate conduct and behaviour of the manage team in the CTS. 4 
From an eye of an outsider from the TV station, this tempest in the teapot can be 5 
viewed as a ridiculous farce. However, since the government is working on a reform to 6 
transform CTS to become one public television in the PSB group, as members of 7 
Taiwan's media watch and a general citizen, we are entitled to ask for an explanation 8 
to the internal tensions within the CTS. 9 
We have no intention to get involved in the clash within the managing team of 10 
CTS or to judge who is right and who is wrong. However, from this clash, and also 11 
from several clashes in the News section or in other departments in the CTS since Xia 12 
Jiang was in charge, they evidently show that the internal management of CTS is 13 
really in trouble. Furthermore, political interference and manipulating still can be seen 14 
in these clashes. An ultimate solution to this situation will begin with the fundamental 15 
transformation of CTS. 16 
    We believe that the ‘Gong Gong Hua’ proposal is the most effective and the best 17 
way to reform the CTS. First, the main reason why Xia Jiang can be appointed as the 18 
general manager for the CTS is because her close relation with President Chen. Then 19 
Xia Jiang can undertake totalitarian ruling style in the CTS is due to the government is 20 
the major stakeholder of the CTS. However, currently the CTS is deemed to be a 21 
commercial television station which is not only has no obligation and responsibility for 22 
the public but also can avoid any kinds of supervision or monitoring from parliament. 23 
Recently, just before the election, the CTS managing team tended to replace all 24 
programming before 18:00 o’clock by News report. The attempt to intervene election 25 
by news is too obvious. Despite there are a large number of oppositions toward this 26 
programme replacement from the public and disagreements from the CTS professional 27 
journalists, we can do nothing to stop this! 28 
Currently under consideration by the Legislative Yuan Legislative release of public 29 
shares will be one hundred percent of China as the transition into a public television 30 
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after the constitution will be "Public Television Act" as the basis for the CTS to serve all 31 
the public, not the government or certain political parties (in the This does not exclude 32 
the CTS can be certain commercial activities, or broadcast advertising as part of the 33 
financial resources. So, Congress will be able to consent by the public television 34 
directors exercise leadership guide is chaos CTS. 35 
The company also recently set up as "news complaints handling team" for the 36 
general audience to comment on the public television news and access to treatment. 37 
"Public Television Act" the relevant provisions and the current operation of public 38 
television within the lake, of course, imperfect, must be gradual improvement, but at 39 
least the public and Congress also maintain participation and supervision of space, 40 
and will not only be angry at the side of concern. 41 
We believe ‘Gong Gong Hua’ not only can sort out most of political intervention 42 
substantially, but also offer benefits to the professional performance, employee rights 43 
and job security, and autonomy of newsroom. PTV is set a few "Editorial Convention," 44 
the media, isolate the intervention of political and commercial interests, and protect the 45 
editorial staff of professional autonomy and independence. Recently, public television 46 
has, through the external consulting and internal democracy process, and actively 47 
develop "production staff professional standards", no matter what the outcome, at least 48 
in the right direction. But was even, coming to public television different from the 49 
special status of private enterprises, trade union representatives could also be 50 
considered for the board and really "independent journalists" ideal. 51 
Earlier, the Executive Yuan proposed investment of 9.2 billion two years, the 52 
public television program, but the real problem of China as the transition is not a word. 53 
Chinese Television executives have expressed support publicly, but do not agree with 54 
the public as the "merger", but they saw their busy in-fighting, or ideas to increase in 55 
the pre-election press time, but have not made any specific and feasible "as the 56 
Chinese version of" public television blueprint. 57 
We look forward to Liangzao to rein in favour of positive, but we also hope that the 58 
opposition legislators, as soon as possible to appropriate the "Wireless Television 59 
Enterprise release of implementing regulations", and requested the Government to 60 
promote the immediate supervision of the Congress meet the public interest, maintain 61 
a professional, caring staff, as the public the principles of transformation of China, from 62 
China, as the fundamental solution to the problem. We agree Communications 63 
Commission (NCC) with the broadcast of the legislative and importance, but letting the 64 
problem worsen as China, to continue to operate under the shadow of political 65 
intervention, but cannot achieve the desired social benefits of public services, which to 66 
a to, the price is too great. (Wei Ti is assistant Professor in Dept. of Mass 67 
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Communication at Tam Kang University. Chad Liu is assistant Professor in Dept. of 68 
Communication at Chung Cheng University. Both of them are executive committee 69 
from Campaign for Media Reform) 70 
(China Times, 11/09/2005: A15) 
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Letter 2: (Published on 14/09/2005 which is three days later since the first letter 
was published) 
 
CTS with the Same Resentment as Zhao-Jun Wang’s4  
by Fisher, Executive director of the CTS  
 
                                                 
4 Zhao-Jun Wang is famed as one of the four breath-taking beauties from ancient China. As a palace 
lady in harem of a Chinese Emperor in Han dynasty, she was sent out as a gift by the Chinese Emperor to 
get married with the Huns tribe leader in order to strengthen their national relationship. The letter writer 
drew on this story as a metaphor to illustrate the situation that CTS, which is used to be a commercially 
profitable TV station, is reluctant to be forced by the government to transform to a public TV in the PSB 
group.   
 
On 11th your honour newspaper published a letter, ‘Appeal for an Ending to the 1 
CTS farce’ written by Wei Ti and Chad Liu. As an executive director of the CTS, I am 2 
writing this letter to officially respond the letter you published.  3 
In the Han dynasty, to exchange peace and harmony, the emperor sent the beauty, 4 
Zhao-Jun Wang, to get married with the Huns, but that naive plan didn’t work out. The 5 
bond of the marriage didn’t stop the attacks from the Huns. Only a famous song, 6 
‘Zhao-Jun Wang’s Resentment,’ has been remembered and sung till today. 7 
Now both the government and so called ‘social intellectual (media academics)’ are 8 
determined to force the CTS to marry the Public Television Station to form the PSB 9 
family. The CTS is in tears to sacrifice herself to marry the alien person. No objection 10 
to the ‘Gong Gong Hua’, however, it is just like what the Murphy's law says, what’s 11 
wrong from the very beginning will keep going wrong to the end. 12 
"‘Gong Gong Hua’" now has become a "sacred mission" for many media 13 
academics. It is already ridiculous enough. What is more unbelievable is now these 14 
media academics can even use the CTS internal clash to prove the need of ‘Gong 15 
Gong Hua’. None institutions or organisation has zero internal clash and conflicts. It 16 
is inevitable and this is totally irrelevant to the ‘Gong Gong Hua’ project. However, to 17 
the internal clash, the media academics can even claim that ‘the ‘Gong Gong Hua’ 18 
proposal is the most effective and the best way to reform the CTS.’ If so, then maybe 19 
next time when any internal conflicts and clashes occur in any other television stations, 20 
these two media scholars can help to sort it out just by the idea to transform them to 21 
public media. If it works just like that, all professors in business and management 22 
departments can be all replaced by media scholars.  23 
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Public television" has now become a lot of press and scholars of the "sacred 24 
mission" really Mokenaihe. CTS can be vice president of academics and the news 25 
director Chenji Fang Zhu Lixi discord between the two, being represented publicly, is 26 
incredible, in fact, no organization has the personnel struggle, in the end and the 27 
public of what relevance? Actually said, "Reform of public of China, as the constitution 28 
is still effective and appropriate means", and then later appeared in a television station 29 
personnel of any struggle, you can ask the two scholars to help them publicly, and if 30 
the truth can pass it around the world professor of management can be requested to 31 
replace the Department of Journalism. 32 
Zhu Lixi China as the future in order to purify the news pride to a sense of 33 
admiration, however, the Department under his control, good or bad to be all worried, 34 
we cannot return his good and bad left CTS, the reason is simple, CTS Press both the 35 
reputation of clean, natural daylight that cannot Lu Asa removed the program and 36 
concentrate on good news, how they can be directed at China, as there is no evidence 37 
to ‘attempt to intervene election so obvious’. 38 
  I am the Executive director of the television station in this controversy. Although my 39 
position is voluntary with no salary, I still feel confident to say I am an important role in 40 
the management team since I am responsible for finance part and also the 41 
development of digital media. I feel neutralising news report from political bias is in the 42 
right direction, the CTS are not running the ‘morgue5’, and occasionally two a charge 43 
of discord, general corporate, even if common public institutions, which do not have to 44 
work to guide the Congress leadership is chaos, right? 45 
  ‘Gong Gong Hua’ is a public debate, not a religion. should the facts to prove the 46 
point, can contemporary Manchao Chiang, Shuo-yin, who will it run into national 47 
disaster. Chinese scholars say, as the government shares accounted for seventy-four 48 
percent, a little basic "Company Law" are not common knowledge, private is private, 49 
how can the use of state property used as private? Comparison of controversial issues 50 
such as "Dawn Foundation" and so on, that people share more than half of the civil 51 
fund, most people donate money, purpose is to take care of veterans, at most, only to 52 
divest the dawn, so that more than half of China as the government shares, Now I 53 
want people to donate money to the Public Television Foundation, does the President 54 
of the communist leader to force the situation, to the extreme pressure of Defence, 55 
Department of Defence and then the dawn gun off to the dead people threw money? If 56 
the directors of dawn to do so, probably also in violation of good management 57 
responsibility, were all arrested and in jail. 58 
                                                 
5 The writer implies if the CTS were a morgue, dead people cannot cause internal conflicts. 
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The two scholars also understand that the Executive Yuan 9.2 billion investment 59 
plan, as the transformation of China's real problem is not a word, but the two scholars 60 
do not understand, please put "public broadcasting and the cultural and creative 61 
development of digital television for two years plan "and" lifelong learning, knowledge 62 
and education to develop the project plan "look at the two plans, it seems to really like 63 
the public, as surgeon, and Information Office did not even look at the view, on the 64 
labeled" Government Information Office, "six words would go to the hospital! Detract 65 
from the official documents also set out an incredible record of winning public 66 
television over the years, let me see, "the draft law on public television," it Bacheng is 67 
public television's Masterpiece? Actually serve the public as a director of CTS over 68 
other provisions of public interest without written up, and the three together, just 69 
someone to circumvent the law, abuse of budgeting, coupled with the merger of China 70 
as nothing more, how can there be a benign the public of? 71 
Media scholars also blame the CTS managing team are only busy on internal 72 
fighting and clashes but has no time for a CTS version of a viable plan for "‘Gong 73 
Gong Hua’." In fact, the PTS (Public Television Station) has no intension for any type 74 
of ‘communication’ with the CTS. As an executive director, I took the initiative to meet 75 
the PTS people and then some scholars from the Campaign for Media Reform blamed 76 
me as a representative of anti- ‘Gong Gong Hua’ power from President. In the “‘Gong 77 
Gong Hua’” policy-making process, we begged policy makers to save some 78 
commercial windows/opportunities for the CTS, but found that whole ‘Gong Gong Hua’ 79 
plan has already been finalized and no room for any commercial income. The ‘Gong 80 
Gong Hua’ project is doomed as a huge waste of public money and government 81 
budget. So, before Zhao Jun Wang marries to Huns, I would also like to appeal media 82 
academics to put an ending to the “‘Gong Gong Hua’” farce. (The author is 83 
executive director of CTS) 84 
(China Times, 14/09/2005: A15) 
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Letter 3: (After four Days: 15/09/2005) 
 
CTS Is Public Goods Not Private Property 
by Wei Ti & Chad Liu 
 
We are pleased to see a commencement of discussions since Mr. Fisher respond 1 
us from a different perspective. To the opinion of Mr. Fisher, here we would like to 2 
briefly clarify and discuss more. 3 
First of all, in Mr. Fisherman’ point of view, the internal conflicts happened in the 4 
CTS seem to be common things happened in any other institutions. To avoid 5 
responsibility by drawing on this kind of logic does not help to solve current problems. 6 
In fact, in the letter we mentioned: firstly, we have no intention to judge who is right or 7 
wrong in the conflict. Secondly, now the CTS is in a transition and it is not just a private 8 
media firm so the CTS managing team should accept criticism from the public. 9 
This referred to the Government of China as the direct or indirect equity interest of 10 
seventy-four% of the data, not the author invented, including the Information Office 11 
and other research organizations have switched recognition and use of the data. 12 
"Dawn Foundation" was established by the Department of Defence funding 13 
contributions and stationed in the eight fifteen directors, is typical of authoritarian era 14 
coat of government control under the pretext of non-governmental organizations. And 15 
its main driving the media, cultural activities, not to take care of veterans, please do 16 
not accuse others knowledge, Mr. fisherman before the first check carefully. 17 
To think from this perspective, we have observed CTV problem is not just a 18 
personnel struggle, but about political control, professional autonomy, and job rights 19 
and other issues. Other media reports, the past two years, China emerged as the 20 
news department of a very high staff turnover rate, this phenomenon occurs in a basic 21 
working conditions and not too bad for media organizations because very carefully. 22 
External observation shows that one of the largest of which are in overt or covert 23 
political intervention. 24 
If the attempt of the CTS managing team to expand the news programme has 25 
nothing to do with political motive but only because of the quality of your news report is 26 
gaining more creditbility and popularity, then we are pleased to invite the public to 27 
make a public judgement on this together. In short, let Chinese Television journalists to 28 
professional autonomy, to prevent undue control system to provide the conditions for 29 
public television, was clearly superior to commercial television, namely, China 30 
proposed as physical transformation of public into the appropriateness of the means of 31 
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justification. CTS high-level infighting and public transformation, of course, related. 32 
In fact, Mr. fisherman CTS if the public really does not oppose the transformation, 33 
for our ideas, should be let alone "do nothing", at best practice are different. Media 34 
reform community's long-term advocate public broadcasting system was established 35 
that public shares processing and wireless TV sets, CTS transition issues should be 36 
"consistent with public interest and maintain a professional, caring staff" and the 37 
principle of priority three, so hurry against the Government Information Office proposed, 38 
and the misallocation of budgetary issues such as policy 9.2 billion two years, have 39 
been publicly. 40 
However, we are sorry that the CTS has not had to see a complete high-level 41 
blueprint for the reform and restructuring. If CTS is really determined to promote 42 
high-level public process, the specific claims? Staff plan to take care of that? 43 
Expectation that the development of the "business" Why? These "opportunities" for the 44 
public or the private? Should be clear. Furthermore, if the CTS 9.2 billion two-year high 45 
against the policy, why do we talk to make policy-level employees saw a news bureau 46 
to protest, while the top only with the author on the paper or the media to change 47 
social debate? Mr. Fisherman, "Zhao Jun Fan" story to describe the transformation of 48 
China as the public shows that it is still the CTS as a "private property", the goal will be 49 
the transformation of public imagination as a "sacrifice" of selfishness, is incredible. 50 
    Finally, we need to emphasise the reason why the group of Campaign for Media 51 
Reform and other social activists all support the ‘Gong Gong Hua’ proposal is because 52 
it is a solution to the over-politicized and over-commercialized media landscape in 53 
Taiwan. None of us view it as a ‘religion.’ It is a proposal and concept emerging social 54 
reforms. Historically, when someone intends to describe certain proposal or ideas form 55 
social reform as a ‘religion’ or ‘sacred mission,’ it is always proven that he is using a 56 
suppression tactic to against the idea and concept. (Wei Di Tamkang University, 57 
Assistant Professor, Department of Mass Communication, Liu Changde for the Chung 58 
Cheng University, Assistant Professor, Department of Communication Studies; they 59 
are both Campaign for Media Reform Executive Committee) 60 
 (China Times, 15/09/2005: A15) 
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Letter 4: (After five Days: 16/09/2005) 
 
Media Reform Requires Procedural Justice 
by Fisher, Executive director of CTS  
 
Although I am frustrated on the policy forcing the CTS to transform to be a public 1 
television, I would do nothing to stop it since I am not really against the Disney concept 2 
of a public television group. However, although I am frustrated with the policy, I believe 3 
there are still procedure justices held in the transformation. The CTS has been running 4 
as a private company. No matter how "improperly" the past authoritarian regime 5 
established this television and owned it as political tool, in a democratic era, the CT is 6 
a private company according to the "Company Law". Therefore, during the process of 7 
transformation from a private company to a public of the process, we have to take the 8 
procedural justice into account. Otherwise, what is the difference when there is an 9 
unprecedented change in political ruling parties while old and new regimes seem to be 10 
the same? Therefore, in order to clarify the dispute about whether the CTS is a 11 
"private property" and whether Its main shareholder, "Dawn Foundation," is the 12 
government-owned stocks, I consulted this main shareholder (Dawn Foundation) 13 
before I wrote this letter. From their view, before any lawful judgement is officially 14 
announced, the CTS remains a private company and therefore it is a private property. 15 
We cannot view the CTS by its past ‘history6’. 16 
In fact, the Chinese Television System to the public of the law must hold a shareholder 17 
meeting to obtain consent to the Board responsible for the high-level CTS, scholars, 18 
there is no active public questioning "of China as the version of" I do not understand 19 
why the Chinese keep up high-level academics as homework ? Scholars active in 20 
promoting the public of, and have actually going to figure out why the old "Public 21 
Broadcasting and Television Act", on the set of public foundations, under the 22 
Broadcasting System CEO, and then set the channel or radio station the next level 23 
general manager, then the new law but somehow The full return to the current "Public 24 
Television Foundation", and according to the part-time public television as a director of 25 
China over the post of staff unrest set off CTV,  CTS, recently held an emergency 26 
board to discuss response strategies. 27 
    Currently many challenges the CTS team need to face are really desperate. In 28 
fact it is a private firm which follows the "Firm Law" but this firm now need to manage 29 
                                                 
6 Here the writer implies it was established by the KMT government and the state by 
government budget.                                  
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many interferences: media academics assert that the CTS is not a private property; 30 
the PTS is ambitiously trying to merge us; and political interferences are endless. 31 
Although the Government Information Office (GIO) ordered the CTS to merge with 32 
PTS, in this ‘marriage’ three parties (CTS, PTS and GIO) are lack of talks. We don’t 33 
mind if the GIO has no intention to meet us, but in the GIO proposal the CTS is 34 
renamed to be the PTS 2. In this marriage we become PTS's small mistress, how can 35 
we accept this? 36 
(China Times, 16/09/2005: A15) 
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Letter 5: (After five Days: 16/09/2005) 
 
Digitalisation Can Expand PSB 
by Hui-fang Hou, Marketing Manager in PTS  
 
In Mr Fisher’s letter, ‘CTS with the Same Resentment as Zhao-Jun Wang’s’, 1 
mentioned a number of issues related to the Public Television Station, I would like to 2 
clarify some points for the PTS officially. 3 
First, the public television this in the "establishment of the mass media for the 4 
public service system, to make up for the lack of commercial television", and 5 
government departments as the group of public policy statements, the contents of the 6 
future digital channel of the plan, already initiated, end of last year and set up a task 7 
force to set out the process, master schedule. 8 
Secondly, on the rollout of digital, the Government has commissioned public 9 
television for three consecutive years for "common transmission platform for building 10 
wireless", "MHP interactive TV experiment", "DVB ─ H experimental" and "mobile TV 11 
channel test" work. The channel content planning, public television is also with experts 12 
and scholars and the community, after a number of evaluation and discussion. 13 
Furthermore, the Executive Yuan passed the "Public Broadcasting and the cultural 14 
and creative development of digital television program for two years" and "lifelong 15 
learning, knowledge and education to develop project plans," the Department for the 16 
development of the next two years by the public as the budget subsidies no direct 17 
connection with the CTS. In terms of commercial opportunities, in the current draft of 18 
"the statute regarding the disposition of government shareholdings in the terrestrial 19 
television industry", it provides some room for the terrestrial television stations to run 20 
commercial advertisement and tends to maintain the spirit of vitality and efficiency in 21 
private industries. The plan and the draft are currently waiting for the final review and 22 
decision from the Legislative Yuan. 23 
Finally, in our two-year-long plan for the public TV programming, the content about 24 
children and youth, public aesthetics, foreign language learning, and international 25 
channels, are designed to fill the gap where all commercial television stations are not 26 
able to provide. This is made to meet a high degree of public interest and needs. On 27 
the other hand, the consideration for the infrastructure for digital development laid its 28 
emphasis on the possibility to improve domestic industrial development, to accelerate 29 
the digital transformation, and to expand the range of public services. The priority of 30 
these plans needs more discussion and it is no doubt that they all need a 31 
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breakthrough progress. For these issues, we do not reckon that we are responsible for 32 
the whole balance of the media environment, but we won’t avoid any commitments 33 
and social expectations the public ask us to carry out.  34 
(China Times, 16/09/2005: A15) 35 
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